Is Afghanistan the Next Afghanistan?
16 Oct, 2006 · 2136
Alex Stolar examines five trends that point to an increasingly ungovernable and insecure Afghanistan.
In August, the Council on Global Terrorism released a report which posited that Afghanistan may become the next Afghanistan. Their paradoxical question implies that present day Afghanistan may again become a terrorist sanctuary, just as it was before 9/11. Prior to 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda was able to organize attacks upon America because it could train and coordinate from ungoverned regions in Afghanistan. The war to topple the Taliban eliminated Afghanistan as a terrorist sanctuary. After Tora Bora, Bin Laden retreated to the safe haven of the Afghan-Pakistani border. However, developments in the last month suggest that Afghanistan is indeed becoming a terrorist sanctuary, and the next Afghanistan. This article examines five disturbing trends, each of which points to an increasingly ungovernable and insecure Afghanistan.
Trend 1: Iraq. Most ironically, one of the most significant reasons Afghanistan is again becoming a terrorist sanctuary is Iraq. The Bush administration's singular focus on Iraq has prevented the devotion of time, attention, and resources to Afghanistan. It is unrealistic to expect that troop levels similar to those deployed in Iraq will be committed to Afghanistan. At the same time, an infusion of American soldiers would no doubt help stabilize an increasingly dire security situation.
Trend 2: Resurgence of the Taliban. After the 2001 war, the Taliban was feeble. Now it is back, and with force. In addition to its safe haven along the Durrand Line, NATO forces are deeply fearful that the Taliban will establish new strong holds in south and west Afghanistan. Recent clashes with NATO troops in these regions highlight two facts. The first is that relatively well coordinated and equipped Taliban forces will continue to threaten NATO forces and the Afghani government. The second is that the newly potent Taliban will keep sending body bags back to Western nations, thereby testing the West's willpower.
Trend 3: Impotence of the Karzai government. As the Taliban has strengthened, Karzai's power has declined. After Karzai's election, his government made several important achievements. At the peak of Karzai's power, over two million Afghan girls were in school, social services were provided to the citizenry, and infrastructure development projects were underway. These gains have all been reversed. Taliban acid attacks on schoolgirls as well as arson attacks on schools signal a major setback to Karzai's education initiatives. Likewise, Afghanistan's already minute educated middle class is leaving the nation in droves to seek opportunities in other nations. Similarly, power cuts, especially over the past summer, reached new highs.
Most of all, the Karzai government seems unable to provide basic security for its people. NGOs are fleeing Afghanistan. Poppy cultivation is at an all time high, providing upwards of 90% of the world's opium. And the Afghani people are deeply fearful of the Taliban. The Taliban, and not the Karzai government, is dominating daily life in Afghanistan. With the Taliban, and not the legitimate government, controlling the state of play, the prospects that Afghanistan will once again become a terrorist sanctuary increase dramatically.
Trend 4: Pakistani interference in Afghanistan. President Bush's optimistic rhetoric encouraging President Musharraf and President Karzai to cooperate in the fight against terror belies a more grim reality. There is little doubt that Pakistan is providing at least tacit support for the Taliban and Al Qaeda as evidenced by the recent Waziristan peace deal between Taliban militants and the Pakistani government. Whether Pakistan is providing additional support to attacks within Afghanistan is another question. Many American analysts and President Karzai suggest this is the case. Pakistan denies aiding the Taliban at all.
Several facts, however, are clear. Without a robust Pakistani effort to make sure the Durrand Line does not provide safe haven for the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the security situation in Afghanistan will continue to deteriorate. Additionally, President Bush does not have the power to influence Pakistan's approach to Afghanistan. Moreover, besides perfunctory meetings with Karzai and Musharraf, the President seems wholly focused on Iraq. Few believe Bush's attempts to get Karzai and Musharraf on the same page will result in substantive improvements in Afghanistan or along the Durrand Line. In short, Pakistani policy is making the security situation in Afghanistan worse, not better, and is unlikely to change.
Trend 5: Decreasing international attention on and support for Afghanistan. The NATO led forces continue to wage fierce battles against Taliban troops. As the casualty tolls mount, especially among the Canadian, Polish, and Italian troops, the staying power of the Western nations comes into question. It is unclear, as well, whether the pledges of aid and support from the G-8 and EU will be fulfilled. At a time when the need is most critical, the commitment to a stable Afghanistan is waning.
Read together, these five trends paint a potentially disastrous picture. No one, save the Taliban and Al Qaeda, will be better off if Afghanistan becomes a terrorist sanctuary. There may still be time to stabilize Afghanistan, and to prevent history from repeating itself. But such a prospect appears bleak without a massive recommitment to Afghanistan by the US, the West, and the Afghani people themselves. Five years after 9/11, Afghanistan is becoming the next Afghanistan.