Nepal: Issues Regarding Maoists-Parties Understanding

28 Mar, 2006    ·   1979

PG Rajamohan analyses the implications of the salient features of the recent MoU between the political parties and the Maoists, and the likely difficulties for its implementation


Nepal is resuming its normal life after six days of economic and transport blockade imposed by the Maoists. Following an understanding with the seven-party alliance (SPA), the Maoists withdrew their blockade on 20 March 2006, but they have jointly agreed to intensify their stir against the royal government from 6 April 2006 to explore avenues of peace and democracy by implementing their 12-point understanding. The recently publicized second Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) since the formation of Maoists-SPA coalition in November 2005 has raised key issues.

First, the joint statement announced separately by leaders of the Maoists and political parties does not address the difference between the two sides. Although the declaration has vowed to find a common agenda in time, the persisting difference between them about the Constituent Assembly casts doubts on the likelihood of an immediate political settlement. The alliance has reiterated its earlier views on the need to reinstate the dissolved House of Representatives, while the Maoists want an all-party conference preceding the constituent assembly elections. Fearing Maoist domination after the success of the present movement, the alliance wants to retain its position by restoring the Parliament in which they have majority. But, the Maoists - who are seeking a soft landing for their 'People's War' - wish to secure their place alongside the democratic political parties by organizing a common political convention.

While expressing their commitment to the 12-point agreement, the Maoists have infracted the unilateral ceasefire agreement and returned to violence on 2 January 2006. The security forces' operations were given as the major reason for this infraction, implying that the Maoists are easily provoked by the government. It would be difficult for the Maoists, who strongly believe in retaliating with force, to maintain a peaceful political movement. Despite the fact that the Maoists had agreed to allow political activity in the agreement, the political parties have alleged that their activists are being harassed. It shows that these problems at grassroots level would persist, even if the top level leaders agree for cooperation.

Secondly, the understanding was signed despite strong opposition from the US. Fearing that support by the political parties would legitimise the Maoists, the international community has been arguing for reconciliation between the political parties and the monarchy. But, the parties are optimistic about securing international support by bringing the Maoists into mainstream politics and persuading them to abandon violence. Despite this rationale, the agreement was reached while the rebels were relentlessly pursuing violence, and hence this makes the international community sceptical about trusting the Maoists. After declaring their commitment to a peaceful movement, the Maoists have killed over 30 security personnel in Jhapa and Kavre districts. At this juncture, an immediate indefinite ceasefire by the Maoists might acquire political stature and change the international opinion. Besides, the problem remains before the Maoists as to what would be the government's response even if they declare unilateral ceasefire.

Moreover, the policy of the royal government suggests that it would not change its attitude towards dealing with the Maoists by military means. The government might impose a curfew to thwart the alliance's mass movement scheduled for 8 April 2006. Immediately after the Maoists-parties agreement, the government has warned the political leaders with stern action if they continued their alliance with the Maoists. The refusal of the political parties to form an alliance with the monarchy could lead to the royal government in encouraging the newly born political parties to enter the parliamentary elections slated for April 2007.

The government strategy is to control the Maoist's insurgency, and strengthen the RNA and the royal government. Although external powers have exerted pressure on the King to adopt a more conciliatory approach towards the parliamentary forces, he has not sought a compromise, but has aggravated political hostilities to establish his supremacy. While the political parties have shown signs of moving towards reducing the Maoist violence, the monarchy has not shown any interest in resolving the basic issues. Modern weapons and high-tech communication systems available with the rebels shows they are well equipped. Despite the Maoists expressing their wish to return to mainstream politics, the government prefers to continue this war. However, the present stalemate reveals that a military solution is not possible in the near future and the country cannot wait and suffer until a military victory is achieved. There appears to be no alternative to a dialogue to end the present deadlock.

POPULAR COMMENTARIES