Despite the presence of delegates at the venue of the talks in Oslo, their inability to meet each other, and particularly the stand taken by the LTTE has put the future of ceasefire monitoring in Sri Lanka in serious doubt. The hopes of a peace process, that peaked in 2002-03 with a cease fire, is now relentlessly proceeding towards war and bloodshed.

The main objective of Norway to call the meeting at Oslo on 8-9 June was to discuss the safety of the ceasefire monitors and the status of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) post-EU ban on the LTTE. The LTTE delegation consisted of its political wing leader, SP Tamilchelvan, its Legal Advisor, Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, Police Chief, B Nadesan, and Peace Secretariat Head, Pulidevan. The government team included Palitha Kohana, the Secretary General of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), Gomin Dayasiri and Shanaka Jayasekera.

Despite its acceptance to parley at Oslo, it was surprising that the LTTE refused to meet the delegations of the Sri Lankan government and the SLMM. Tigers maintained that the government sent a "low level" delegation and therefore, only its Peace Secretariat head Pulithevan could meet his counter-part Palitha Kohana. The LTTE did not want to "shake hands" with the EU members in the SLMM delegation after the EU ban. As a result the very objective of the meeting failed. An obvious question that arises is that despite knowing the composition of government and SLMM delegations in advance, why did the LTTE not communicate its reservations before arriving at Oslo? There is some confusion here: it is still not clear whether the facilitator communicated all aspects of the meeting in writing to both parties before going ahead with the arrangements. A crystal clear itinerary should have avoided many inconveniences and embarrassments. Norway's good intentions of making both conflicting parties meet at this hour of tension, remain indisputable.

With LTTE team taking hard-line positions and the government delegation returned empty handed, Oslo's stand now is that "there is at the present time no room for Norwegian initiative". The situation has turned so hopeless that the facilitator, Norway has gone to the extent of asking both the LTTE and GOSL:

1. Will the parties stand committed to the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 22 February 2002?
2. Do the parties want the continued existence and operation of the SLMM as a mission coordinated, facilitated and led by the Royal Norwegian Government with diplomatic immunity to ensure its impartial operation?
3. Are the parties able to provide full security guarantees for all monitors, employees and physical assets of the SLMM in all situations, in accordance with CFA Article 3.9?
4. Will the parties accept amendments to CFA Article 3.5 in order to enable the continued functioning of the SLMM at its current operational levels and with the necessary security guarantees?
5. In the event that amendments to Article 3.5 are made, will the parties provide full security guarantees for current SLMM personnel and assets during a six-month transition phase until an amended solution has been identified, decided and fully implemented?

The government has already communicated its answers to the above questions positively; and the LTTE might take some time to respond. The LTTE continue to insist that it is difficult for it to engage peace monitors from EU countries viz., Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Tigers also raised doubts on monitors' impartiality after the ban. The reasoning appears to put indirect pressure on the EU against the ban. Though the EU ban did not come at an opportune time, the LTTE should have utilized the chance to engage with EU via SLMM. It is not too late, however. The LTTE should realize that the Nordic EU countries expressed their reservation on listing LTTE as a terrorist organization by the EU and did not fail to point out the practical difficulties posed on their monitoring by the ban; they, however, had to go by the majority decision in Brussels. Removal of EU monitors from SLMM would bring the present strength of 57 to 20. When more personnel to monitor peace are required during the current upsurge in violence, it is not prudent to lose the experience and expertise of those 37 monitors. Instead of demanding a change in the composition of SLMM, what is urgently required is a transformation of mindset of both conflict parties supported by a strong ceasefire agreement.