In June 2006, the Indo-US nuclear deal was endorsed by overwhelming majorities in key Congressional committees over the objections of the US non-proliferation lobby. For many Indians, the non-proliferation lobby is a source of bewilderment and disappointment. Why do American non-proliferation experts oppose the agreement, given India's impeccable non-proliferation record, vibrant democracy, and promising future? This article attempts to explain why many in the US non-proliferation community oppose this nuclear partnership.

To understand them, consider the deep and lasting impact of 9/11 on the American psyche. Americans are constantly reminded of the horrors of that September day when they ride the train to work, read the newspaper or fly on an airplane. For defense strategists, this fear is more profound than the average Americans' dread of Osama Bin Laden. Non-proliferation experts fear catastrophic nuclear terrorism. Indeed, Sam Nunn, dean of the non-proliferation community, began a recent article on the nuclear deal emphasizing that it would make America more susceptible to nuclear terrorism. Nunn's view is widely held. Senator Richard Lugar commissioned a 2005 survey of 85 American national security experts. On average, they believed there was nearly a 30 per cent probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion in the next ten years.

This fear of nuclear terrorism has suggested a simple policy prescription in the non-proliferation lobby: less is better than more, and what exists must be secured. That is, fewer bombs is better than more; less highly enriched uranium is better than more; and the bombs and HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) that exist must be protected from theft or illicit transfer. For the American non-proliferation community, the Indo-US nuclear deal runs counter to their principles. It is likely the new US-Indian nuclear partnership will lead to more bombs and more HEU being produced. Indian strategists counter that India has a superb non-proliferation record. This is indeed true, and if the revisions to the Atomic Energy Act were only about India there would be little opposition from the non-proliferation lobby. However, these experts believe the nuclear deal will encourage Pakistan to increase its nuclear arsenal and production of HEU.

For these experts, this means more nuclear materials with the Pakistani government despite its infamous history of proliferation, poor export controls, and support for terrorism. Unsurprisingly, for the US national security establishment, scarred by 9/11, dangerous materials in dangerous hands is a deadly combination. Recollect that most American non-proliferation experts live in Washington, which is a short subway ride from the Pentagon that was attacked on 9/11. It is understandable that members of the non-proliferation lobby - living in a city that is al-Qaeda's top target - would oppose an agreement which increases the likelihood of nuclear terrorism in their hometown.

The non-proliferation lobby has an additional concern. US non-proliferation experts believe the agreement will cause other nations to seek similar concessions from America. Sam Nunn has cautioned that the US will be hard pressed to deny similar agreements to countries like Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Japan. Like ripples emanating from a stone thrown into a pond, American strategists fear that such agreements will lead to more HEU production the world over that must be carefully guarded, lest it end up in a bomb in Manhattan or Washington.

A final point should be made about the perspective of the American non-proliferation lobby. Much has been written in the Indian press about the "opposition" of the non-proliferation lobby to the deal. "Opposition" is the wrong word. Even the most vehement members of the non-proliferation lobby realize that the agreement cannot be scrapped as the cost to US-India relations would be prohibitive. Many members of the community desire substantial changes in the deal. Some want more reactors under safeguards; others hope India will sign the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; still others want India to help curb Iran's nuclear program. In any event, it is unlikely that these demands will materialize.

The American non-proliferation lobby has been branded as "non-proliferation ayatollahs" and compared to religious extremists. Their stance on the nuclear deal has been a source of frustration for many Indian strategists. Indian policymakers may agree or disagree with them; however, if Indian policymakers look closely at the perspectives of the US non-proliferation lobby, they will find much common ground. In fact, close examination will reveal a community of scholars whose world view is shaped by terrorism, and who are seeking to protect their country from catastrophe.