Panelists: Ambassador Lalit Mansingh, Lt General Shantonu Chowdhry, Gopi Arora
Chair: PR Chari

PR Chari

Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh is set to embark on a state visit to the United States which signals a new beginning to a diplomatic dialogue. Despite the media hype there is need for a reality check. We need to appreciate the driving forces and the compulsions of the principal actors in this dialogue. The fuss that the US is making is only indicative of its current level of interest in India and Pakistan. American interests are defined by the Pentagon, Department of State, White House, business interests and the NRI community. The recently concluded Defence Agreement forms part of the broader New Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) and signals a radical change in the attitude of the Pentagon and the Bush administration towards India. But the rollback by the Indian administration of its clauses casts a shadow over the forthcoming visit by the PM.

Among others, the issues of defence cooperation, high technology transfers, economic cooperation and the energy sector will come up for discussion. A realistic framework for the PM's visit to Washington should include:

1. An understanding regarding the domestic consensus within Indian polity, prominently the apprehensions of the Left parties.

2. Also understand President Bush's compulsions, vis-?-vis the need to extricate US forces from Iraq, the importance of keeping Pakistan on board in the ongoing war on terror, India as a strategic balance vis-à-vis China. There would inevitably be contentions in the areas of energy, defence and high technology transfers.

3. A focus on economic growth for India.

The success of these negotiations between India and the US during the PM's visit will depend on how these issues are played out; in other words, how India and the US place each other in their respective world views.

Ambassador Lalit Mansingh

This is the first time that there is so much interest in Washington about the visit of an Indian PM. It is unusual because never before have such preparations have been made, in the form of several cabinet level discussions, resulting in landmark agreements, before a visit by an Indian Prime Minister. There is widespread consensus in the United States among both Democrats and Republicans that a partnership with India would be in its best interests. This is supported by the intelligence community. A CIA report describes India as an emerging power and an important swing state in the near future. While there is a consensus in the US policy establishment, this consensus is lacking in India and it is up to the Congress party, and the PM to justify the forging of a close relationship with the United States.

India's relationship with the former Soviet Union (now Russia) began in the late 60s had served its foreign policy well in the last millennium. Similarly, Indo-US relations will shape the course of India's foreign policy over the next several decades. In the post 9/11 world, India is again at the crossroads just as it was in the late 60s, seeking an ally that could help gain its aspirations. The PM has to take into account the pre-eminence of the US as India's largest trading partner, and a military, economic and technological superpower, to further its national interests. Improving Indo-US relations is not a matter of choice, but necessity?

India's relations with the US have gone through distinct phases that can be recognized by:

1. The five decades of hostility preceding President Clinton's state visit.

2. The visit of President Clinton in 2000 and the following five years of engagement.

3. The ongoing dialogues between India and the US resulting in the NSSP and the forthcoming visit by the Indian PM to Washington.

What the PM will have on his agenda is composed of two sub-agendas:

1. The old agenda that draws on the quartet of NSSP issues; comprising the nuclear, space, high technology sector and missile defence issues.

2. The new agenda focusing on development of an economic partnership, with agriculture being provided a special place.

If these items on the agenda can be achieved then the relationship will most definitely be a step in the right direction that will shape our foreign policy for years to come and reap future rewards.

Lt General Shantonu Chowdhry

There is a need to develop depth in all spheres of Indo-US cooperation, be it military or political. It is necessary that there be a consensus on both sides among defence bureaucrats, whether civilian or military. With respect to the joint exercises that have been conducted between the two countries, until now there seems to be a glass ceiling in that they have been symbolic, lacking depth. What the Defence Framework Agreement might do is end up breaking this glass ceiling and lending strategic depth to the relationship.

While the US has its reasons for having India work on multilateral security initiatives in Asia in the light of the CIA report, the geostrategic position of the India astride the major sea lanes and the utility of India as a possible counterweight to China, there are our own interests in the region. It makes sense for India to enter into a closer relationship with the US given the basket cases of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal in its backyard. India needs the United States to counter any eventualities that might arise from the tensions among its neighbours.

While it is by no means certain that the outbreak of conflict in South Asia will prompt US intervention, it is realistic to assume that India will be compelled to act, and the United States could provide a useful role in keeping our rivals "off our back."

Gopi Arora

While it is true that India might well be the fourth largest power to reckon with in the years to come, and what can be achieved in terms of economic growth through its partnership with the US, the Indian government runs a high deficit and lacks the infrastructure to absorb the investments that might well come its way. As much as India may be committed to establishing a Free Trade Agreement as a means to both opening markets and attracting investment, two long-standing limitations continue to plague such efforts: the serious "infrastructure deficit" and a "deficit of governance." These constraints hamper India's ability to develop the types of world class industries necessary for broad-based growth.

Notwithstanding recent strides in the so-called knowledge industries (particularly outsourcing and software), economic relations between India and the United States involve several major areas of disagreement. Agriculture issues, particularly those for small farmers, remain sources of contention between the two countries. It seems unlikely that major breakthroughs in agriculture, or with regard to the WTO, can be achieved by the PM's visit. To counter such differences there is a need for India to identify its own areas of growth and develop the human resource potential in these areas. Concentrating on HR efforts in the services sector will not do the trick. Analysts are eager to discuss GDP figures, but GDP is a poor indicator for a country like India. It is far more useful to consider GDP per capita. This perspective highlights the significant human resource challenges facing India, challenges for which service industry growth is simply not a panacea.

Discussion

General Chopra highlighted that while it is important that India participates in multilateral security initiatives in the Indian Ocean, it is imperative that India does not limit its role to being a local sheriff. Its interests centre around disaster management efforts and playing an important global role be it with a seat in the UNSC or as an independent regional power.

General Malik stressed that while it has become fashionable to talk about US pre-eminence, we must realize its constraints given its dependence on the import of knowledge workers. In fact, the United States R&D community relies heavily upon PhDs and experts from beyond its borders, whereas countries like India and China continue to churn out large numbers of PhDs. Also, there are structural flaws in reaping rewards from such a relationship. Relations between the US military establishment and the government are very different from what exists in India, with the armed forces having little say. In the US they form the crux of major policy decision making. Thus, a fundamental question arises whether India will be able to cope with the speed of transformation within the US government and military.

Siddharth Varadarajan from The Hindu questioned whether an endorsement from the US might, indeed, end up hindering our prospects for a UNSC seat? Is the US a stabilizing force? By entering a partnership or strategic alliance with the United States, "India is weakening its position by reducing its strategic space."

Air Marshall Virr Narayan highlighted that what was being discussed till this point were matters of detail, not broad policy. He stressed the urgent need for concerns to be diverted towards economic growth, national security, non proliferation and securing a UNSC seat.

• What is stopping the United States from implementing the package of UN reforms?

• What assurances do we have that, even if we get a US endorsement for a Security Council seat that China will do the same? It is not in Chinese interests to see a US-India relationship develop given its long standing apprehensions about US force posturing, be it in the Taiwan Straits, the Indian Ocean or West Asia.

• To what extent is the US offer of nuclear technology cooperation credible given its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the Glenn-Symington Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act that forbid transfer of nuclear material and technology to non-nuclear weapon states as defined under the NPT?

• As far as securing a Chinese endorsement for a seat at the UNSC for India is concerned, according to Amb Mansingh, the main objective of the Chinese is to keep Japan out and it has given implicit guarantees of its support to India. Also, while further stressing that there is a need to celebrate the process, not the event, and that this meeting in Washington is going to define India's foreign policy for decades, Amb Mansingh was quick to add that, "this strategic partnership is like an insurance policy, and whether one likes it or not, insurance policies do have an expiry date."

Closing Remarks

PR Chari

While there is no denying the mutual benefits of a US-India strategic alliance or partnership, India must be wary. One must remember the story of the frog and the mouse from the Panchatantra where the frog let the mouse drown to save itself. India must be cognizant of the potential pitfalls of unequal alliances and partnerships.