Pakistan Army’s Strategy in Kashmir
16 Jun, 1999 · 205
Maj Gen Ashok Krishna, AVSM (Retd) points out how the present aggression in LoC is not a stray incident but part of a much larger game plan...
There is a grand design behind
Pakistan
’s transgression of the Line of Control [LoC] in the Ladakh region of
Jammu and Kashmir
[J & K]. This Line has never been violated in the last 27 years. The LoC Agreement is enshrined in 19 mosaics and 27 maps signed on December 11, 1972 . They depict the terrain and there is no scope for errors in recognising key features. The first step in elementary map reading is to relate ‘map to ground’ and vice versa.
Pakistan
was well aware of the LoC’s alignment when it downed Indian aircraft and directed artillery fire onto Indian positions and roads.
India
by inducting trained militants belonging to fundamentalist Muslim organisations. Kashmiri youth were enticed with money and false promises to go to
Pakistan
for training and induction. The Pak Army had contacted the J & K Liberation Front [JKLF], which agreed to cooperate on the condition that
Kashmir
would be granted independence after Indian control ceased over the State.
Pakistan
elements who made it a pro- Islamic movement and raised the slogan of
Kashmir
’s accession to
Pakistan
. The Kashmiri youth saw through
Pakistan
’s deceit and disassociated themselves from it. It was the population of J & K imbued as it has always been with the spirit of Kashmiriat [ a secular outlook, lack of bigotry, and above all generosity in the spiritual sense] that defeated
Pakistan
’s plans. By 1997 the situation was well under control to enable the government to hold elections.
India
and
Pakistan
not to escalate tensions. Some Indian defence analysts believed that nuclear weapons would preclude a conventional war and lead to settlement of the J & K issue along the existing LoC. In the last two or three years, it has become clear to Pakistan that, in the Indian state of J & K, a mere 10 percent of the population wish to join Pakistan; the rest would opt for autonomy within the Indian Union. What is worse the Kashmiris in Pak Occupied Kashmir [POK], having been denied political and economic freedom for 50 years, desire to break loose.
Pakistan
to induct some 2000 to 3000 mercenaries all over J & K and whip up a fresh wave of insurgency. Initial success would provide the impetus to the Pak Army to breach the LoC at other points. The overly stretched Indian security forces, unable to thwart this two pronged invasion, would continue to lose control, and
Pakistan
would be finally able to internationalise the J & K issue.
Pakistan
is the sole preserve of the Pak Army. Interference and opposition is not countenanced.
Delhi
talks. Infiltration will continue and the proxy war will go on.
India
will find it very hard to trust
Pakistan
again. The Indian Army is coming out with flying colours, yet it is exercising remarkable restraint in keeping the conflict localised. Although
Pakistan
has found little support abroad for its misadventure, the J& K issue has been internationalised. It will not be long before the
United States
and other Western powers begin to declare they cannot play the role of mere onlookers.
It was President Zia-ul Haq who chalked out the strategy for insurgency in J & K in 1985. His intention was to inspire a popular uprising against
As insurgency picked up, the Pak Army engineered a split in the JKLF and went back on its commitment to an Azad Kashmir. The control of anti- Indian operations later passed on to pro –
May 1998 saw the nuclear tests and pressure on both
Thus, the Pak Army had to do something quickly to defuse the situation. It consequently, shifted to a military approach. The essence of this strategy was to use the Pak Army to occupy important heights in the Dras-Kargil-Batalik-Turtok area and thus cut off the Ladakh Division and Siachen Brigade. It was calculated that the critical situation would force the Indian Army to divert troops from the Valley and elsewhere in J & K to meet this challenge. This would enable
The Pakistani General Staff did not anticipate a firm Indian response, particularly the use of air power, and certainly not in high altitude terrain where a superiority of 6:1 is required to evict the intruder. Nawaz Sharif was definitely taken into confidence, but he could not rein in his generals as national security in
Where do we go from here. The LoC may not be transgressed at other points to keep the conflict restricted to the present area of operations. However, having undertaken an intrusion of this magnitude, it would lead to loss of face for the Pak Army to pull back across the LoC; hence, Pakistani intransigence at the
POPULAR COMMENTARIES
