Among the various issues being addressed by the ongoing Indo-Pak composite dialogue, conventional and nuclear CBMs are significant as they seek to deal with reducing, if not altogether preventing a - conventional or nuclear - conflict in the sub-continent. To that effect, can the proceedings of talks in conventional and nuclear CBMs be used to test the veracity of the Stability/Instability Paradox? That is, has the current peace process raised the threshold for a conventional war from breaking out?

The Stability/Instability Paradox came into sharp focus after the Kargil War, and subsequently after the 2001 Indo-Pak stand-off.. According to Charles L. Glaser [Analysing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990)], its central tenet is that, "lowering the probability that a conventional war will escalate to a nuclear war - along pre-emptive and other lines - reduces the danger of starting a conventional war; thus, this low likelihood of escalation - referred to here as 'stability' - makes conventional war less dangerous, and possibly, as a result, more likely."

The nuclear and conventional CBMs between India and Pakistan are based on the framework of the Lahore MoU (1999) and the joint statement of 20 June 2004. Three rounds of Expert Level talks have been held on conventional CBMs. It has been decided to implement the "1991 Agreement between Pakistan and India on air space violations; upgrade DGMO hotlines; not to develop any new posts and defence works along the LoC; hold monthly flag meetings between local commanders and periodically review the existing CBMs." Also, during the last meeting in April 2006, discussions were held on Pakistan's draft agreement "on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels and aircraft." The respective sides also agreed to alleviate future conflicts by finalising Border Ground Rules along the international border. The Indian Coast Guard and the Maritime Security Agency of Pakistan will also set up a hotline soon for surveillance at sea.

While the aforementioned aspects are the positive outcomes, disagreements do exist, especially over Pakistan's "demilitarisation" proposals. Pakistan claims that the objective of these proposals is to reduce threat along the LoC and the international border. To this effect Pakistan had proposed "a redeployment of artillery, guns, missiles and mortars above 120 mm outside the 'boundary of Jammu and Kashmir'," and thus reduce or thwart any attempts by either side to launch operations using "strike formations." In fact, Pakistan's second proposal in the demilitarisation bouquet is related to "non-deployment of 'strike formations' close to the border." India does not subscribe to these proposals as it impinges on India's defence doctrine and "sovereign" right to move its forces based on "ground realties."

After four rounds, the expert level talks on Nuclear CBMs have sought to prevent misunderstanding and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues by "operationalisation and upgradation of the DGMOs' hotline and the establishment of a secure hotline between the two Foreign Secretaries." The two sides have also reached an understanding on the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles. But, immediately following this agreement in August 2005, Pakistan test fired its cruise missile, Babur. Pakistan did not inform India about the test because the pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic missiles agreement did not cover guided missiles. Since then, there has been little headway in talks on nuclear CBMs. The fourth round of the expert level dialogue on Nuclear CBMs did not issue a joint statement. However, in a press conference after the talks, India reiterated its stand on its "no first use" clause of the Indian nuclear doctrine and highlighted the threat of a nuclear exchange resulting due to an accident.

These talks are of particular interest due to the fructification of the Indo-US nuclear deal since the last round of nuclear CBMs talks ,held in New Delhi in August 2005. Even though the India-specific 123 Agreement is yet to pass through the US Congress, statements emanating from Pakistan make it abundantly clear that it is concerned. Pakistan has proposed talks about a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) under the rubric of the talks on nuclear CBMs. A final draft declaration on nuclear CBMs in April 2006 might have been held up due to differences over the SRR, which incorporates interlinking three elements of "nuclear and missile restraint, conflict resolution and conventional balance."

The track record of the talks for conventional and nuclear CBMs shows that the Stability/Instability Paradox is not verifiable in the Indo-Pak context. While there have been a slew of conventional CBMs that are at various stages of being institutionalised, the nuclear CBMs, however, have very few achievements on its roster; even the highpoint of the agreement on pre-notification of missiles was short-lived as Pakistan tested its cruise missile immediately .Closer scrutiny of the nuclear CBMs shows that the India wants to prevent an accident as well as thwart terrorists from securing nuclear weapons. There is little progress to address this issue and this questions the 'stability' factor that nuclear weapons supposedly accords to South Asia. It must be noted that conventional and nuclear CBMs are not mutually exclusive. Yet, there is a possibility that conventional CBMs, agreed upon so far, may prevent or ameliorate a rapidly deteriorating situation, but the lack of a corresponding degree of CBMs at the nuclear level may lower the threshold for a nuclear conflict if a conflict does break out.