The month of July was notable in Sino-Indian relations for the reopening of the Nathu La on the Tibet-Sikkim border but the same month also saw the foreign ministers of China, Myanmar and Bangladesh meeting on the sidelines of the 13th ASEAN Regional Forum in Kuala Lumpur, and agreeing to the construction of a highway linking Kunming to Chittagong in Bangladesh via Mandalay in Myanmar. With the Qinghai-Tibet railway fully operational, and plans for rail connectivity between Lhasa and Kunming via the eastern Tibetan town of Nyingchi already on the anvil, Tibet will have another access to the Indian Ocean. While the Myanmarese have all along been reluctant to go along with the road project and despite the postponement of the October visit of the Bangladesh Foreign Minister to Myanmar - one of the key outcomes of the visit would have been an agreement on the road link - the declaration in Kuala Lumpur shows it is unlikely that Myanmar will hold out much longer.

The implications for India of Chinese-driven infrastructure development in its border areas and particularly the Bangladesh-Myanmar-China road link are many. Bangladesh is undoubtedly the victim of a 'Pakistan' state of mind where relations with India are concerned and is employing some of that country's methods as well. To reverse this process, the greater effort must undoubtedly be made by India. The latter may hope for a more friendly government in Dhaka following elections to the Bangladeshi parliament in January next year but the rejuvenation of India's northeast - closely tied to reviving pre-Partition links in the region - requires some serious rethink on what India itself must do to improve its relations with Bangladesh. While New Delhi may well complain of Dhaka's intransigence, the latter might play ball if, for example, India were to allow Nathu La to be a conduit for Bangladeshi goods as well. This could serve as the beginning for the renewal of rail links between India and Bangladesh and of efforts to access to India's northeast via Bangladesh. India will have to move very fast on this approach for the opening of the Chittagong road link to Kunming will likely be more worthwhile for Bangladesh in the longer run. Needless, to say current Indian apathy on trade through Nathu La, as is evident from complaints from both Chinese and Sikkimese traders, is no help.

Ruksana Kibria, professor of international relations at the University of Dhaka, has argued that Bangladesh ought to promote Chinese geopolitical goals in South Asia, as this would help maintain the regional balance of power. She admits however, that the Sino-Bangladeshi relationship is significant only in relation to Sino-Indian competition in South Asia and that it is a largely of a politico-military nature. Herein lie also the seeds of a larger lack of sustainability of the relationship, something India should take advantage of, while there is still time.

India's chances with Myanmar are brighter even though the Chinese projection into Myanmar may be far stronger than with respect to Bangladesh. Myanmar remains wary about Chinese intentions and India is already engaged in both overt and covert competition with the Chinese in that country. In addition, to deal with insurgents operating from across the border, the Indian army Vice-Chief admitted recently that India had started transferring military hardware to Myanmar. Joint operations between the two armies are also foreseen, if they are not already underway. In striking a deal with the military junta, democratic India seems to have taken its lessons on 'pragmatism' from the British and the Americans

For Bangladesh's economic development improving its relationship with India is imperative and similarly, for Myanmar, closer political ties with India are necessary to balance the Chinese but India too need not sulk at the emerging Sino-Bangladesh relationship nor think that 'pragmatic' compromise on democratic values is the only way to deal with Chinese presence in Myanmar. India must look at means of ensuring that its northeastern region benefits from the geopolitics of the region. This would mean extending a greater say to the northeastern states themselves in India's Look East policy - something that New Delhi has been reluctant to allow so far. Perhaps, Guwahati ought to be the new centre for decision making in this regard. And if decision making were devolved to the northeastern states, India would also perhaps find its engagement with Bangladesh and Myanmar smoothened at several levels. With economic revitalization a key demand of the northeast populace and this being of necessity tied to forging greater links to both countries, the onus would now be on the state capitals in the northeast to improve local law and order and deal with separatist questions. If in all these years, New Delhi has been unable to solve political problems in the region with heavy-handed measures, it is perhaps time to try something new. True, the internal security establishment in New Delhi is likely to baulk at the likely changes to policy formulation and implementation, and indeed to prevailing mindsets, that this entails but as Sanjib Baruah says, "reconciling the demands of a globalizing economy that relies on greater opening with security concerns is a policy dilemma that many governments face today." And it is not a dilemma that New Delhi can escape from by the mere expediency of continuing with the status quo whether in the northeast or elsewhere.