Russia and China Joint War Games: What Lies Beneath?
08 Sep, 2005 · 1835
Priyanka Singh elaborates on the objectives of the Sino-Russian joint military exercises and its implications for Central Asia, US, Taiwan & India
The eight-day long joint military exercise between Russia and China was a grand affair involving combat aviation, warships and armies. Apart from the 10,000 troops, it involved Su-27 fighter planes and TU 95MSs and TU 22M-3s, with long distance bombing runs and cruise missile attacks. The objective of the 'Peace Mission 2005' exercises was to 'help strengthen the capability of the two armed forces in jointly striking international terrorism, extremism and separatism'. This reflects the concerns of both countries relating to violent uprisings in Chechnya, and China's Xinjiang border province that has a considerable Muslim population. Besides, the Chinese need Russian oil and China is a potential buyer of Russian weapons. China has surpassed India as the largest buyer of Russian weapons system.
Russia and China embarked on a strategic partnership in 1996, which culminated into the 'Good Neighbour Treaty of Friendship' in 2001. What does this new 'love thy neighbour' camaraderie suggest for the regional political and military balance? What other reasons are behind these developments? What are the implications for India?
The overarching objective is to limit US' influence in Central Asian geo-politics. The war against terrorism has given a reason for the US to move into Afghanistan and Central Asia. The US has bases at Manas in Kyrgyzstan and Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan. The exclusion of the Americans from the military exercises has set the alarm bells ringing among American officials. Russia is a shadow of its former self with its decreased global power, but it has keenly asserted its Eurasian identity. It has turned its attention to its 'Near Abroad' that it had neglected earlier. With the US consolidating its presence in the region, Russian anxieties are obvious. Similarly, for China, the US presence on its eastern flank, added to its Taiwan problem is reason enough for its present activism. China is looking to play a greater role in the region and has apparently engaged in a dialogue with Kyrgyzstan to set up a military base in that country. It also has substantial oil investments in countries like Kazakhstan.
The war exercise was envisaged as a probable UN mandated peacekeeping operation. In the face of US unilateralism, it is a subtle expression to the worldviews of these two countries. Post-Iraq, the effort to build a multi-polar world has gained salience. In this context, the trilateral strategic relationship proposed between India, Russia and China had received much attention.
The participation of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is secondary. Recently, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) - an organisation dominated by Russia and China - demanded a time line from US to remove its bases from the region. Elections in the region and the Caucasus have unfolded into a struggle between candidates backed by the US and Russia respectively, with the balance tipped in favour of the US. The American bases in Uzbekistan are still intact. The future of oil exploration and cash inflows in Central Asia lies westwards. Russian control in this matter is resented. With failing economies and dictatorial head of the states relying more on oppressive measures, US benevolence is positively desired.
Looking beyond the 'American threat', the exercise is also aimed at testing the operational preparedness of China's modernization efforts. China would like to conduct exercises off the Taiwanese coast as a power projection tactic and has employed such tactics in the past. Russia's role is insignificant in this regard, as the US remains the sole extra-regional party to the China-Taiwan issue.
It will take more than a military exercise to get the US out of Asia. A strong alliance needs to deliver and challenge the status quo. An outright challenge to America's unparalleled military might would be a fallacious strategic move. Issues of trade, investment and assistance would be endangered, and regional sensitivities would be used as checkmates without fail.
For India, the event is an example of the unique position it finds itself in. Any counter to US dominance in Asia needs an Indian participation. On the other hand, it is fast emerging as the best option to contain China. India, along with Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia were official 'observers' during the Sino-Russian exercises. There has been talk of triangular war games involving Russian, Chinese and Indian militaries in 2006. An involvement in a regional security framework should not be viewed with unrealistic optimism. Any antagonism towards the US would hurt the upsurge in the US-India relations.
The real issue for India is Russia's eagerness to sell more weapons to China. In a situation where two regional competitors rely on the same supplier, would China use its influence as the largest buyer with Russia to India's disadvantage? Thus, it is in India's interest that it looks at other sources to arm its military. India at this point should wait and watch. With the trend of allying on common issues and differing on contentious issues, there is much scope to explore all options pragmatically.