November 24, 2005 would be a crucial day for India's foreign policy, if the EU-3/Russia initiative fails to reach a compromise solution before the IAEA meeting. What would India's position be - oppose, support or abstain? Its strategic interests, rather than any idealist or ideological considerations should guide India's vote.

India should pursue efforts to avoid Iran being referred to the UNSC; if that fails, India should support the initiative rather than oppose it. Abstaining is not an option and opposing would not secure India's long-term strategic objectives. The following considerations should guide India's vote at the IAEA meeting.

First, is Iran pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, violating the NPT, which it has signed? Has Iran been clandestinely pursuing its nuclear weapons programme through its links in the international nuclear black market? Are Iran's domestic politics unstable, with the possibility of fundamentalists taking over in the future? Is a nuclear Iran in India's interests? Any effort to support Iran should examine these questions.

Second, India's policy towards Iran should not be guided by the non-alignment rhetoric. Non-alignment is dead; so is Third World solidarity. Undoubtedly, non-alignment as a policy and foreign policy objective served India's interests in the first two decades after its independence. Non-alignment in an un-aligned world is not a credible option for India.

Third, what are India's strategic objectives in the post-1998 period? India has been striving to establish strategic partnerships with major countries and regional forums, to break out of its regional shackles to become a global power. India's strategic partnership with the US and EU, and efforts to forge a strategic relationship with China are based on these calculations. India is trying to be recognized as a responsible state with nuclear weapons, if not a 'nuclear power'. The Indo-US nuclear deal should be interpreted in this perspective rather than the narrow prism that it aims to strengthen civilian nuclear energy.

Fourth, if India aspires to become a global power and get official or unofficial recognition as a nuclear power, then it should pursue efforts towards reaching that goal. It is for this reason that abstaining from voting is not an option. India has to contribute positively to the maintenance of a stable global nuclear regime; hence, India's objectives should be guided by cold realism rather than utopian ideals. Nuclear disarmament would never be a reality; hence, a major policy revision needs to be undertaken, keeping in mind that the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan was the last concrete proposal India made on the subject. Then 21 century presents new problems and opportunities; India should attempt to contribute to global nuclear stability by being a part of a new nuclear regime. Voting on Iran would provide such an opportunity to India. India is already working with Russia and the EU-3 countries on reaching a compromise before the 24 September meeting. India's External Affairs Minister visited Moscow in October and the National Security Advisor visited London during the third week of November for a series of meetings with the EU-3.

Fifth, India's decision on Iran would have major implications for the Indo-US strategic partnership and the nuclear deal, but that should not be the only concern. If India's decision were only to appease the Bush administration, then it would never achieve its larger strategic interests. True, the US cannot to be trusted, as the critics and the Indian Left have been arguing. Nevertheless, why should 'trust' play a role in a strategic relationship? Rather it should be national interests, which should remain primary.

Sixth, should India abandon Iran? What would happen to the gas pipeline deal that would play a vital role in the energy security and economic development of India? India has been attempting to reach an understanding on Iran with the EU-3 and Russia. It should make Iran understand the need for compromise; in a worst-case scenario, India could explain to Iran of its decision. The gas pipeline is a separate deal, which would be mutually beneficial; economic stakes are high and neither can afford to abandon it, irrespective of India's vote.

Finally, would the Left in India paralyze the government as it has been threatening? It is unfortunate that the Left's decision is based on anti-US convictions, rather than any pro-Iran or pro-nuclear disarmament concerns. If the US agrees to let Iran continue its nuclear enrichment, the Left could still oppose the move as supporting proliferation. Its reasoning is based on anti-US ideology rather than any principled stand or strategic calculations.

India should attempt to reach a compromise before the IAEA meeting. In a worst-case scenario, India should vote along with the EU-3. Abstaining is not an option worth pursuing.