Speaker: Dr C Raja Mohan

C Raja Mohan
Manmohan Singh's recent visit to Washington has been the most successful of any Indian Prime Minister's visit to the United States. So much has happened in the last one year. The Line of Control (LoC) has been opened; and the bus is running between the two Kashmirs. In April 2005, India signed an agreement with China on the framework for settling the boundary dispute in virtual violating the 1962 Parliament resolution. The agreements that India has negotiated with other countries, shows that things are changing fast. In its engagement with the world, there is going to be accelerated change. There are moments in history where there is a break from the past and one begins to engage in a different direction. Discontinuity is the nature of India's foreign policy. What has taken place is a reflection of that change.

Implications for Indo-US relations
Four issues were of importance in the recent developments: The nuclear issue and its implications for non-proliferation and high technology defence cooperation; defence cooperation between India and the US; structural change that is taking place in Asia and constructing a new balance of power; and larger convergence with global issues

The Nuclear Agreement
Many expected that the US would lift restrictions on high technology cooperation with India, including civil and nuclear energy programme, in return for certain broad constraints on latter's nuclear weapons programme. India has been seeking this since 1970. The NPT made India a non-nuclear state that would not sign the treaty and give up its options. It was not recognised as a nuclear weapon state. The NPT itself did not restrict India, but in the post-1974 period, the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) dramatically expanded the nature of international restrictions against India. The Gulf War (1991) and many other factors made any cooperation on the nuclear front impossible. The option for India was to give up on the nuclear programme, which was not possible and India exercised the nuclear option in 1998. The second option was for the world to accept India as a nuclear weapon state; this was not possible as it needed changing the NPT. Third option was for a dominant power to recognise India as nuclear weapon state. This has been the objective of India ever since 1998 nuclear tests; the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbot talks, or Brajesh Mishra-Rice talks, and the recent negotiations emphasized this. The outcome has been a dramatic one. The debate - why does India have to be given an exemption is bigger in the US than here. This has a potential for dramatic change in the Indo-US relations.

Why did the US sign such an agreement? The American newspapers have predicted the collapse of the global nuclear order as it undermines an established treaty, the NPT. For the US, it is a political question. For others like Norway, Australia, and New Zealand it is legal question. Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, during her visit to India in March 2005 stated that the US would like to make India a great power. In India, many wanted something substantial to prove this and thus the process of negotiations began with a series of high-level conferences and visits to the US - Foreign Minister Natwar Singh's visit in April, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's visit in May and National Security Adviser M.K Narayanan's visit in June. To overcome the scepticism in New Delhi about mere American rhetoric there was a need for a spectacular breakthrough to show that the US is serious about this relationship.

The deal is about constructing a new balance of power in Asia. The CIA-NSC Reports on "Mapping the Global Future - Rise of China and India" analyses what it does to the balance of power in Asia and the world. It predicts that the rise of these two non-European states will fundamentally alter the international structure. The rise of India is important, as it is a country that shares the values of the US. India has to be strengthened to balance the precipitous rise of China. This is not the first time that India is playing political manoeuvres. India sided with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and did not object to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rise of China is an important factor and how to address it is a major diplomatic and political challenge for India. The rise of China is going to affect India irrespective of contrary views and India needs to engage China in a positive sense in areas such as Tibet, and Burma.

Defence Cooperation
In a span of three weeks, the defence agreement was signed by Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee. The US looks at the defence as an area with long term potential. The consequence of the rise of China and its impact on the security environment needs to be looked into. The Indian Ocean would be on the lines protecting the sea lanes, participating in interdicting regimes etc. Questions of action outside the United Nations need to be decided based on India's interest. The greatest opportunity for cooperation is in the naval area. We have Indo-Japanese naval cooperation, though we do not have an agreement on it.
Global issues

US President George W Bush's policies on unilateralism have been criticized by sections of the American media. We are not US citizens having a vote to decide whether President Bush is right or wrong. What India needs to see is whether Bush policies are in its interests or not. Bush paved the way for convergence of interests between India and the US. Had Al Gore won the US Presidential election, India would still be discussing the CTBT. The whole nuclear debate would not have turned without Bush saying the CTBT is redundant.

The US and India converge on their stand on Kyoto Protocol as against the European approach to global warming. The US cannot accept constraints on the US role, just as India and China do not want curbs on growth. What Bush wants is technology solutions engineered by domestic power. India, China and the US will redraw the rules on energy, technology and growth. The US and India want a framework completely different from the UN, G-8 Summit, NAM. They want to set the rules according to their interests.

India and the US share their views on the International Criminal Court and use the sovereignty argument. India can not let an unelected jury decide the fate of its soldiers. India has negotiated agreements where its soldiers cannot be tried outside India. India has always had a dual policy on the UN. We do not want the UN in Kashmir, Sri Lanka and Nepal. The elected government of the people will decide about war and peace, and not UN bureaucrats. The campaign is to tinker the Yalta system, which has not served our interests. India needs to break the Yalta system. India is also of the view that we need to device a new system that is in our interest and so does Bush. India is moving towards this in the next ten years.

Global Democratic Initiative
The question of democracy will be implemented in operational manner in small places. India could agree in Afghanistan, where there could be Indo-US cooperation on democracy in the coming months. The Russians and the Chinese want US to get out of Afghanistan. India does not want Afghanistan to be thrown open to Pakistani influence. The structure and logic of international relations are changing. What India has done in the last few weeks is a fundamental change in India's relations with the US.

Discussion
Question: The new Indo-US agreement gives the impression that the Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) stands concluded. When it is politically expedient to terminate an agreement, the US would do it. The $5 billion agreement with the US on conventional weapons is only a sweetener.

C Raja Mohan: There is a difference between the NSSP and the new agreement. India had three rounds of talks on the US quoting benchmarks such as signing the CTBT and imposition of sanctions until these benchmarks are met. During the Bush administration, the Brajesh Mishra-Rice talks concluded with the US stating there was no need for the CTBT. Post-September 11, sanctions on India were lifted. What emerged out of the NSSP was the changing nature of the nuclear debate in January 2004. This will be done within the framework of US domestic law during 2004-05. Indo-US relations are to be reviewed within that framework. The recent Defence Agreement implies that the US will change domestic law and international rules to cooperate with India. This is a huge advancement on the NSSP. The $5 billion agreement with the US on conventional weapons is not a big deal for the US.

Question: What is the implication of the PSI for India? Have we thought of unilateralism as an accepted norm? Are we acquiescing in critical areas? Why is the Indian domestic debate tailing to the Americans?

C Raja Mohan: We should join the PSI in our own interest. The obsession with multilateralism and the UN denies our own interest. Multilateralists want to go to the UN to take permission to tell the Chinese to stop proliferation to Pakistan. The UN does not confirm to international law. States produce international law. If 60 odd countries come together, they create new international law. Like in the NPT, if India does not act in its interest, the price will have to be paid. India acquiesced to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Vietnam. Where is the acquiescence here? India was not punished for not sending troops to Iraq. Critics still have the Third World mindset.

Question: India's national interest is secured through the maintenance of international peace and security. Do we have similar defence agreements with other countries? Do we view ourselves in terms of US interests? What is India's vision for this kind of engagement? What is our future in terms of economic strategy? Look at what we have seen this year in terms of the lifting of denial regimes. Otherwise, we could not have cooperated on technical agreements. The regimes of the last 30 years are gone. We asked for it. But we are not prepared to deal with it. We are not prepared to deal with the embarrassment it has caused.

C Raja Mohan: The challenge for us at the diplomatic level was to remove rules obstructing cooperation. We are even denied access to uranium ore. We always wanted to be a great power, but are not prepared to deal with the outcomes of this agreement. We had the first aircraft carriers in this part of the world. Even in think tank circles, the need to tread carefully was reinforced. The central question is how we prepare institutionally and intellectually.

Question: Does the agreement really involve transfer of technology, understanding on military and space security, cooperation and coordination in defence and development?

C Raja Mohan: We will talk about joint productions and technology safeguards. The Russians are saying, "Put the clause in". What the US can be given, we should also be given. In terms of maritime security, there is cooperation on fuller terms.

Question: Was the agreement really signed within three weeks of negotiations? In fact, the wooing process has been going on since 1995. We have never exercised with the Russians. The Chinese Joint exercises were a sham. We have not even exercised with the British.

C Raja Mohan: India went into isolationist mode only in the 1970s. Until 1965, we exercised with Pakistan. The emergency, domestic politics, socialism and other factors pushed India into isolationism. We have broken away from that isolationism. We are looking for bases and have agreements with Singapore, access arrangements with Burma and Sri Lanka. As India looks for energy security there will be changes in the Indian Ocean.

Question: In the late 1980s, we trained with the Americans in the mountains in the middle sector. We have been talking about nuclear equivalence, balance of power. Nevertheless, we are still far from China. Why is China so quiet on this deal? I do not see any cooperation with the US in South Asia on Sea Lines of Communication.

C Raja Mohan: China does not have to say anything. Change in the UNSC is another manoeuvre for changing fundamental strategic conditions for India. China too is beginning to notice this and is taking us seriously because of our relations with the US. All the non-proliferationists will say that this is a destruction of the global order. However, these "pure white countries" will not say anything against the Chinese proliferation. Bush expounds multilateralism when convenient and unilateralism when necessary. That is what we should follow. There are no rules for war and peace. How much ever the Europeans want to construct a world based on rules, the world is not based on rules.

Question: The most challenging time for any country is when there is change. The Americans were building up the Japanese and Germans while countering the Soviet Union. When Japan was rising and threatened the US economically, they strengthened China to balance Japan. Today, to counter China, they are cooperating with India. China's trade surplus with the US is more than the whole trade with India. Furthermore, care should be taken while talking about countering China, where the US is involved economically.

C Raja Mohan: China's trade surplus with the US was larger than the whole Indian trade with the US. US-China relations are thicker than India-US and China-India relations. This is a hedging strategy at this point. How does balance take place in a period of economic integration? The pressure not to confront China is a challenge every country will face. Chinese rise has already placed diplomatic constraints and problems unlike what we saw in the case of Soviet Union, which was in isolation.

Question: What are the broad constraints for our nuclear programme? The US has not made a new power plant since the 1970s. Is nuclear safety no longer an issue? Are we opening up an ecological disaster? Unilateralism and looking over international law can in the long run bite us. We have to look beyond short term expediency.

C Raja Mohan: We need to look at the civil nuclear programme and the nuclear program separately. Many countries like Sweden have banned the nuclear power programme because of safety hazards. Some went ahead with it, like France because of the global warming issue and hike in oil prices. There has been renewed licensing and up gradation of plants in the US. There have been no new plants, but they are extending the life of old ones from 30 to 60 years. US law was opposed to nuclear plants, but there is a new law pressurizing for change. Complete avoidance of nuclear power has been reversed. The world debate on global warming has pushed our interest in nuclear power.

Question: What about the attitude of the Left in India? Are they going to be an impediment?

C Raja Mohan: What the Left said in the last six years did not matter. For the first time they have a significant influence in the Parliament. On economic issues, some negotiations and bargaining have been done. In the last few days, the Left has said they are opposed to the nuclear programme. They have backed off on the nuclear issue. They will make a bigger issue out of the defence deal. Their concerns would be: Would China get upset? Is this a regressive policy as opposed to the past progressive policy of anti-imperialism? However, none of this needs legislation. Their actual influence on this is questionable. The situation is similar to the UK where the Labour Party is in majority, but cannot influence Prime Minister Tony Blair's policy. Nations behave according to their national interest. The Left can delay it, but cannot stop it.

Question: There is such a wide disparity in the US between the liberals and the conservatives. What will happen if the liberals come to power?

C Raja Mohan: We need substantial support from the Democrats to lobby for this deal. We need the American jack hammer to break the nuclear club. Now we can play the game.

Question: While I accept the comprehensive energy politics of the US, the same would happen in India. If there is going to be massive structural change in the international system we will need some kind of rule based system that is operational. What would be the rule based mechanism among the three disparate countries India, China and the US?

C Raja Mohan: Energy is a major issue. This is not a short term measure to contain China. Broad, new additional ties will emerge for cooperation

Question: There were discussions by the previous Vajpayee government with the US on cooperation in space. You have not addressed it. Can we get into co-production and co-development? The US itself is looking at militarization of space.

C Raja Mohan: There has been considerable advancement in the space sector. The head of the Department of Space was there during the negotiations and there was an agreement on launching satellites with American components. There has been a lot of activity going on in this sector. On June 29 and 30, 2005, there was a meeting in Bangalore on globalizing space industry. Commercial decisions and how to cooperate with those in Bangalore were taken. Indian astronauts will be trained in the US and activities have been pushed forward.

Question: By opening up and getting access to US technology, there is not only scope to cooperate on nuclear energy, but also non-conventional energy. Other systems have not delivered. That is why nuclear energy has come into focus.

C Raja Mohan: Cooperation in the energy sector is by no means limited only to nuclear sector. We are still struggling with rules in terms of nuclear energy and others as well.

Question: Indo-US relations could be at the cost of India's goodwill with Indian Ocean rim countries. Nobody takes into confidence these through which the SLOC lanes pass. India's increasing cooperation in Malacca led to a certain degree of conflict in the minds of other states. Indonesia has expressed reservations on the role that India can play at strategic choke points.

C Raja Mohan: As far patrolling the Malacca straits is concerned, Australia went into Indonesia for troop inspection. We would never have done this. Southeast Asia's concern about Indian presence is only rhetorical. They want to balance China and appease China at the same time. They do not want to upset China. We could follow policy similar to that of 1980s where we tried to counter Chinese influence in Vietnam and Cambodia by siding with the Russians.

Question: Why does the domestic law on nuclear proliferation have to be changed? Can't the US President give a waiver on this? If the law is changed now, a new government came come to power and change it once again.

C Raja Mohan: The President can give a waiver on national security. Changing the laws would be better in the long term.