Kim Jong Il, the reclusive dictator of North Korea, finally called the bluff of the international community last week with a nuclear test. The test constitutes a grave challenge to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, led by the United States . The US has repeatedly declared that a nuclear North Korea was unacceptable and that it would use all means at its disposal, including military, to prevent it from going nuclear. China, the chief patron of the North Korean regime, is equally challenged by this development as it could lead to an arms race in Northeast Asia, with Japan , South Korea, and even Taiwan, likely to go nuclear . This would have deleterious consequences for China's security in Asia.

The North Korean test raises a broad question fundamental to the dynamic of contemporary international politics: What is the relevance and utility of force in contemporary international politics? Answering this question would shed light on North Korean actions and the behavior of other states like Iran who aspire to acquire nuclear weapon capability.

The end of the Cold War, as many analysts have pointed out, saw a dramatic transformation in the nature of international politics. Earlier, the international system was distinguished by a primacy accorded to force in interstate relations and was dominated by the great power rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons were their symbol of power and influence.However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, as per these analysts, has paved the way for a new world order dominated by a search for peace, conflict resolution, and a substantially diminished role of force as a principal tool for nation states to achieve their foreign and security policy goals. Nuclear weapons had absolutely no role to play in such a changed international environment.

The North Korean test has, proved them completely wrong. Though it seemed that force, embodied in nuclear weapons, had lost its utility and relevance in international politics after the end of the Cold war, it is actually not the case and never has been the case. At least the North Korean leadership did not believe that nuclear weapon capabilities had no role to play in international politics. If one peruses the North Korean thinking and behavior on the nuclear issues in recent years, it is very clear that North Korea did envisage a significant role for their nuclear weapon capabilities in furthering their foreign and security policy goals.

First and foremost, North Korea saw nuclear weapons as providing it the necessary security vis-?-vis the increasingly belligerent United States. The Bush administration had included North Korea in the 'axis of evil' after the 9/11 terror attacks and, its new National Security Strategy openly called for regime change with preemption as the primary mechanism to achieve this goal. North Korea's repeated calls for security guarantees from the US, in return for abandoning its nuclear weapons program, failed to elicit any US response. US' invasion of Iraq further strengthened the resolve of Kim Jong Il to secure himself and his regime by openly defying the US. He, thus, initially withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and later conducting a nuclear test. China, its only patron, had been increasingly putting pressure on North Korea to seek reconciliation with the US by putting an end to its nuclear program. Thus, the primary rationale behind the North Korean test was to seek nuclear security vis-à-vis the US.

It has to be kept in mind, however, that North Korea did not seek nuclear weapons only to mitigate its nuclear security concerns vis-?-vis the US. An equally significant motivation was to use its nuclear weapon capabilities as a leverage to increase its overall power and influence in Northeast Asia, and beyond, by ending its pariah status in the international system. It sought to do this by, paradoxically, seeking "normal" relations with the US - the sole superpower today. This meant an increasing access to US aid, trade, commerce and technology. An economically stagnant and starved North Korea sought to enhance its overall place in the region by strengthening its economy. The North Korean negotiating stance clearly reflected this desire to break out of all the embargoes- arms, technology, aid and trade- and an acquisition of nukes provided them the most significant leverage to do so. Understanding this dynamic is crucial for evolving a strategy dealing with the aftermath of the North Korean test.

In conclusion, the North Korean test offers significant lessons for international politics theoreticians and practitioners alike. If one has to deal with such states, it is very important to understand the relevance and utility of force, depicted in the "absolute weapon" viz., nuclear weapons, in contemporary international politics.