The first roundtable conference on Kashmir convened by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi on February 25, 2006 was not a historic occasion. However, it sent out some positive signals and opened a window of opportunity to strengthen the internal peace process in J&K. It was boycotted by the separatist groups, but reportedly had 52 representatives from J&K.

The decision to release detainees not wanted in any serious cases by March 2006, plans for a second roundtable in May in Srinagar, broadening participation to include groups that boycotted the first round and taking forward the reconciliation process were positive signals emanating from Singh. Preliminary impressions indicate the roundtable was primarily aimed at widening the space within the internal peace process.

The intra-Kashmir engagement between mainstream and separatist leaders goes against the Pakistani script. Hence, unsurprisingly, prominent separatist groups such as the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, the Democratic Freedom Party, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, People's Conference and the Kashmir Bar Association did not join the roundtable. The Hurriyat faction led by Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, the JKLF and People's Conference has already held direct talks with the Prime Minister.

Meanwhile, the separatist groups have decided to leave for Pakistan to attend a conference on Kashmir. The same separatist leaders, who rejected the Prime Minister's invitation, are willing to travel to Islamabad to attend a meeting being organized by the Pugwash movement from March 10-12, with the same set of people. The Pugwash-guest list is almost similar to those whom the Prime Minister had invited, including people from mainstream political parties, civil society and separatist groups. Among the separatist leaders attending the conference in Islamabad are Sajjad Lone, Yasin Malik and Abdul Gani Bhat. National Conference President, Omar Abdullah, who had attended the Delhi rendezvous, and others will represent mainstream political parties.

The separatists, including those of the Hurriyat, stayed away from the New Delhi conference, reportedly saying they did not want to be part of a "non-serious discussion in a noisy crowd". This clearly indicates the duplicity that characterizes the separatists' landscape and the dominance of Islamabad over them. Hashim Qureshi of the J&K Democratic Liberation Party, one of those who attended the Delhi meet, notes: "I wonder how the same noisy crowd has become serious thinkers for the same separatists. Actually, they are nothing but a B team of ISI which always danced the way their masters from across the border wanted them to." There are indications that the Umer Farooq faction of Hurriyat Conference boycotted the New Delhi roundtable at the behest of Islamabad, coming as it did before the visit of US President George W. Bush to the sub-continent.

More importantly, the boycott is unjustified since the separatist amalgam has already had three rounds of talks with New Delhi - two with the BJP-led NDA government and the third with the Congress-led UPA government. While People's Conference leader Sajjad Lone met Manmohan Singh in January 2006, the JKLF leader Yasin Malik, who met the Prime Minister seven days before the conference, also boycotted the roundtable.

With this boycott, the separatists have lost an opportunity to put across their views to a wide spectrum of Kashmiris. This militates against the spirit of the process. According to the Prime Minister, "A round table is a dialogue. No one preaches and no one just listens. This is a dialogue of equals who promise to work together." While there is a considerable improvement in the ground situation in the State, the process of effective governance is an issue that evidently will demand more attention in future, both in New Delhi and Srinagar.

An aspect of the 'collateral damage' inflicted by 9/11 on Pakistan's covert warfare enterprise in South Asia is the increasing uncertainty confronting management of both the underground and 'overground' movements it has created and sustained over the past decades. In J&K, the underground has been forced to de-escalate under increasing international pressure and media attention; the 'overground' front and proxy organizations has, consequently, been provided increasing largesse from Islamabad. However, their claims to be the 'real representatives' of the Kashmiris is wearing thin, with the improvement of civil governance in J&K and the successful conduct of elections at all levels - Parliamentary, State and local. Hence, with the progressive delegitimisation of terrorist violence, Islamabad's options are shrinking, and its efforts to retain its hold on actors like the Hurriyat seem likely to strengthen in the foreseeable future.

Views expressed here are of the author.