The Interpol has sounded another warning on 21 November 2005 about the 'clear and present danger' of a bioterrorist attack by groups like al Qaeda. The Cape Town conference was the first of a three-part bioterrorism conference being organised by Interpol. Singapore and Chile will host the remaining conferences in 2006. The conference received media attention due to the ominous references to al Qaeda's ability to add bioterror to its capabilities. The conference also shed light on the motivations, concern and efforts of the international community to forge horizontal linkages between law enforcement agencies to tackle bioterrorism. Valuable insights were provided regarding the shortcomings in bioweapons non-proliferation efforts after the dramatic failure of the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001 and later developments in the run up to the next conference in 2006.

Launched in 2004 under the aegis of a $1 million grant from the US-based Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Interpol held its first 'Interpol Global Conference on Preventing Bioterrorism' at its headquarters on 1-2 March 2005. U S Misra, Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation, represented India along with delegates from over 150 nations. The March conference sought to "examine the risk of bio-terror attacks, case studies, prevention of attacks, preparation and training of law enforcement personnel, and the related legal and political framework." One of its aims was to "strengthen regional cooperation and enable all agencies to immediately identify and work closely with the right partners at the right time to establish a common response against biological weapons and to resolve the consequences of bio-attacks."

The fact that Interpol is organising this conference is significant as it highlights the linkages between law enforcements agencies around the world to counter the criminal-terrorist capability to launch a bioterror attack. This move by Interpol strengthens the BWC, which primarily focuses on nation-states, their bioweapons capability, and the various ways of addressing resultant issues. However, the BWC's agenda is cognizant of the threat posed by bioterror attacks.

Currently, there is a lacuna in international legislations and treaties to curb or prevent biological weapons attacks. There are inadequate national laws, calling for synchronisation for taking effective action against bioweapons use. Interpol's Secretary-General Ronald K. Noble remarked that, "Defence measures against a biological attack are neither well known nor easily implemented, so there is a natural tendency for law enforcement services to put them aside in favour of 'more urgent' problems that they are more comfortable dealing with." Noble's statement also conveyed the urgency of cooperation in non-traditional areas of crime fighting. In the light of the difficulties in establishing transnational linkages, this endeavour will help to produce results by using Interpol's existent global network and institutional expertise. Interpol has recognised the need for "partnerships" between scientists, educators and public health practitioners. Jackie Selebi, Interpol President, drove home the need to nurture these partnerships.

Strengthening law enforcement agencies also necessitates upgrading legal and judicial mechanisms to tackle this new menace. Misra stressed the need for an effective legal framework and interlinking a state's various agencies like police, public health and environment. Therefore, linkages need to be made at two levels. First, it is evident that such intra-agency linkages are quite rudimentary in India and across the globe and elsewhere. Second, inter-agency linkages between states also need shoring up, which seems to be the purpose of the Interpol project.

This conference will definitely address the BWC's aims and objectives. Other international treaties and instruments related to the BWC, enacted recently, are the 2001 International Convention for the Supression of Terrorist Bombing, the 2002 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, The Convention on Biodiversity, etc. The WHO, FAO and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) are also involved. The coordination of BWC's mechanisms more closely is coming into place. A network - however tightly knit - is ineffective without a strong legal framework to support the mesh. The BWC's has to provide that strong framework and establish itself as the principal mechanism to prevent the spread and the use of biological weapons. These measures must include, not just national legislation, ethical codes for scientists and cross-linkages, but also ways to address the issue of international verification and dual use technologies.

The agenda of developments since 2001-2002 have conferred to what the US wants by strengthening national safeguards and establishing greater cooperation between signatories. This conference reflects this very agenda. However, it is imperative to simultaneously address the beneficial issue of evolving a credible verification mechanism to implement the BWC.