Iran Nuclear Debate Continues

01 Jun, 2006    ·   2029

Beryl Anand analyses the latest series of events shaping the debate over Iran's nuclear programme


The Iranian nuclear crisis is moving fast in an alarming direction. Its quest for nuclear energy is becoming a dangerous adventure with grave regional and international implications. At the heart of the issue lies the Iranian regime's aspiration to become a hegemonic Islamic and regional power and position itself among the world's most powerful nations. This was apparent when Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, said that his country has become a member of the nuclear club. The following events must be noted: on 8 May, Ahmedinejad wrote a 17-page letter seeking direct talks with the US President. He reiterated that Iran wanted direct talks with the US. The question then arises as to why Iran indulged in such behaviour? Did it have any strategic underpinning?

When Ahmedinejad stated that Israel should be wiped off the world map or when he wrote a letter to the US President criticising American politics in West Asia (like supporting Israel and the occupation of Iraq), political observers - internal and from outside - said that he had only one objective, viz. 'to win the hearts and minds of the Arabs'. Thereby, Iran successfully garnered the support of the Muslim countries - Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, Malaysia, Egypt and Bangladesh - for its nuclear programme at the recently concluded D-8 Summit in Bali, in May 2006. Iran's Gulf Cooperation Council partners - Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - have similarly advocated a negotiated settlement to ward off US military action, though they had earlier been supportive of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in West Asia.

Meanwhile, the US House of Representatives, on 26 April 2006, approved a legislation tightening sanctions to curb progress on Iran's nuclear programme. The 397-21 vote came despite the Bush administration's concerns that this measure might harm relations with some US allies. The approval of the House will, in effect, extend the ambit of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).

The Bush administration is also pressing Europe and Japan to impose wide-ranging sanctions to strangle the Iranian leadership financially if diplomatic efforts fail to resolve the impasse over its nuclear programme. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany will meet in Vienna, in June 2006, for 'approving a package of incentives and penalties meant to persuade Iran to give up uranium enrichment'. The meeting seeks to find 'common ground on rewarding Iran if it gives up uranium enrichment or punishing it if it does not'. Iran's alternatives should be no less than recognition and security, or total isolation. Indeed, the two remaining options - Iran's emergence as a nuclear power or the use of military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability - would, in addition to other dismal consequences increase oil and gas prices.

The high price for refusing this option is clear to the Iranian leadership: should no agreement be reached, the West will isolate Iran economically, financially, technologically and diplomatically. The international community will support this move. A referral to the UN Security Council would declare Iran to be a threat to international peace and security. Iran has received the message right.

Taking note of the consequences that Iran might face, the reasons why it seeks direct negotiations with the US could be: first, sanctions are the obvious reason. Sanctions could affect the Iranian regime and their position might be weakened in the eyes of its masses. Sanctions could also affect trade and investments. Iran is already reeling under sanctions. Secondly, Iran would not want to be considered a pariah state and would wish to have direct relations with the US. Iran might want to shed its present isolation and become a full-fledged member of the international community. Thirdly, the future of the regime might be at stake; in case there is a strike on its nuclear installations, the Iranian people might call for a regime change.

Iran has successfully dragged this issue for two years without any concrete results. The ultimate decision lies with the US. Iran's leadership has been vocal about direct talks with the US. If the US can assess the motives of Iran's actions and deliberate a proper response, then the long-pending nuclear issue can be resolved once and for all to the benefit of both conflicting parties. The ultimate decision is for the US to seek a diplomatic solution, in cooperation with the Europeans and the support of the UN Security Council by offering 'Grand Bargain' to Iran. The bargain should not be unequal, but the US should offer security guarantees to Iran. Also, the offer must include enhanced trade and investment if Iran forgoes uranium enrichment until it rebuilds and regains the confidence of the international community.

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