Early this month, a Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) flotilla comprising a missile destroyer, Shenzhen and a depot ship Weishanhu under the command of Rear Admiral Han Linzhi, Deputy Commander, South Sea Fleet (SSF) left Zanjiang, and sailed for the Indian Ocean. The flotilla will call at ports in Pakistan, India and Thailand. According to Chinese media reports, the voyage will last more than 40 days and the ships would cover some 10,000 nautical miles. The ships are programmed to undertake joint naval exercises with the navies of these countries. Interestingly, Shenzhen, an indigenously built destroyer has visited 11 countries in four previous deployments indicating the Chinese attempts at displaying their ability to build modern vessels.

After the port call at Karachi, Pakistan, the PLAN flotilla undertook joint naval exercises with the Pakistan Navy under the banner 'China-Pakistan Friendship 2005'. The exercises included search and rescue and others aimed at improving the joint readiness for humanitarian assistance in case of disasters such as typhoons. This is the second China-Pakistan joint navy exercise. In 2003, the Chinese Navy had engaged in their first ever joint naval exercise off Shanghai with the Pakistan Navy. According to the Chinese, the exercises were the first with any foreign country, and Pakistan described the event as another milestone in its long-standing bilateral cooperation in the defence sector.

In the second leg of their voyage in the Indian Ocean, the PLAN ships will carry out naval exercises with the Indian Navy off Kochi, Kerala. According to Indian naval sources, the exercises will be at a very basic level, but would help improve bilateral relations. While the Chinese believe that the joint exercises are a reflection of their understanding of the concept of "seeking security through cooperation." Ambassador Sun Yuxi has noted, "Fighting terrorism and piracy in regional waters could be the focus of future joint military exercises." He also pointed to several other military initiatives between the two sides including the exchange of observers for exercises and high-level visits. In 2003, the Indian Navy too had undertaken joint exercises with the PLAN after their visit to Shanghai. On completion of their exercises with the Indian Navy, the PLAN flotilla will visit Thailand and undertake exercises with the Thai Navy.

Since 1999, Chinese naval ships have been either calling at ports in the Indian Ocean or transiting through these waters, thus demonstrating their ability to engage in distant deployments. The PLAN ships have called at ports in Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, UK, Germany, Italy and France. These visits, though labeled as goodwill, are aimed at testing the strategic reach and the ongoing deployment has been flavoured with joint naval exercises thereby exhibiting a strategic shift.

China has long been seeking an outlet to the Indian Ocean to safeguard its energy sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf and its markets in the region. It is also well aware of the importance of choke points like the Malacca Strait, Straits of Hormuz and Suez in maritime strategy. After decades of evolving relations, Beijing and Islamabad have cemented their strategic links. Their cooperation now covers almost all facets of economy, energy, industry, and infrastructure, with nuclear and military cooperation at its core. Similarly, the Chinese diplomatic and military efforts in Myanmar also exhibit a conspicuous policy of power projection against competitors like US and India. Chinese strategists, maritime planners and practitioners have closely watched the growth in Indo-US maritime cooperation, and believe that the two are attempting to counter China's regional influence.

Given the Chinese creeping assertiveness in the Indian Ocean based on its politico-military and economic initiatives, it is fair to argue that there could be clash of interests between New Delhi and Beijing. In that context, in the naval realm, the clash could occur under two scenarios. First, if India becomes part of a larger US-led coalition aimed at containing China, there could then emerge a possibility of the two navies being drawn into confrontation. In the second scenario, the Indian Navy may come face to face with the Chinese Navy in the event of formation of a strategic alliance among China, Pakistan and Myanmar.