As the Oslo talks did not succeed, Norway was forced to 'go back to the basics' by asking the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the LTTE on 8 June 2006 to respond to five questions in 15 days:

1. Will the parties stand committed to the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 22 February 2002?

2. Do the parties want the continued existence and operation of the SLMM as a mission coordinated, facilitated and led by the Royal Norwegian Government with diplomatic immunity to ensure its impartial operation?

3. Are the parties able to provide full security guarantees for all monitors, employees and physical assets of the SLMM in all situations, in accordance with CFA Article 3.9?

4. Will the parties accept amendments to CFA Article 3.5 to enable the continued functioning of the SLMM at its current operational level with the necessary security guarantees?

5. In the event that amendments to Article 3.5 are made, will the parties provide full security guarantees for current SLMM personnel and assets during a six-month transition phase until another solution has been identified, decided and fully implemented?

Norway categorically declared that the next steps in the facilitation would be determined by the responses to these questions by the two parties. Both parties having submitted their answers, it is pertinent to assess the situation in the light of their responses.

Commitment to CFA
Both the GOSL and the LTTE have reiterated their commitment to the CFA, which provides a tiny ray of hope in the prevailing gloomy environment. What is important, however, is for them to demonstrate this commitment on the ground. The present upsurge in violence is mainly due to their lack of commitment. Both parties, therefore, have to keep their promises made at Geneva in February 2006 instead of flexing their muscles and trading charges against each other. The next step should be to proceed with the next round of Geneva talks, originally scheduled for April 2006 to strengthen the CFA.

Existence and Operation of SLMM
Both parties have expressed their confidence in the SLMM, but the LTTE has objected to the presence of monitors from the EU countries--Sweden, Finland and Denmark as their "monitoring would be skewed as a result of the EU ban" on the Tigers. The LTTE has given one month's time starting 19 June to replace the monitors from EU countries. The GOSL has objected to any change in the SLMM's composition. Any change would necessitate amendment of clause 3.5 of the CFA that reads "the SLMM shall be composed of representatives from Nordic countries." Three options are available: to hire all 57 monitors from Iceland and Norway (they contribute 20 monitors at present); to search for new countries acceptable to the GOSL and LTTE to replace the shortfall of 37 monitors; or to reduce the areas of monitoring. At this time the need is for more intensive monitoring; hence the last option is ruled out. The first two options carry their own problems of excessively burdening Norway and Iceland, and the availability of new countries to contribute the monitors.

The LTTE's argument that monitors from EU countries have suddenly become "partial" is unsustainable. The Nordic countries were preferred over others because of their neutral stand in world affairs. Since its establishment in February 2002, the SLMM members have functioned impartially, not as citizens of a particular country, but as members of a neutral Monitoring Mission. By insisting on its reconfiguration, the LTTE is further weakening its case to gain international legitimacy. Instead of being obdurate, the LTTE can wait for six months as sought by Norway to see the functioning of monitors from the EU countries. This suggestion may not have occurred to the LTTE, as its sole purpose in adopting an anti-EU posture is to pressure the EU to lift the ban.

Safety of Monitors
Despite both parties agreeing to guarantee the security of the SLMM members, this is a matter of grave concern for two reasons. First, the CFA does not bind the host of 'invisible hands' allied to both parties. These proxy forces enjoy immense power, but without responsibility. The attack on the Batticaloa SLMM office in January 2006 was by one such proxy. Security guarantees by both parties, therefore, must include safety from these proxies. Secondly, the dispute on sovereignty over the seas between the GOSL and the LTTE remains. Unless, this dispute is resolved, sea monitoring will be hazardous for the SLMM monitors. But, basically the safety of the monitors will be assured as long as the sanctity of CFA is respected by the antagonists in Sri Lanka.