The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) was discussed at the recent Conference on Disarmament (CD) and a hornet's nest was stirred up after the US tabled its draft proposal on 18 May 2006. Presenting the proposal, acting Assistant Secretary in the US Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation, Stephen G Rademaker, set out a draft proposal without a verification mechanism for the FMCT. What are Indian concerns and its stand, and is it consistent with its position at the CD on other issues like the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)?

The US' controversial proposal must first be discussed to provide the context for analysing India's statement, which was made a day earlier. Rademaker argued that the US' stand was consistent with its conclusions on the "verifiability of an FMCT", as declared in July 2004 by the then US representative to the CD, Ambassador Sanders. However, he added that, "this does not mean that compliance with the treaty would be unverified, but rather that the primary responsibility for verification would rest with the parties using their own national means and methods - or, said another way, through the exercise of the sovereign responsibilities of the states parties to monitor compliance." It must be noted that India made two statements at the CD during this debate. The first was on 17 May 2006, when India's permanent representative to the CD, Jayant Prasad, made a detailed statement, and the second on 18 May 2006, after the US had presented "its initiative." Prasad's non-committal statement on 18 May said, "We hope that further discussion on these ideas and suggestions will help us collectively to move towards a consensus."

A detailed Indian stand was articulated by Prasad on 17 May 2006, but can be summarised. India subscribes to the Shannon Mandate, which is to arrive at "the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty" based on the 1993 General Assembly resolution. Secondly, India calls for a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable" treaty, while indicating that "verifiability" can be a sticking point during the negotiations.

Jayant Prasad explicitly backed the need for a verification mechanism while indicating India's willingness to negotiate the "extent and mechanisms for verification." India's logic is that a verification mechanism provides an "assurance of compliance with treaty obligations" through a "dual purpose of detection and deterrence."

It would be recalled that in 2001-2002, the US scuttled negotiations for a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention at the fifth review conference by placing the emphasis on national verification mechanisms. The annual meetings of the BWC parties have focused thereafter on national safeguards and legislation, code of ethics for scientists, and domestic efforts. Ironically, Rademaker terms the US insistence on national mechanisms as a "hallmark of the Bush Administration's approach to proliferation issues across the board [which] has been to promote exercise of the sovereign responsibility of states to act against WMD proliferation." India had nuanced its stand at the BWC while tacitly adopting the US line. This is evident from Prasad's statement in December 2005 where he stated that India supported the US-sponsored BWC process, established by the "resumed" session of the Fifth Review Conference in 2002. The "resumed" session of 2002, had abandoned the Verification Protocol and proceeded to set-up meetings that focused on national mechanisms, code of conduct for scientists, and domestic efforts.

It is apparent that India's stand on the FMCT and BWC is divergent with regard to verification. This assertion could be countered by the argument that a treaty on nuclear weapons, devices and fuel must differ from one on biological weapons due to the different nature of these two weapons. Further, it can be argued that a uniform policy towards all WMDs is impractical and does not serve the cause of disarmament. However, a verification mechanism for any weapons category cannot be harmful to disarmament and arms control, and provides one of the few areas to find common ground for the State Parties to act together.

The application of a uniform policy for all WMDs is already an established policy of countries like the US. Rademaker's earlier statement on the Bush Administration's "hallmark approach" to proliferation issues "across the board" is proof of this uniform policy. Therefore, what are the reasons underlying India's divergent positions? Will India's position on the FMCT change and reflect the US position in  the future as happened with the BWC? India has already mentioned that verification mechanisms for the FMCT would be subject to negotiations, but, will India renege on its commitment to verification influenced by the US' effort to link this issue with the Indo-US nuclear deal, despite India's commitment to negotiate a viable FMCT? These are questions that need further clarification for a clearer picture to emerge about India's position.