After four years of truce, the Sri Lankan peace process is under severe strain. The Sri Lankan elections of November 2005 brought the United People's Freedom Alliance into power with the support of the hardliners. Mahinda Rakapakse was sworn in as President and Ratnasiri Wickramanayaka was sworn in as the Prime Minister. This change slowed down the process. September 2002 to March 2003 witnessed the United National Front government of Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wikermasingha hold six rounds of talk with the LTTE. The new government withdrew the helicopters facility that was being provided by its predecessor government to the LTTE leaders in the East to go to their headquarters in the North for chalking out the strategy for talks.

The LTTE also complicated matters with Prabhakran's demand for disarming the eastern breakaway leader Karuna, who is believed to have parted company as the Tamils of the north assumed a superior status. The pertinent question is whether the disarming of Col. Karuna should have been a condition to the continuation of talks. The LTTE accuses the Sri Lankan government of collusion with Karuna. The armed forces resolutely supported Karuna. Of course, everyone accepts that there is no military solution to this problem. Nevertheless, the LTTE cadres' belief in the tactics of terrorism has again been demonstrated by the 25 April suicide attack; when a female Tamil Tiger targeted the Sri Lankan Army Chief, Lt. Gen. Fonseka. He was seriously wounded along with 27 others and eight persons were killed. Colombo responded by bombing and shelling LTTE camps on 25 April. Fortunately, there restraint was exercised subsequently. President Mahinda Rajapakse announced the ceasefire agreement of 2002 will hold. The head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, Maj. Gen. ULF Henricsson, observed, "We still have a valid ceasefire agreement. No body has ended it." Geneva II has been saved. It is believed that talk will resume on 10 May.

In his Hero's day speech on 27 Nov 2002, Prabhakaran asserted," Our people's right to self-determination" and demanded regional self rule. He said, "We are prepared to consider favourably a political framework that offers substantial regional autonomy and self-government in our homeland on the basis self-determination." Earlier, in an interview to the BBC on 2 March 1993, he had stated, "If a federal scheme of things that recognizes the territorial integrity if the Tamil homeland is put forward, we are ready to consider it."

Federation is a dirty word in Colombo. However, during the Kumaratunga regime, a federal package had the possibility of evolution. Both parties need to accept that an agreement in principle on a workable constitutional arrangement is a primary requirement. Once there is agreement on this basic issue, other things will fall in place. Prabhakaran needs to realise that a federal arrangement in his best option to protect the political and cultural concern of the Tamils. India needs to use its influence in this direction overcoming the hesitation to deal with the LTTE due to its role in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination. The LTTE need to understand that issues like Karuns's rival role will disappear if there is an agreement between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka on the constitutional issue.

The ceasefire is a means to facilitate a political solution. It would be futile to drag the process ad infinitum. The LTTE needs to give up violence, come to an agreement on the constitutional arrangement and let nothing come in the way of establishing this. This is no mean task and requires the support of the Sinhala people also.

In the present environment of lack of trust and bitterness caused by prolonged violence, a great deal of patience is needed and the Norwegian peace facilitators need support. India needs to facilitate an agreement overcoming legitimate past experiences with both the LTTE and Sri Lankan government of Premadasa. The impending visit of Sri Lanks' foreign minister, Samaraweera on 6-7 May 2006 would provide the opportunity to consider how India can assist the peace process.