In an interview to CNN-IBN on 13 January 2006, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf identified Srinagar, Kupwara and Baramulla for demilitarization and said he can "ensure that there is no militancy inside." Musharraf opined that troop withdrawal by India would help build the 'impetus for peace'. While claiming he would use "whatever influence anyone can wield on anyone" to stop the violence in these cities, he unsurprisingly added the caveat that, "But, if somebody tells me you give me certificate and a guarantee that not one bullet will be fired, I would not be able to do that."

The issue of troop reduction has been a central part of Pakistan's long-standing demands on Kashmir and had also been projected as a pre-condition for talks with India. It is also an indication of the end-game Musharraf proposes to pursue, comprehending a partition of the Valley under which Kupwara and Baramulla (both with a Muslim majority of over 95 per cent) would be ceded to Pakistan. However, such purported solutions are clearly in the realm of arm-twisting in which terrorist violence is a blackmail factor.

A scrutiny of the trajectory of violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) helps understand why Musharraf is insisting on troop withdrawal specifically from three places, and indicates that the rationale goes beyond concern for "total peace and tranquillity." Further, it goes well beyond the fact that both locations are on the LoC. Baramulla and Kupwara have traditionally served as a gateway to terrorism in the Valley and for long have been crucial to the jihad in Kashmir. Srinagar has also been central to the terrorist strategy.

According to those who oversee security in J&K, the prevailing situation does not warrant any re-adjustment of the counter-insurgency grid, and any dilution of the security apparatus is bound to affect the grid. Pakistan-backed terrorist groups active in the districts include the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, which has a northern division for Kupwara-Bandipora-Baramulla, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Al Umar Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen and Al Badr. Kupwara and Baramulla witness high levels of infiltration and terrorist activity and a lowering of guard would allow the terrorists - who have been under extraordinary pressure lately - to regroup and recover lost ground. It would also mean granting unhindered access to the Valley, especially to Srinagar, which is to the southeast of Baramulla. Operational advantage in these districts, accruing primarily due to terrain and location, lies with the terrorists. Troop withdrawal would simply cede the entire territory to the terrorists. Furthermore, flow of actionable intelligence of terrorist movement into other districts would also be adversely affected.

It is useful to note that 54 terrorist 'commanders' have been killed in the three districts between 2003 and 2005 (16 in Srinagar; 12 in Baramulla and 26 in Kupwara). While the number of civilian and Security Forces (SF) fatalities is not as high as in some other districts (76 civilian and 31 SF deaths in Baramulla and19 civilian and 20 SF deaths in Kupwara in 2005], the two districts serve as a gateway to the Valley. As many as 183 terrorists were killed in Kupwara and 169 in Baramulla in 2005 (the two highest numbers in J&K), and the two continue to be vital for terrorist activity. In Srinagar district, 49 civilians, 45 SF personnel and 42 terrorists died in 2005.

The Army currently holds commanding positions on the Shamshabari mountain range, north of Kupwara and above Uri in Baramulla. It is here that Indian positions commence, on an approach from the PoK side, and these are crucial for any counter-infiltration plan. In the recent years, the SFs have been able to block ingress sites across Kishanganga river that flows through Gurez Valley in Baramulla. Also, the SFs physically dominate the area up to Shamshabari. Although current information on ingress routes is not available, at least 20 were identified in Kupwara and seven in Baramulla in the recent past.

Musharraf has argued that India needs to reduce troops in Kashmir to reciprocate Pakistan's 'peace overtures', failing which CBMs would lose their impact. He has thus clearly linked further progress in the peace talks to troop reduction and indications suggest that Pakistan intends to raise the stakes and subsequently portray India as being obstructive.

Islamabad hopes demilitarization will put the onus on India as far as the peace process is concerned. Evidently, the problem is not with the Army, but the terrorist violence, which since 9/11 has been maintained at a certain threshold. The absence of terrorism will inevitably mean reduction and eventual withdrawal of the military. Furthermore, demilitarization is a decision that is to be taken by India in accordance with its sovereignty and not otherwise. Clearly, what could not be achieved on the ground in Srinagar, Baramulla and Kupwara through terrorism is being sought onto the negotiating table. This is a false notion of peace that Pakistan seeks to portray. Progress in the peace process, on the contrary, can only occur with complete cessation of cross-border infiltration and violence.