This article is written in response to Arun Vishwanathan's reply on "Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation," a rebuttal to "India at Crossroads," written by this author. It should be stated at the outset that closer Indo-US ties would benefit both countries. Likewise, if the nuclear deal falls through, the damage to the Indo-US relationship will cost both nations dearly. Notwithstanding these points, a close examination of Vishwanathan's argument and supporting contentions is in order.

It is heartening to see that his reply accepts the central premise of "India at a Crossroads," that India has important decisions to make about the nuclear deal specifically and its place in the world generally. Whether one calls this decision-making a "cost-benefit" analysis as Vishwanathan does or a "crossroads" or merely an evaluation of different policy options, it is clear that India has decisions to make-and these decisions will be consequential for India, the subcontinent, and the entire world.

Now, for Vishwanathan's subsidiary contentions. First, his argument that the nuclear deal furthers America's strategic interests. Which ones? America gains little from the nuclear deal. America's foremost foreign policy priority is non-proliferation, and the deal will likely cause tremendous damage to the non-proliferation regime. America only benefits from the nuclear deal if India, in the unlikely scenario, decides to uphold its pledge to play a leading role on non-proliferation.

Second, it is true, as Vishwanathan asserts, that the US has an interest in countering a rising China. Yet he unrealistically suggests India will act as America's "regional counterbalance to a rising China." A challenge to Vishwanathan: Find one senior Indian official who will go on record saying India desires to be America's counterbalance to China.

Third, Vishwanathan's assertions about Iran. He writes that in completing the nuclear deal, America is "gaining an important ally on the Iran issue." He suggests later that with regard "to being reticent on the Iranian nuclear program, the Indian government's actions cannot be described as reticent by any stretch of imagination." He correctly points out that India voted against Iran at the IAEA. But let's look at the facts.

It is a poorly held secret that Indian diplomats told their American counterparts in Geneva that they would only support a watered down IAEA resolution on Iran's nuclear program. However, do not take this author's word for it that India was reticent on the Iranian nuclear program. The first paragraph of India's own statement on its IAEA vote speaks for itself: "The Indian delegation has studied the draft resolution tabled by the EU-3 yesterday. There are elements in the draft which we have difficulty with?finding Iran non-compliant in the context of Article XII-C of the Agency's Statute is not justified."

Fourth, Vishwanathan makes two interrelated points about India's purportedly "responsible" nuclear record and its right to test weapons in the future. Stated plainly, if India is unwilling to foreswear nuclear testing forever, it is not responsible, and undeserving of American nuclear assistance.

Significantly, as well, Vishwananthan claims, "India has been a responsible state and possesses a clean non-proliferation track record. This is the reason that the US did not extend a similar deal to Pakistan?" He falls victim to a logic which is quite common in India. It goes like this: India's non-proliferation record is better than Pakistan's, therefore India has a "clean" non-proliferation record.

It is time to call this logic what it is-fatally flawed-and to talk plainly about what India has and has not done. Dr David Albright has rightly posited that one should think of non-proliferation as a spectrum. There are states with clean records, states that have acted responsibly at times and irresponsibly at others, and states that are proliferators.

India is somewhere in the middle. India's illicit diversion of American nuclear assistance for its bomb program and its 1974 nuclear weapon test were the reason the Nuclear Suppliers Group was formed in the first place. Likewise, India's 1998 weapon tests did great harm to the non-proliferation regime. Nor can one overlook the fact that seven Indian entities have been sanctioned by the US State Department for nuclear misdeeds in the past twenty months. A clean Indian non-proliferation track-record? Hardly.

Lastly, Vishwanathan's claims that India has not been wary or dismissive of the IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Proliferation Security Initiative simply cannot be reconciled with the facts. If India is not wary of the IAEA, then why is it unwilling to put more nuclear facilities under safeguards? Does he not realize that many NSG member states opposed the nuclear deal because it could potentially destroy the NSG? Finally, if Prime Minister Singh's description of the Proliferation Security Initiative as "extraneous" to Indian foreign policy was not dismissive, then what was it?

The Indo-US nuclear deal will have a tremendous impact on India and America. Whether this impact has been thoughtfully considered in New Delhi or Washington is unclear. However, careful evaluation of the agreement cannot occur unless one faces the facts of the nuclear deal.