Speaker:
Dmitri Kosyrev
Chair: Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee
Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee
The China-Russia-India triangular relationship idea may be traced to Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in 1986. He spelt out then the framework of USSR's relationship with Asia and, in particular with India and China. The end of the Cold War, Russia's transition into a democracy in the 1990s, Sino-Japanese tensions, the rise of China, and finally the resurgence of India will outline a new era of relationship between these three countries.
Dmitri Kosyrev
The China-Russia-India relationship issue has been overblown out of proportion ever since it cropped up as an idea in 1999. The so-called "triangle" has been very disappointing so far. This fact needs to be recognized. The main message of this presentation being that this 'legendary triangle' needs a strong infusion of business commonsense. The word "strategic," which has many meanings, is used less frequently these days while defining a Russia-China-India relationship. It is also another matter that all three sides are accusing one another of dragging their feet for the lethargic pace at which this relationship is evolving.
Former Russian PM, Yevgeny Primakov, had proposed a Russia-China-India strategic triangle in 1999. The war in Kosovo, in the heart of Europe, had rattled the continent and Primakov was acting as a diplomatic combatant in defending Russian interests. He floated this idea in this backdrop. He clearly had an anti-US intention for formulating this Russia-China-India alliance idea. But, of course he was bluffing. None of these countries will antagonize the US to provide a fillip to this relationship. Maintaining their respective relationship with the US is top priority for all three countries.
What happens between Russia-China-India is a matter of deliberations on issues like Central Asia, trade and business opportunities, etc. The relationship must be tailored along the lines of India's relationship with Brazil and South Africa, where there are regular consultations between the respective foreign ministers. But, it is not a strategic relationship.
It has been mooted that India is the driving force behind the Russia-China-India triangle, and is at the forefront of the talks that are held regularly. The first meeting was held at the UN, and the second meeting at Vladivostok in May 2005. Both were supposed to be Indian initiatives. There is a perception in Moscow and Beijing that New Delhi is to blame for the slow pace at which this relationship is blossoming. Nevertheless, there have been regular meetings of trade officials and diplomats. There are no official pacts apart from verbal agreements between diplomats i.e. diplomats informing each other about their positions on a number of issues. The items on the agenda for the three countries are:
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Economic Issues
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Iran is at present being discussed between the respective foreign ministers and all countries are being very careful as to the positions they adopt. None of the countries are willing to take a stance that completely supports Iran, as it is proving to be an obstinate actor.
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Global security issues in specific areas like terrorism and security in Central Asia are areas of convergence for the three countries, and they are satisfied with their coordination in this regard.
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In the last meeting at Vladivostok, Russia proposed setting up a joint-disaster management mechanism. The Asian tsunami had just preceded this event and the need for better coordination in disaster management was the need of the hour. The Russians had earlier proposed this idea on several other fora like ASEAN, APEC, etc. as it was interested to sell disaster management-specific technology, in which it is a specialist. This proposal has been met with an eager response and the matter is still under negotiation.
The clarity in the relationship reduces or gets muddled when the main problem is sought to be tackled, and that is economic issues. Although a number of initiatives are under way in bilateral networks between the countries, but a viable platform for all three countries for business has to be approached with renewed vigour by the concerned diplomats. The issue becomes tricky when one looks at geo-strategic issues. Carving Russia's "oil cake" is one such issue. Here, India and China are competitors. Coordination for pipeline routes is also a subject for further discussions. From Russia's point of view, it is profitable to keep hold bilateral talks in this regard as it can secure a better price for its products.
The idea of joint-investment projects is a highly politicised issue and is known to have a dubious track record. This trilateral relationship will need some business acumen and less of politics. A firm economic and business foundation has to be laid. Hence, the main idea at Vladivostok was to set up a business council, which would then decide the further course of action. The underlying logic being that the businesspeople will boost economic cooperation and will provide valuable inputs to the respective foreign ministries over its implementation.
The Indians have been faulted for having missed an opportunity to host Russian and Chinese delegations early this year. Apart from the inherent suspicion displayed by Russia and China, Russia claims that it is not sure about India's positions on subjects like the setting up of disaster management units. Suspicions about India's commitment to deeper engagement were amplified in the wake of US President George W Bush's visit to India in March. Russian suspicion was much more subdued than that of China. While India might have kept the Russian government in the loop about the Indo-US nuclear deal, it is however, not reflected in the Russian media and intelligentsia. India has to allay Russian and Chinese fears that it has compromised its "independent foreign policy."
Returning to the topic of the aborted meeting between Russian, Chinese, and Indian businesspersons, the Indian government is to blame for not arranging the meeting in March. Although it is now slated to be held in April, it is still low priority for India as all its energies are focussed on the Indo-US N-deal.
In Moscow, a group of Russian businesspersons are arranging a meeting with their Indian counterparts. Unlike the diplomats, this group thinks that getting the cream of businesspersons is not a good idea until a working bottom-up framework is developed to facilitate businesses to chart unknown areas in other countries as well as in Central Asia. This Russia-India trade council was formed in February 2006 and is still a fledgling entity that will mature by the time Putin visits India this year. This trade council helped the Russian foreign ministry to reject the first draft of Indian proposals, which was "colonial" in nature. That is, it was a case of wrong thinking where the main idea hinged around Russian oil exports, and cheap Chinese labour and products. This model is against Russia's long-term economic strategy. Russia is not content with the status of a "second Saudi Arabia." Although Russia takes its position of being a major oil supplier in a serious manner, yet, Russia wants to base its future economy in trade of high-tech goods, services, and industrial development. Russia seeks high-tech and research based ventures.
India has drafted a second set of proposals, which made China suspicious as it saw this development as a result of deeper India-Russia engagement. China basically interpreted Russian designs as efforts to set-up Russian manufacturing facilities in India and China. They were, however, interested in the possibility in a joint-venture to manufacture a cargo plane. This venture can be profitable to all the parties involved. Ideas about energy delivery can also be discussed at the government level.
However, the Russia-India Business Council is wary of drawing up too many proposals as they will not take off the ground due to inevitable delays in the subsequent discussions between the concerned parties. Therefore, the Russian idea is that the first meeting must be low-key effort to establish institutional mechanisms. There are Chinese ideas of engaging with the SCO for greater engagement in Central Asia. This idea may bear fruit in April or July.
Discussion
Some issues that emerged during discussion are summarised below. These comments are from the participants as well as Mr Kosyrev.
Nuclear Deal: Premier Wen Jiabao has remarked that China has reconciled itself to the Indo-US Nuclear deal. The question of Russia remains. Though Russia has supplied fuel to Tarapur, it is perceived that this move is against the wishes of its people. The reasons for apprehensions over the nuclear deal must be clearly examined. Suspicions arise mainly from a fear of what may lie beneath the deal. American policy around the Russian neighbourhood has been aimed at reducing Russian influence in the region. Also, India's vote on the Iran issue is seen as having been influenced by the deal. However, one must realise that India has always stood alone on nuclear issues. The Iran vote should be seen as largely independent of the deal with the US. Also, the deal reflects a strategic partnership and is not an alliance, and this needs to be understood clearly.
It is also important to remember that when one speaks of misunderstanding or wariness about the nuclear deal in Russia, the reference is not to the government but the mid-level public. While the inter-governmental communication is excellent, there is a need to educate and win over public opinion in Russia.
Trilateral Cooperation: When Primakov enunciated a trilateral relationship it was more a throwback to the old days rather than the clear enunciation of a policy. It was also in response to a reporter's question and was not part of a prepared speech. India's position today is one where its power and influence is appreciated and as a result its bilateral relations are diverse and complex. Due to this a few problems arise as far as trilateral cooperation is concerned. Besides, China has always emphasised bilateral cooperation over trilateral endeavours. To the extent that the three countries can cooperate on important issues like Iran, the cooperation will be beneficial; however, one must remember that bilateral economic cooperation is always greater than a trilateral arrangement. Thus areas where trilateral cooperation may be significant are limited. Trilateral relations may have been conceptualised in the Cold War, but are no longer relevant. Improved India-China relations, however, have emerged only in the last few years; therefore it would be correct to say that while the hope of better relations exists, the practical policy aimed at the same is missing.
The question of seeming Indian reluctance towards trilateral meetings must be understood within the context of recent developments. Though India had proposed at Vladivostok that the next meeting be held in New Delhi, the minister concerned now handles a different portfolio. This change in personnel is bound to alter matters. Also, India has been rather preoccupied with the Indo-US nuclear deal and this may be the reason for the delay of the meeting to April. If it appears that India is dragging its feet on the issue of trilateral meetings, it must be acknowledged that we have a cumbersome decision making process. For Russia though, it would seem that the nuclear deal is what has affected India's willingness to act quickly on trilateral meetings, this may not be true and the time is right for India to allay such fears.
Areas of Cooperation: Though areas of trilateral cooperation may be somewhat limited, important areas of bilateral cooperation do exist. The most important being 'energy'. On this issue, however, Russian policy seems somewhat difficult to understand. While Russia is seen as Saudi Arabia in Europe, it supplies gas and oil to Europe without hard bargaining on technology transfers and bargaining only on cost and pricing. The policy towards India and China is very different. Looking at the issue from the Indian or the Chinese perspective, why should technology transfers become a bargaining point when they are not an issue when discussing oil/gas supplies with the EU? This is an issue that needs to be addressed. Russian aspirations of developing its technology industry are well understood but, Russian policy must also take into account the energy needs of its partners.
Since the Russian market has displayed limited receptiveness towards traditional Indian consumer products, the focus of trade thus must be high-tech. This is an issue that Putin attempted to address during his 2004 visit. Efforts must therefore, be made to further trade in this area.
Cooperation in fields such as disaster prevention could be extremely helpful. Setting up disaster prevention centres would be a good investment because it would employ Russian technology.
The common interest of all three states - India, Russia and China could be in Central Asia. While Russia and China already enjoy clout in the region, India would do well to enter in discussions with the two states on how India may engage Central Asia. While a grouping may not be desirable, political support for cooperation is necessary.
Improving Relations: Russia appreciates the improved ties between India and China for it no longer needs to balance relations with one or the other. The relations between Russia and India need to be strengthened. The dichotomy between governmental understanding and mid-level perceptions is what must be addressed. Though some have suggested that the Russian government should be responsible for educating its public, others insist that the time is ripe for the Indian government to engage and win-over the Russian people. However, mid-level contact between intellectuals and institutions is what must be encouraged.
The declining contact between the respective media and intellectuals in the post-Soviet era must thus be rectified, for it is alarming that public opinion in a state considered a traditional ally by India is not favourable. As trade and communication at all levels grow, bilateral relations will undoubtedly see a vast improvement.
Concluding Remarks
Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee: As India and Russia both move to claim their place in the global order, greater cooperation between the two is very desirable. As traditional friends, it is hoped that cooperation between India and Russia continues and is strengthened. The prospect of trilateral cooperation between India, China and Russia, however, will remain somewhat dubious and limited as all three have other pressing concerns and interests that may be better addressed through different arrangements.