India in East Asia: More Than Just Economics

20 Feb, 2006    ·   1944

Jabin T Jacob analyses the changing nature of India's engagement in East Asia as the realm of interests between the two extends beyond predominant economic issues.


India's engagement in East Asia, with the exception of China, is largely prioritized around economic relations - the odd joint military exercise, and its involvement in the ARF notwithstanding. Therefore, it is not surprising that Indian President Abdul Kalam's recent visit to South Korea was significant in that it initiated talks for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the two countries. However, while economic issues will continue to dominate the scene for some more time, an increasing awareness in the region of political and social issues in India is equally important.

For example, the South Korean daily, Joong Ang Ilbo, pointedly referred to both Kalam's religion and the religious conflict in India. But the article did not stop there. In a reflection of the fractious nature of domestic politics in South Korea, the article also reminded the Korean minister designates at the National Assembly confirmation hearings, to emulate Kalam, and perform their "public duty with creativity" and be "free from avarice." If this comparison seems forced, it is remarkable for the fact that India was used as the example. It is highly unlikely that South Korea would look for modern political role models in China or Japan. The cynics might scoff and point out to the unsavoury characters in the Indian political spectrum. Admittedly, knowledge about India in East Asia remains inadequate, and views are naïve. Still, the point is that stereotypical images of India in the region are slowly eroding, which is a good thing. There is, in fact, a keen interest in the caste system, besides Indian software.

The political awareness about India is considerably more advanced in the Japanese case. The joint efforts by India and Japan in their quest for permanent seats on the UN Security Council, is an example of how a relationship that hitherto emphasized economics to sustain itself is gaining greater political substance. A Japanese decision that might likewise be viewed in political terms is China's very public fall, in 2004, as the top recipient of Japanese development assistance, to be replaced by India. Further, Japan's support for India's inclusion in the East Asian Community, proposed at the East Asian Summit in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, and the fact that India and Japan will begin FTA talks in 2007, while Japan and China will begin similar talks only in 2009, are issues with strong political flavour.

The latest government in the region to encourage economic ties with India, deriving from political compulsions, is Taiwan. President Chen Shui-bian's New Year speech indicated a tightening of cross-Straits policies, and was followed by the formation of the "track-two" Taiwan India Association. It is noteworthy that the move was initiated by Taiwan's National Security Council. The Taiwanese government's seriousness about focusing on India is apparent from the fact that the person tipped to be the first director of the association, Yu Shyi-kun, subsequently became chairman of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In early February, both the chairman of the national economic planning agency and the Minister of Economic Affairs backed Chen's call to Taiwanese businessmen to balance their investments, plumping for India as the ideal alternative. The Chinese-language media has reported plans being afoot for joint ventures between Taiwan and India for manufacturing PCs, and in petrochemicals and petrol retailing.

Certainly, the economics that is fueling interest in India at present must be taken full advantage of, but while India pursues these economic ties vigorously, it is unclear whether a long term political strategy - of engagement with civil societies in East Asia and the development of support constituencies in the region - are in place. The problem lies in the weak resources that India has deployed to deal with the countries in the region on a political plane, despite a decade of the 'Look East' policy. Outside of the government, India still lacks the skills to engage with East Asia. Has the Indian government expended sufficient resources in developing such capacities, or does it consider this to be at all necessary.

These capacities are crucial as political interest in India, missing in much of East Asia until recently, is increasingly evident now. This is a welcome development, and India should encourage it further. What is at stake is the opportunity for India to project itself to the world as a modern nation that employs progressive and democratic methods to tackle its economic and social problems, and which is open to the outside world. India's foreign policy must not limit itself to a lesser challenge.

POPULAR COMMENTARIES