Report of the discussion held in the IPCS Conference Room on 16 October, 2006. Speakers: PR Chari, Vyjanyanti Raghavan, Jabin T. Jacob, and Alex Stolar.

PR Chari

 The implications of North Korea's first nuclear test need to be carefully analyzed. The situation will be be analyzed from the Korean, Chinese and American perspective. Since the explosion was the equivalent of only five hundred tons of TNT, people have questioned where this really was a nuclear test. There are two theories about the small size of the test. First, North Korea deliberately held a small explosion to preserve their supplies of uranium and second, the nuclear test was a failure where either the fuses were wrong- leading to a pre-detonation- or the test was a fizzle. Several questions still need to be answered : Why did North Korea decide to test its nuclear weapons? What is different after the test? Is it likely that North Korea will transfer or use its weapons? What is the threat now? How effective will the international response be? What are the implications for India?

Vyjanyanti Raghavan: The North Korean Nuclear Test and the Koreans

To understand the North Korean perception  of  the nuclear test, we should begin our analysis with the national news statement from the morning of the detonation. The statement claims that the "DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] successfully conducted an underground nuclear test." The question of whether the test was actually "successful", however,  is an  academic concern and should be left to the experts.

The real question is the intention behind the  testing of the weapon. First, North Korea wanted to show its displeasure, with the main target being the United States. The North Koreans believe that the Americans maintain double standards, having failed to meet Korean energy requirements as promised in the 1994 Agreed Framework while continually thwarting their efforts towards reunification. North Korea's repeated assertion that it is only pursuing a nuclear weapons program for deterrent purposes demonstrates that it feels threatened by the US. Second, the North Koreans used the test to demonstrate their defiance of the international community-in particular the US ; not only does the North Korean test defy the US policy of preemption but it is also a response to the Korean War.

 During the Korean War, the US used biological weapons against North Korea and  dropped blankets infected with lice and fleas. During Operation Hudson Harbor in 1954, the US simulated dropping nuclear weapons on Kim Il-Sung. Moreover, in the armistice agreement at the end of the Korean War, the US promised that there would be no nuclear weapons in the region but later, it deployed tactical nukes to South Korea. Herein, North Korea is the only nuclear aspirant to have faced an overt nuclear threat.

Returning to the Korean statement on the tests, the North Koreans asserted that the test "was conducted with a 100 percent indigenous wisdom and technology." That is clearly a questionable assertion. Moreover, the statement indicates that this "historic event" greatly pleased the Korean People's Army and "people that have wished to have powerful, self-reliant defense capability." This statement underlines the Korean preoccupation-ever since the early 1960s-with defense expenditure at the expense of the Korean people. In 1993, North Korea argued that it was entitled to nuclear weapons, and even more deadly weapons if those were invented.

The term "self-reliant" is included in the statement in order to keep the country together. Conceptually, the policy of national self-reliance is like a Korean version of Marxism; it requires no other popular motivation other than a desire to serve the nation. North Koreans are indoctrinated to follow the state unquestioningly, even if the state does not fulfill its part of the social contract.

The date of the nuclear tests is very important to the North Koreans, who are constantly reinventing their history. The 8-10th of October marks the anniversary of the founding of the party. It also marks the anniversaries of the founding of the 'Down with Imperialism Union', Kim Jong Il's accession to leadership, and a successful bombing campaign of South Korea. Moreover, Japanese Prime Minister Abe's trip to South Korea and the election of Ban Ki-Moon to the UN Secretary-General's post were also important factors explaining  the timing of the test.

What are the implications of North Korea's nuclear test? First, it will help Kim Jong Il to consolidate his power. Kim Jong-Il plays the China card very well. He knows that China wants a reformed regime and not regime change, and he is savvy enough not to push China too far. Moreover, China will be watching very closely to see how Japan reacts and there is the feeling that China has outsourced its problems with India and Japan to Pakistan and North Korea. South Korea, with its huge defense plans, will benefit from the tests, as  will Prime Minister Abe's push for Constitutional reform in Japan.

To establish a concrete solution will be difficult but several steps need to be taken. The US should avoid using derogatory terms towards North Korea that only serve to escalate tensions. Kim Jong Il can use these remarks to whip up nationalist sentiment at home. Moreover, South Korea needs to play a major role in ending the crisis. The US is too distant to understand the nuances  of North Korea. In this regard, the South Koreans can provide valuable advice.

Jabin T. Jacob: The North Korean Nuclear Test and China

With regard to China, there are four questions that arise from the North Korean nuclear test:

 1) Why, according to the Chinese, did the Koreans conduct the test?
 2) What have the Chinese reactions been?
 3) What are the implications for China?
 4) What possible action can China take?

First, according to the Chinese, the blame must be laid squarely at the American door for their hard line position. The crux of the matter is the bilateral relations between the DPRK and US. A People's Daily editorial stated that Western double standards of "not treating countries involved in nuclear development equally" was responsible for the "eating away at the moral foundation of the nonproliferation program."The timing of the North Korean test can also be explained from a Chinese angle and is probably something the Chinese themselves might not acknowledge. The strong Chinese backing for the UN resolution following the North Korean missile tests in July, probably convinced North Korea that the Chinese could no longer be counted on for support. Therefore, North Korea's "displeasure" could also have been targeted at China. Moreover, contrary to American beliefs, the Chinese have never really cut much ice with the North Koreans. China might have leverage but it has so far been unable to use it.

Second, the Chinese reactions to the test have been as follows:

• The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement stated the North Korea had "flagrantly" tested in "disregard" of the "common opposition of the international community." The same statement also said that Chinese sought "a peaceful solution through consultation and dialogue."

• Again, China's ambassador to the United Nations, Wang Guangya, statement to reporters that he thought there had to be "some punitive actions" has to be contrasted with the his rather ambiguous: "We need to have a firm, constructive, appropriate but prudent response to North Korea's nuclear threat.

• China has been "disappointed" and "angry" but all its official pronouncements have had a mix of tough talking and soft-pedaling. "The core of the issue is not nuclear weapons," as Prof. Shen Dingli, of Fudan University says but "peace and stability."

• China has learnt the hard way that it cannot draw on any goodwill from Pyongyang - the relationship has gone from good to bad and worse, rather like that between India and Bangladesh - but in slow motion. China has however, said that if it continued to provide aid to North Korea it was for the sake of the people of North Korea, not in support of its nuclear test.

• China continues to believe in the efficacy of the Six-Party Talks but supported the UN Resolution as a necessary way to respond to Pyongyang's "flagrant" behavior, but opposed a full Chapter VII resolution, which the US, Europe and Japan had called for. It has also refused to participate in interdiction operations, despite UN authorization. Ambassador Wang has stated that China would not participate in the inspection regime because it would create "conflict that could have serious implications for the region."

Third, the implications for China are as follows:

• There could be a feeling on the Chinese side that another nuclear power on its borders does not sufficiently change matters. After all, they encouraged the proliferation perfectly aware that NK would eventually acquire capacity. The Chinese must certainly have considered the possibility for a long time.

• Alternatively, if the Chinese thought that they could use the NK as a proxy threat to Japan and the US in East Asia, that purpose would have been served only if NK had continued to maintain the threat of going nuclear. That will no longer be possible. China cannot really complain if the Japanese or even the South Koreans either attack NK or go nuclear themselves. Such a scenario would put paid to "peace and stability in the neighbourhood" requirement that the Chinese would require for their "peaceful rise."

The questions that then arises is what happens on China's western frontiers, i.e China's relations with India and Pakistan. In this regard there are three possibilities:
 
 1) a quickening of the pace of negotiations on the border
 2) increased assistance - of whatever sort - to Pakistan, to complicate Indo-Pak relations but there is the possibility that this might come a cropper if
 3) the Americans decide to do something about Pakistan's own nuclear capacity

Fourth, what possible actions can China take?

It was not in China's interest that North Korea tested but it is also now not in China's interest to see North Korea being targeted. So, China has the option of going the usual route of supporting limited sanctions against North Korea. According to some estimates, China provides up to 70 percent of North Korea's fuel and food and could certainly create severe economic hardship there, if it follows the sanctions route. But it is likely that such action will be temporary and food and fuel aid are likely to resume once the initial outrage has died down. Imposition of sanctions could leave the Chinese with a refugee problem that they would not want.

For the Chinese, the first important thing they can achieve is to keep the US from being overtly involved. China sent state councilor and former Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, as emissary to Washington, to convey China's position to President Bush and his national security team. The Chinese have very clearly said that China does not side with Washington but that it stood together with the international community against nuclear proliferation.

The Chinese can also very well tell the Americans that if Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, led to a nuclear deal flouting the NPT with the former and partnership as a major non-NATO ally for another, why pick on NK? The North Korean nuclear test can be a potential turning point in Sino-US relations. If the core issue for the Chinese is that of peace and stability in the neighbourhood, they must realize that the Kim Jong-Il regime is not a contributing factor. Many Chinese analysts continue to view North Korea as a strategic asset but the Kim regime does not look amenable anymore to Chinese influence.

A very bold option for the Chinese would be to intervene in North Korea and effect a regime change. This does not have to take the form of a military intervention but can instead be a palace coup. There are certainly factions in the North Korean hierarchy that the Chinese will have some influence over and could prop up in the form of a puppet government. Call it 'intervention with Chinese characteristics.' This tough response from China, backed crucially, by the Americans is essential to send out a strong message to other proliferators and nuclear wannabes.

Why is American support crucial? First, the Americans cannot carry out a military operation as they are stretched in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two, this gives China and the US an opportunity to work together and improve relations. Three, if the Americans think that the Chinese can do anything about North Korea, this is the sort of thing that they might actually be able to effect. Without American support however, the Chinese will find it harder to justify their action under their theory of "peaceful rise." Four, unlike in Iraq, where the Americans went in without a game plan, the NK test has probably been war gamed for years by both the US and the PRC. Even if it might be asking for a bit much, combining efforts on NK is still within the realms of possibility. The decision is ultimately going to be more a political decision than a military one.

It is unlikely, however, that the Chinese will follow this course of action. Hu Jintao is not a military man and his power base in the PLA is not strong enough for him to either recommend such an action or support it if recommended by the PLA. He will not do anything that he can not completely control.

Alex Stolar: The American Perspective

From the American standpoint, the discussion must be dissected into three sections. First, why did the North Koreans test and how did we get to this point? Second, what are the strategic implications of the test? Finally, what should be the US strategy moving forward?

Several factors motivated Kim Jong Il's decision to conduct a nuclear weapons test. His strategic calculus took into account the US threat, Iraq, the upcoming US elections, his failed missile test in July, and the international response to that test. North Korea's test demonstrates a failure of US policy that spans two decades and three presidents. Although there may be some within the administration that would disagree, the broad consensus in the US policy community is that this situation probably could have been avoided.

The road to the current situation began in the early 1990s. The 1994 Agreed Framework, negotiated by the Clinton administration, ended an eighteen month crisis, in which North Korea threatened to walk away from the NPT. Pyongyang agreed to freeze construction and operation of all reactors. In return, the United States offered to provide proliferation-resistant reactors and fuel oil. Thus, between 1994 and 2002, there was no new plutonium production, no plutonium reprocessed, and no new nuclear weapons. 8,000 nuclear fuel rods were kept under lock and key.

However, in 2002, President Bush branded North Korea as part of the "axis of evil" in his January State of the Union Address-the biggest address that the President makes each year. On October 4 of the same year, North Korea admitted to a uranium enrichment program. In response, the US ended oil shipments to North Korea, leading to Pyongyang's expulsion of its IAEA inspectors. It is crucial to understand that at this point, while the Agreed Framework was falling apart, North Korea was not close to developing a uranium enrichment based bomb. However, with both parties unwilling and/or uninterested in coming to the negotiating table, no new substantive contacts took place between the two countries after September 2005.

Why did the US fail to productively engage North Korea during this crucial period? First, US inaction was caused by indecision. A debate raged within the government over the correct approach to the North Korean problem; the administration simply did not ever decide whether it favored regime change or regime behavior change in North Korea. Second, US inaction vis-à-vis North Korea was predicated on a sense of system overload. With full military mobilization taking place in Iraq, extensive involvement in Afghanistan, and a growing threat from Iran, the Bush administration was unable to deal effectively with the threat from North Korea. Finally, the Bush administration's approach was hindered by a sense that it had to do everything differently than the Clinton administration had. From Bush's point of view, Clinton had tried to negotiate and it had failed. Thus, he was determined to take a harder line on the issue.

What are the strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear test? First, from the American standpoint, this test completely changes the dynamics of the North Korean threat. No nation that has ever tested a nuclear weapon has given up the bomb. Moreover, US policy-makers see the test as increasing both political and economic insecurity in Northeast Asia. A nuclear North Korea is a nightmare for American non-proliferation efforts. North Korea has sold every weapon system that it has ever acquired, underscoring a fear in Washington that the North may sell either a bomb or nuclear technology to other countries, or worse, sub-state actors. However, some argue that now that the North's nuclear know-how has been proven effectual, North Korea will be less likely to sell this information.

Moreover, the US understands that Tehran is watching very closely to see Washington's reaction to the North's nuclear test. The US will attempt to use the North Korean case to serve as a disincentive for Iran to develop the bomb. Yet, not only does this appear unlikely to happen, but so far, it seems that North Korea's tests have actually emboldened Iranian efforts.

A third concern in Washington is that the North's test will lead to cascading proliferation in Asia with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all abandoning their non-nuclear status. In the short term, it is unlikely that any of these countries will develop the bomb. However, in the long term, Washington is concerned that these nations-or others-might reconsider their nuclear policies in the face of a North Korean threat. Some see Prime Minister Abe's steps towards constitutional revision as a harbinger of such a trend.
In turn, such concerns yield fears of a "Second Nuclear Age." A New York Times article on October 15th, cited forty countries possessing the knowledge of how to make a nuclear weapon. Although a smaller number of countries actually have the materials and technologies to do so, several US allies have recently expressed interest in beginning the enrichment process. These include Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Australia. Meanwhile, Egypt and Yemen are both embarking on new nuclear programs. If the US cannot dissuade its allies from pursuing nuclear weapons, it raises legitimate concerns that it would be unable to do so with less friendly regimes.

A "second nuclear age" could be further accelerated by a feeble NPT regime weakened by the North Korean tests, Iranian determination, and the Indo-US nuclear deal. With the prospect of North Korea selling its technology and a number of impending security dilemmas, a "second nuclear age" appears to be a distinct possibility.

However, the North's nuclear tests also provide a number of opportunities for the international community. Both Russia and China can take advantage of developments in North Korea to establish themselves as responsible stakeholders. Also, the impetus exists for improved relations between China, Japan and South Korea, with a Sino-Japanese thaw being a welcome development to the security of northeast Asia. Finally, a likely outcome of the North Korean test will be the establishment of a better relationship between the US and South Korea.

With those opportunities in mind, what will be the US strategy moving forward? US strategy towards North Korea will be shaped by the political playing field at home. The Bush administration has only two more years in office, which realistically means only a year to a year and a half of time to enact policy before the election overwhelms its foreign policy agenda. During that time period, US policy is likely to demonstrate more continuity than change. Deep divisions remain in the US community over how to deal with the North. Although there was evidence of a cross-partisan "united front" in the immediate aftermath of the test, the divisions quickly reemerged. The two front-runners for the 2008 election-Hillary Clinton and John McCain-have divergent views on the best way to handle North Korea, so US policy is likely to change quite drastically in two years' time. Until that point, US strategy can be summed up by Christopher Hill's statement that Kim Jong-Il "is really going to rue the day he made this decision."
The US will focus on three main priorities vis-à-vis North Korea. Firstly, non-proliferation; US policy-makers will go to lengths to ensure that North Korea does not sell anything. Secondly, the US will focus on deterring North Korea from using its bomb. Finally, US policy will continue to operate with regime change as its ultimate objective.

Regarding the UN Security Council Resolution towards North Korea's test, the US sought to ensure a resolution with teeth. However, the resolution does not contain everything that the US wanted. According to the US, the UN sanctions are inadequate, which raises the question: was the US overly optimistic about China and Russia? However, US strategy will continue to pursue the six-party talks framework with the hope that this will lead to substantive results and provide North Korea with an alternative to its chosen course.

Meanwhile, the US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, has indicated that steps will be taken to increase financial pressure on Kim Jong Il's regime. Although the UNSC resolution does not include measures that would crackdown on money laundering, counterfeiting, and selling of narcotics, the US will likely push such a strategy unilaterally. As Ambassador Bolton has said, "I think the North Korean population has been losing height and weight over the years. Maybe this will be a little diet for Kim Jong-il." An IAEA inspections regime will also be pushed although it is unlikely that anything will materialize.

North Korea's test will also have an impact on the Indo-US nuclear deal, although it will probably be less than what is being portrayed in New Delhi. In fact, it may be a blessing in disguise if India does not get a vote on the deal in November. Politicians in Washington have short memories and by the spring session, non-proliferation arguments will have likely subsided.

Discussion

• The Indian nuclear test was a 5.6 on the Richter scale and the outside world said it was a 5. North Korea's test was a 4.5-a few kilotons at best. It was not , however, a bogus test.  If he needed 500 tons of TNT and those TNT trucks only carry 5 tons, then he would have needed 100 trucks. There is no way this could have happened though it could however be a "fizzle".

• This will have a big impact on the US-Indo nuclear deal. The situation will become more intense as all the politicians who weren't that interested before will be expected to take a stance. It is perhaps better to let it wait until the spring before a vote.

• The reason that China is against regime change is the fear of refugees pouring into their country. They also don't want the US getting involved because they don't want a US presence that close to their border. In addition, India does not want a later vote on the US nuclear deal because it will never go through a Democratic Congress. However, perhaps it will make the US more understanding of the importance of the Indo-US deal.

• It doesn't matter what we think about the timing of the US vote on the nuclear deal because we have no control this issue. The US legislative process is a juggernaut. Moreover, one more nuclear power is not a big deal but a clandestine program or sales would be a serious issue.

• North Korea is a cult masquerading as a nation-state. How do we deal with a cult-is there any new thinking on this? Iran, on the other hand, is a nation-state with institutions. How are we going to deal with that? Is anyone thinking about classical theories of deterrence?

• Why should India pass value judgments when we are no better than them vis-à-vis the NPT? Is anyone trying to expose Pakistan's role in all of this?

• There are two major problems with sanctions. First, they punish the people and not the leaders. Second, neighboring states and provinces are always difficult to deal with, but in this case, the neighbors are the biggest trade partners. What can be done about this?

• Double standards are the biggest problem. What if Japan goes nuclear? There are no good options now.

• From the US perspective there are two variables that will shape the likelihood of a vote on the nuclear deal in November. The first is the outcome of the election and the second if the length of the session. The implications for Iran are very important and, keeping with this, Secretary Rice has just left on a trip to Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing and Moscow. There needs to be an Indo-US dialogue on Iran. The US will need to always play a role in northeast Asia, but India should also be involved. There is a growing dialogue between the US, Japan, and India

Responses:

Vyjanyanti Raghavan

What physical counter-measures has North Korea been threatened with? This is similar to the early nineties when the US threatened sanctions and the Koreans said that sanctions would be a declaration of war. This is history repeating itself. There is also the possibility of a second test where this first test was a deliberate move to bring everyone back to the topic-to keep the crisis simmering. Moreover, the US needs to be more subtle in its approach to different countries and their  needs. The US should not disassociate itself from the problem. Most importantly, the solution needs to lie in regional cooperation.

Jabin T Jacob

For the Americans, tough action on North Korea is imperative to send a clear, unambiguous signal to the Iranians but that again does not mean that a military option is the only way or that something like a palace coup can be effective in Iran. Iran is a different kind of problem and will need a different solution. Moreover, it is still not too late for the Americans to find a reasonable way out of Iranian impasse.

Bush needs to act tough on North Korea, but that does not mean that the US necessarily knows the best way to solve the problem. Still, there are options that the American can use. If the Chinese continue to go slow on North Korea, one way of calling the Chinese bluff would be if the US were to walk out of the Six-Party Talks and perhaps even out of East Asia itself as soon as possible. That would leave the Chinese grasping for control in the region, at least 20 years before they are ready.

This is also perhaps a good time for the Japanese to step up to the plate. The North Korean action proves Shinzo Abe right on his uncompromising stand toward that country. It also allows him to improve relations with China and South Korea as well as  pursue his country's 'normalization' with greater support domestically and with a little less opposition from Japan's neighbours. Certainly, if Japan wishes to go nuclear, this is the best possible time to do so without facing a high level of international opprobrium. However, if they did this in response to North Korea it could conceivably be taken as equating Tokyo with Pyongyang, while Abe's Japan is actually trying to become a stronger player at the global level. The Japanese are unlikely to go nuclear on account of domestic compulsions. However, they will obviously not hesitate to act if they find that they are being threatened. The possibility of hasty US action on the Korean Peninsula, may well draw the Chinese, Japanese and the South Koreans together in an East Asian coalition, uneasy as it maybe.

Alex Stolar

This all goes to the heart of India's role in the world. India has pledged to play a leading role on non-proliferation. Not just a supporting role, but a leading role. India should go to Iran and take a leading role in settling the crisis there. China is backing away from the UN resolution, but perhaps it will do what it always does and put quiet pressure on the North Koreans. As an American, we definitely see China as the most influential power in North Korea.

True, we have double standards. And true, it is not fair. However, it is better to be unfair than to allow a dangerous situation to persist. We need double standards to make the world a safer place.