President Chirac's visit to New Delhi ahead of President Bush is a curtain raiser for the Indo-US nuclear deal. He was clear that the bilateral agreement reached by France and India on civilian atomic energy cooperation was linked to the Indo-US nuclear deal materialising. Being a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) France is subject to its guidelines that prohibit nuclear cooperation with non-NPT countries like India. France cannot make India an exception to the NSG guidelines unless it works out the nuclear deal with the United States and the US Congress is persuaded to amend its laws so that India could receive nuclear technology, despite being outside the NPT regime. Thereafter, the NSG guidelines, based on consensus decisions reached by its 44 members, would require modification to permit nuclear exports being made to India. Despite fond hopes in New Delhi, the basic position of Russia and other NSG members, including China, would resemble that of France.

The forthcoming visit of Nicholas Burns, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, is critical to ironing out differences between the two countries on the separation plan envisaged within the Indo-US nuclear deal. Some prior assurances may have been conveyed by the Indian Government. There is speculation that a compromise has been reached by agreeing to defer the contentious issue whether fast breeder reactors should be included in the civilian or the military programme for some years. Whether this is true or not, and whether this compromise solution would be acceptable to the US Congress is another matter. Apropos, the breeder reactor is believed to be a proliferation hazard since it generates more plutonium than it consumes, which can find use for manufacturing either atomic power or nuclear weapons.

Some issues inextricably linked with the fast breeder reactor issue have not gained attention in the public debate, but are crucial; they relate to the issues of "perpetuity" and "right of pursuit." Both these modalities gained salience when the Rajasthan reactors were placed under safeguards to permit the supply of heavy water for them by the erstwhile Soviet Union, following India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion in 1974 that led to sanctions being imposed upon it by the developed countries. Briefly, the principle of "perpetuity" lays down that, if a nuclear facility is placed under safeguards, these would remain forever, even if the imported nuclear material eg. heavy water is exhausted. The "right of pursuit" visualises that, if any product manufactured in a nuclear facility placed under safeguards is transferred to another facility, the latter would also come under safeguards for the duration of its processing eg. if plutonium in the spent fuel from the Rajasthan reactors is sent for separation to the Tarapur reprocessing plant, the latter would come under safeguards for the duration of these operations.

What this implies is that, should the fast breeder reactor be located in the civilian sector under the Indo-US nuclear deal and placed under safeguards, the plutonium produced therein and its movement to thorium-based reactors in terms of the Bhabha atomic energy plan would bring the latter also under safeguards. In other words, India's future atomic programme would come under safeguards, and they would be unavailable for military use. Unarguably, however, India's existing CIRUS and Dhruva reactors have been producing weapons grade plutonium for several years. According to my estimates, based on rule of thumb calculations, these two reactors could theoretically have produced some 300 nuclear bomb quantities since they became critical--CIRUS in 1964, and Dhruva in 1983. This does not include the plutonium manufactured by the 15 MW Kamini Experimental Fast Breeder Reactor that became critical in 1985, and could theoretically have produced over 5 bomb quantities of plutonium annually over the last 20 years. A total of 400 bomb quantities are thus available, undoubtedly on purely theoretical considerations. Agreed, these are maximum quantities of plutonium production, assuming that these reactors have been used only for manufacturing weapons grade plutonium, and not for any civilian purposes. Further, some plutonium must have been used up by the Pokharan devices exploded in 1974 and 1998. But, even 20 percent of the maximum figure of 400 calculated provides an arsenal of 80 nuclear weapons. Do we need more to establish a credible minimum nuclear deterrent?

The separation plan that India has to negotiate with the United States is essential for the Indo-US nuclear deal. And the fast breeder reactor program lies at the heart of the present impasse. A realistic view of India's strategic requirements is needed to bring this nuclear deal to a successful conclusion. It should be noted that, should the Indo-US nuclear deal not be finalised during the Bush visit, its momentum would be lost, making it infinitely more difficult to negotiate through the normal diplomatic processes.