This article attempts to address a critical weakness of the Bonn Accords. While the Accords were successful in setting up a parliamentary system of government, Afghanistan, it has significantly failed to achieve the treaty's ultimate goal of ending the conflict and establishing peace and security in the country. One answer to this contradiction could be the uneven development of Security Sector Reform (SSR), which had been a cornerstone of the Bonn Process, initiated in December 2001. The ability of the Taliban to operate on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border means that there is an urgent need to deploy indigenous security forces that are familiar, not only with the geographical landscape of the region, but also, with its cultural and linguistic nuances. The argument being put forward is that the current status of SSR is hindered by a lack of an integrated approach. The mentoring of Afghan security forces by different member countries of the Bonn Process is obstructing the interoperability of Afghanistan's nascent security forces and has several implications for political stability in the region.

The Bonn Accords of December 2001 laid the foundations for a democratic process in Afghanistan. The Tokyo conference of donors in January 2002 initiated the reform process in the security sector. Ultimately two donor's conferences, held in April and May 2002, formalized the SSR program for Afghanistan. The SSR consists of five "pillars": the building of the Afghan National Army (ANA); the building of the Afghan National Police (ANP); the establishment of a counter-narcotics force; the initiation of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process; and the establishment of a viable justice system. While the United States is leading military reform, the police program is being supervised by Germany and Britain, Japan and Italy are supervising counter-narcotics, DDR and justice respectively.

According to the "UN Secretary General's Report on the Situation in Afghanistan" (March 2006), the strength of the ANA was estimated at 26,900 personnel, while the ANP consisted of approximately 54,000 officers and included both regular and border police. The ANA is ultimately projected to consist of 70,000 personnel, distributed in five regional commands by 2010, while the ANP is to consist of 62,000 fully trained officers. Despite these projections there are certain inherent qualitative difficulties that hamper the full development of SSR. Of the 54,000 police officers on the payroll of the newly established Ministry of Interior, the UN estimates that 70% are illiterate and primarily consist of former militia members. While the ANA has attempted to field some operational kandaks (battalions) in counter-insurgency roles, alongside coalition forces, they have enjoyed limited success because of the lack of: training (currently recruits undergo an expedited 10-week course), logistical support, advanced heavy weaponry and funds (the ANA is completely dependent on the Coalition for paying its soldiers). The strength of the ANA and ANP must be contextualized because of the proliferation of "illegal armed groups" that form competing sources of authority for the nascent military and police force.

Illegal armed groups now include militias of local government officials and politicians as well as members of the resurgent Taliban and various criminal elements, who exercise a large degree of authority outside the administrative capital Kabul. An attempt has been made to link the DDR program to the electoral arena, whereby, candidates standing for provincial and parliamentary council elections could be disqualified for leading or belonging to "illegal armed groups." In 2005, 34 candidates were disqualified, while 124 candidates submitted 4,857 weapons to electoral authorities in order to qualify. In September 2005, the Joint Secretariat of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission compiled a list of 450 government officials, who were suspected of having links to "illegal armed groups." Of these, only 13 were actually confirmed and ordered to disarm voluntarily. Of the 13, 8 handed over 1,080 weapons, while 4 were removed and 1 died. Currently the remaining 437 are still under investigation. By February 2006, 17,655 weapons had been handed over to the government since the initiation of DDR in 2002.

Although the international community had reaffirmed the importance of SSR during the London Conference of 2006, which resulted in the establishment of the Joint Afghan-International Coordinating and Monitoring Board, ANA and ANP training is still continuing under donor supervision. The awarding of a contract to train Afghan National, Border and Anti-narcotic police, to a US corporation, DynCorp, alongside German supervisors, not only added to the complexity of international mentoring, but also led to a series of doctrinal and operational problems. Moreover, with the expansion of the narcotic trade SSR has assumed grave urgency. In conclusion, it can be said that the intensity of the conflict in Afghanistan will continue till the US and NATO forces are engaged in performing duties that should be the responsibility of the ANA and ANP.