Mahinda Rajapakse, the newly elected President of Sri Lanka followed Sri Lanka's political tradition of reining Prime Ministers becoming Presidents. Thanks to the poll boycott by the Tamil community in the North, 'Mahinda Chintana' will guide Sri Lanka for next six years at least. But, what is of concern is the nature of the election outcome and its ramifications on the issues confronting the island in the days to come.

With the abstention of the largest minority community from exercising their franchise, one can question whether it is a true reflection of the people's mandate. The slim majority secured by the victor - 28,632 votes above the magic mark of 50 per cent - further extends this argument. The numbers of voters who abstained from voting (701,938 registered voters in Jaffna district alone) and whose names were missing from the electoral register, especially in the northeast, far exceed this margin of victory. It was for this reason that runner-up Ranil Wickremasinghe demanded a repoll, but rejected by the Election Commissioner. It is important, however, to note that given the reasons and forces behind the boycott, any number of repolls would not bring the abstainers to polling booths. However, the issue of missing names should be thoroughly investigated. Irrespective of disputes, however, Mahinda's victory is constitutionally valid [Article 94 (2)].

Given this backdrop, it is difficult to be optimistic about the future of the peace process. In the pre-poll agreement, Mahinda agreed to all the 12 conditions imposed by the JVP for its support for his candidacy. The conditions inter alia include full revision of the ongoing ceasefire agreement, reconsideration of Norway as facilitator, rejection of P-TOMS (Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure) and Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA), and inclusion of Tamil parties other than the LTTE in the process. Since none of these conditions are acceptable to the LTTE, the new President will find it hard to move even an inch forward. What will be the terms of a new ceasefire agreement? Who would be the new 'facilitator' acceptable to both the parties? Through what mechanism - other than P-TOMS - is the government going to distribute tsunami aid to the northeast? What will be the starting point of the new peace process? Unless the government finds answer to these questions, Sri Lankans have to accept the existing stalemate to prolong ad infinitum. The appointment of hardliner Ratnasiri Wickremanayake as the new Prime Minister has shifted the balance further towards the right.

This realignment is much to the liking of the LTTE. It was perhaps for this reason the Tigers - clearly in the know about what the Rajapakse's choice would be - covertly opted for Mahinda by restraining the Tamil community from voting. In case Ranil became President, he would not have to start from the scratch, but from where he left when he lost the parliamentary election last year. With an all-powerful Executive Presidency in his reins and ably assisted by the "international safety net," he would have been in a better position to negotiate with the LTTE. But, as a "prisoner of an already agreed agenda" with the JVP and the JHU, Mahinda is falling into the LTTE trap.

Revision of present CFA is demanded to take "care of national security". This implicitly means imposition of more restrictions on the movement of the LTTE cadre. This would push the Tigers further away from the negotiating table. What can be considered is to upgrade powers of the Monitoring Mission, which is now minimal. By doing so, the government can indirectly have a tab on LTTE activities and at the same time, the Tigers would not object fearing criticism from the international community. Removing Norway would be the most unwise move the new government could make. Norway is now acceptable to all the countries, near and far. By asking Oslo to "quit", Mahinda would be taking a huge risk of losing what Kadirgamar built over the years. If there is a need for a facilitator, Norway is the only bet. Dragging on P-TOMS nearly a year after the devastation wreaked by the 26 December tsunami shows the amount of politicization. If this is not acceptable, then the government should come up with a viable alternative. So is the case with the ISGA.

The harder the stance taken by the government, the easier it will be for the LTTE to convince the international community and its own constituency, the Sri Lankan Tamils. To the former, the LTTE can appeal by pointing out the lack of seriousness of the government for a negotiated settlement and to the latter the LTTE can state that Mahidna is a "Sinhalese President" who is not to be trusted. LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingam's observation, "JVP and JHU are our best allies", makes more sense now than ever.