The official level talks on the Siachen and the Sir Creek, held in May 2006, have predictably ended in no agreement. It is obvious that neither side wants to climb down from their oft-stated positions. These issues were included in the Composite Dialogue as confidence building measures (CBMs). However, as 'trust' and 'confidence' are still missing, these have become intractable issues.

So far, only CBMs, where there is reciprocity and an absence of earlier-held positions have been successfully implemented. These include a ceasefire along the 740 km long Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu & Kashmir and the 110 km long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in the Siachen area; opening of roads at selected points between Jammu & Kashmir and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir; resumption of sports activities, especially cricket; people to people contacts at various levels and so on. India should therefore look at other options for enhancing confidence and put these issues on the back burner for the present.

The biggest military CBM would be a LoC, which does not need eyeball to eyeball confrontation on a continuous basis. The present LoC is the second incarnation of the erstwhile Cease Fire Line (CFL), which had come into being on 01 January 1949, when hostilities between Indian and Pakistani forces had ended. During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, although Indian troops had captured large areas across the CFL, including the strategically important Haji Pir Bulge, it had to give them up after the Tashkent Agreement. After the 1971 war with Pakistan, a fresh line was demarcated, which is the present LoC.

Despite the formal demarcation, the Pakistani Army did not honour the sanctity of the CFL from its very inception. They commenced encroaching and nibbling on the Indian side of the CFL, hoping to either gain tactically advantageous positions or merely to incorporate additional real estate. This was naturally resisted by Indian troops. Thereafter, eyeball to eyeball deployment became the norm and it was considered fair game to seize any opportunity and occupy areas across the CFL by both sides. The result was that the CFL became an active border, where firing at each other became a daily affair. This state of affairs continued even after the CFL became the LoC.

After 1990, when Pakistan started infiltrating terrorists across the LoC, many actions were taken to reduce and cover gaps between Indian posts. In this process, many small detachments were deployed forward of traditional posts, many in tactically unviable positions, in an endeavour to reduce gaps. These invited similar actions from the other side, thus further escalating tension and resort to increased firing, as well as attempts at capturing these outposts.

Over the years, the accumulated result of a highly active LoC and jockeying for tactically important positions is that each side is in possession of small areas across the LoC. These encroachments number about a dozen on either side. Such adverse possession results in periodic attempts to dislodge the other side from such areas, which in turn, vitiates attempts to de-escalate violence and bring in a modicum of stability.

Instead of trying to resolve issues where the opposing stances have congealed and solidified, like Siachen and Sir Creek, India and Pakistan should look for areas of convergence, where an agreement may be feasible. Removing the irritants, irrational stances and the tit for tat attitude which prevails on the LoC will build confidence and trust between the two armies. I feel this would perhaps be the biggest military CBM of all. It will also reduce the number of troops the two sides have deployed on the LoC, purely to ensure its sanctity.

Many facets pertaining to the LoC will need to be discussed and resolved. A start can be made by identifying the encroachments and negotiating pull-backs. Since the LoC has been demarcated and authenticated, both on maps and on the ground, it should not be a difficult task. Once these encroachments are vacated by both sides, many possibilities will open up. These include the reduction of troops on both sides, the removal of minefields laid by both sides in many areas and the reduction, if not the elimination, of the prevailing tension. This would also facilitate free movement of local inhabitants to many areas which are currently denied to them.

Both countries need to take a serious note of this proposal, if genuine forward movement is desired in the field of military CBMs.