An agreement signed between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Janatha Vimukti Perumana (JVP) on 8 September could potentially throw the country into a political turmoil. The presidential elections are to be held by the end of 2005, following a Supreme Court directive. The smaller parties are set to play an important role, as both the SLFP and the United National Party (UNP) are unlikely to get a majority mandate in the elections. The nature of alliances being formed is critical as it would decide the political agenda in the coming elections.

The political permutations would dictate the fate of the peace process in the island. While the SLFP's political agenda takes a nationalistic line, the UNP has chosen to emphasize on peace and economic development as the panacea to separatism. Rajapakse seeks victory by raking ethnic sentiments. With such a backdrop, it is important to assess the implications of the JVP's demands and its fall out on the peace process and the LTTE's war for separation.

The JVP's twelve-point proposal to support Rajapakse includes the suspension and replacement of the Post-Tsunami Management Operational Structure (P-TOMS); review of the UNP initiated ceasefire agreement (CFA); and the abolition of the executive presidential system. The JVP also wants the new negotiations to be truly representative of the North and East. It seeks restoration of law, democracy and human rights in these regions, and wants the Norwegian role as a facilitator to be reconsidered and all economic policies of privatization to be shelved.

The demand for a strong unitary state is manifest in the chauvinistic Sinhala attitude which considers Sri Lanka as a Sinhalese nation. It indicates a resurgence of dominant Sinhala political ethos. The signing of the agreement is reminiscent of the SLFP's nationalist agenda in the 1950s, which brought it to power. It would signal to the LTTE that a SLFP-JVP government at the Centre would abandon the efforts to accommodate the interim self-governing authority demands of the LTTE, and Tamils at large within a federal framework. This will not only drive away the LTTE from the negotiating table but also further harden its demand for Eelam.

Any attempt to renegotiate the CFA will not be well received too. It does not serve well in a war-ridden country to abort a structure which has laid down ground conditions to peace and, guidelines to abstain from violence, albeit tentatively. P-TOMS, meant to be a temporary mechanism, proved to be a millstone for the Kumaratunga government. JVP and the right wing party Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) had walked out of the ruling alliance on the issue of collaborating with the LTTE. Any relief disbursement mechanism which does not involve the LTTE would be impossible to activate in the North and East. The LTTE has been keen on the P-TOMS and agreed to include the Muslims in the mechanism, a significant step considering its dismal record in allowing democratic representation in its areas.

JVP'S demand to abolish the presidential system reflects the extent of manipulation in the Sri Lankan political system to serve one's goal. The superimposition of the politicians over the constitutional system has perverted the system. Sri Lanka made a transition from to the presidential system when a new constitution was promulgated in 1978 under J R Jayawardane. The executive president in Sri Lanka is believed to safeguard the rights of the minority groups. Hence, their support is critical in clinching a presidential victory. Rajapakse would end up losing the support of Muslims and up country Tamils if he allies with the JVP. However, the last two elections indicate that a presidential victory can be achieved even without minority support.

Rajapakse's deal with the JVP is a marked divergence from the SLFP's stand under Kumaratunga, who had worked towards the success of CFA and larger acceptance of a federal solution to the ethnic war. Rajapakse's proximity to the JVP highlights the fissures between the two leaders.

The positive aspect is that the agreement will receive legitimacy only after the formal approval of the SLFP. The JVP's assumption that its withdrawal from the present government would receive massive Sinhalese support was wrong. This notion that arousing ethnic sentiments for political gains would lead the country back to instability has lost some steam. These are not foolproof conclusions, as opposition to granting self-governing rights still exists. In addition, any decision affecting the status of the CFA is bound to invite interference from the international community in Sri Lanka.

More importantly, whether the agreement takes concrete shape or remains a form of election jingoism depends upon the people. In an election that will pit issues of a strong, unitary state against the UNP's slogan of democracy and employment, it remains to be seen what choice the Sri Lankan people make to end a conflict that has permanently scarred the psyche of generations.