Afghanistan, Resurgent Taliban and India

20 Sep, 2005    ·   1846

Happymon Jacob highlights the recent elections, the likelihood of Taliban's reemergence and their implicatons, especially for India


Elections to Afghanistan's 249-member Lower House and 34 provincial councils have just been conducted. Despite strict warnings from the resurgent Taliban and other splinter groups fighting the Karzai regime, it is widely held that these elections will be decisive in Afghanistan's march towards democracy. Indeed, similar claims were made right before the presidential elections last October. However, after the much-publicized presidential election and a not so violent winter, violence has returned to Afghanistan. Will this election be different? Will peace finally return to this war-torn country?

The future of Afghanistan is bleak for various reasons. Afghanistan today is the world's most vibrant strategic playground, and is a strategic cauldron in the making. Unlike Iraq, where the 'enemy' and its intentions are clear, in Afghanistan, there are no neatly-drawn battle lines, enemies and friends keep changing their loyalties from time to time, and past errors are repeated. The US is fighting a reluctant war, Pakistan is gradually ensuring its strategic influence in Kabul, a resurgent Taliban is waging a perfectly timed and an equally well-designed guerrilla war, the Northern Alliance (NA) is waiting for the US to leave and the Karzai government is bearing the brunt of it all.

Maulvi Qalamuddin, who once headed the notorious Department for the Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue - set up by the Taliban for moral policing - was allowed to contest in the parliamentary elections from Logar. The other Taliban contestants were Rais Baghrani, a former Taliban leader, Abdul Salaam Rocketi, a Taliban leader named so for his rocket-firing skills, Ahmed Mutawakil, the former Taliban foreign minister and a favourite of the US, and Haji Abdul Samat Khaksar, former Taliban intelligence minister.

These inductions need to be seen as part of a well-thought out plan to place former Taliban elements in the Afghan administration. Hamid Karzai has publicly invited the Taliban to join his government on many occasions. According to him, allowing some Taliban leaders even if they have been accused of human rights violations is nothing but 'healing the wounds of the past'. Although he says that some of those who have committed very serious human rights violations may have to be excluded, the list of those former Taliban members who cannot be pardoned has never been made public.

Externally, it is now well known that Pakistan played a significant role in Taliban's rise to power in Kabul. Today, it is trying to regain its lost strategic leverage in Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to create its own area of influence in the neighbouring country by instigating and remote-controlling regular armed attacks against government positions, both from its North West Frontier Province and from Taliban bastions in Afghanistan, and - when the time is ripe - negotiate for the accommodation of a moderate form of Taliban in the government. For this, Islamabad has drawn a strong line of ideological demarcation between Al Qaeda and Taliban: the former is alien, of foreign origin; the latter is local and not a terrorist group. Taliban leaders who took refuge in Pakistan, including those evacuated from Kunduz at the time of the US attacks are in Pakistani safe houses, and are now being sent in as the negotiations for the inclusion of its moderate members in the government seems to be succeeding.

Hamid Karzai needs an element of stability and is willing to accommodate other interests toward that end. For obvious reasons, the US is unlikely to be interested in prolonging its military presence in Afghanistan. Its aim, to oust the Taliban and install an US-controlled government in Kabul, has more-or-less been achieved. The reconstruction of Afghanistan was never a serious concern for Washington, nor will it be; it has already announced a phased withdrawal of its troops. The US needs friends in Afghanistan, even if they were once its enemies. Washington has to deal with all the players in the Afghan affair, the Taliban included.

The end-result of the ongoing geo-political games is unlikely to do any good for India. Gaining the goodwill of the populations is strategically productive, but one is at a loss to understand how far it is going to help India deter the Pakistani designs in Afghanistan. India has not only been reviving the Afghan airlines but also building roads, schools, hospitals, power and communication networks apart from training military, police ad diplomatic personnel. Post-9/11, India had committed US$ 500 million towards Afghan reconstruction. During the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Afghanistan, there was an announcement of another US $ 50 million. India also has four consulates in Afghanistan - in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. This Indian engagement has only made the Pakistanis increase the level of their subversive activities in Afghanistan as they are wary of Indian intentions. It is doubtful whether India is in a position to influence the geo-political games in Afghanistan. However, it is necessary to proactively engage the country and increase the already existing pro-India constituency in Afghanistan.

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