Those who believe that the nuclear black market chain run by Dr AQ Khan has been shut down could be in for greater shocks in the future. First, it will be folly to believe that Dr AQ Khan was alone in his venture of buying and selling nuclear technology and materials across the world. Howsoever crafty and greedy he might have been, he could not have succeeded in setting up any network without State support which, in Pakistan, means the Army, and an entire chain of traders, amenable politicians and bureaucrats spread throughout the Western world. It is now well-known that AQ Khan had set up his liaison men, contacts and agents in the US, UK, erstwhile W. Germany, France, the Netherlands and other European countries, West Asia and Malaysia. Several shell companies were floated to help the network in smuggling nuclear materials and technology. There have been no attempts to dismantle these links in the global nuclear black market chain.

Three intelligence reports, by different entities in the past one year, conclusively establish that, even though AQ Khan has been disabled, his clandestine network of nuclear traders is active. In May 2004, Switzerland's Annual report on national security revealed that the Khan network had twice tried to acquire Russian nuclear technology through a Dutch and a Swiss firm. The report said various that front companies for the Khan Research Laboratories made attempts to procure 120 tons of Russian aluminium tubes for enriching uranium.

Last year, the British intelligence agency, MI5, compiled a list of 360 companies operating in different countries, involved in the clandestine nuclear trade. Significantly, the Pakistan High Commission in London is high on the list. The 17-page document titled Companies and Organisations of Proliferation Concern identified 96 Pakistani organisations and government bodies involved in this clandestine trade. The Pakistan High Commission was kept under surveillance when the intelligence agencies discovered the involvement of the diplomatic staff.

Another British intelligence estimate revealed early this month accused Pakistan, Iran and Syria of buying technology and chemicals required for enriching uranium. The document, belying Pakistan's claims of dismantling the Khan network in February 2004, pointed out that "since the beginning of 2004 extensive procurement efforts for the Pakistan nuclear sector have been registered." The document said the quantity and range of equipment and materials bought clearly pointed out that a significant amount was meant for resale.

Within Pakistan too, there are quite a few clues. Two individuals, if questioned, can reveal the extent of the Khan network and the people involved in the deals, both within the country and outside. Humayun Khan is one of them. He runs a firm, Pakland PME (2nd Floor, Abbas Centre, 87-W, Blue Area Islamabad-44000) and is a known agent of the Pakistan Army. Some of the emails seized from an Israeli businessman, Asher Karni, at Denver airport in January 2004 reveal that Khan has been involved in buying not only Sidewinder missiles and infra-red sensors for the missiles from Lockheed Martin Naval Systems, but also nuclear materials. Humayun Khan was not questioned.

Similar is the case of Aizaz Jaffri, a prominent businessman based in Islamabad. He owns (until the Khan scandal broke out) Hot Shots, a bowling alley in Islamabad and a mall complex besides scores of business establishments which, reports in the Pakistan media said, were actually owned by Khan. Jaffri used to work for Pakistan's National Development Corporation, a state enterprise, before he joined Khan's network and began acting as a front man for dozens of businesses established by Khan--he serves as the managing director of the Best Western Hotel in Islamabad, and runs dozens of restaurants and hotels either partially or fully owned by Khan.

Jaffri is also tied to Khan's activities in Dubai where, reports said, could have been laundering the proceeds of Khan's Black Network. Between November and December 2003, when Khan was being questioned and his associates detained. Jaffri made three trips to Dubai, possibly, as investigators suspect, to shut down the financial structure that he ran for Khan. Jaffri reportedly flew to Iran after three employees of the KRL were detained for questioning in December 2003. Officials suspect that Jaffri's brief was to find out how much the Iranians had told the IAEA officials about Pakistan's involvement in their nuclear weapons programme. As for Dawood, he runs an extensive network in Dubai, which has often been used by Pakistan's intelligence agencies as a safe conduit for illegal arms purchases and drug sales. There are reports of the involvement of a bullion king, a big dealer in gold and jewellery, and a major player in the stock exchange working as conduits for the Khan network.

References:

• www.paklandpme.biz

• Military Ties Seen in Pakistani Arms Trade, International Herald Tribune, 20 February 2004, http://www.iht.com/articles/130529.html