In 1998, New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman asked a 23-year-old Angolan who had fought in Angola's civil war for eight years as to why the conflict happened. The Angolan's response was, "I don't know if there was ever a reason for this war." Sociologist Beth Roy interviewed many Bangladeshis about a communal conflict in 1954; some claimed it was caused by a Muslim's cow eating a Hindu's crop. US troops in the ongoing Iraq conflict initially believed they were fighting persons having WMDs and links to Al Qaeda. These examples suggest that people in conflicts often do not have a clear understanding why conflicts occur or why they are involved. Similarly, perceptions of conflict causes do not necessarily correspond to the actual causes of conflict. Indeed, understanding the cause of conflict by examining the motivations of its participants and supporters is fraught with difficulties.

Interestingly, many - perhaps most - analyses of the Naxalite conflict in India focus on motivations as the conflict's cause. Many contend the conflict is caused by attempts to end injustices, deprivations, and oppression suffered by adivasis, dalits, and other traditionally discriminated groups. Others counter that the conflict may have started for these reasons, but continued because Naxalites are quasi-mafias selfishly motivated by money and individual benefits derived from the conflict. Thus, some regard Naxalites as Robin Hoods, others as Al Capone.

Motivations are a necessary but insufficient cause of this conflict. This is partly because Naxalites' motivations do not explain this conflict's curious geography. The frequency and number of violent events has been highest in two regions of two states - Bhojpur in Bihar and Telengana in Andhra Pradesh. Since 1999, the frequency and number of violent events has increased substantially in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Relatively fewer violent events have occurred in Srikakulam, eastern Uttar Pradesh, north Bihar, and other areas of eastern India. However, it is unlikely that the abovementioned motivations are relatively higher in regions where the Naxalite conflict frequently occurs compared to areas where conflict events are lower, less frequent, or nonexistent.

Some contend the conflict is due to the conflict areas' histories and caste structures. However, caste structure are rarely restricted to state boundaries, as eastern Uttar Pradesh, for example, has a similar caste structure to Bhojpur, but has experienced fewer Naxalite conflict events. Moreover, adivasi involvement in the conflict suggests that caste issues are not always associated with the conflict. Despite historical and social disparities, different Naxalite organizations operating in different areas and composed of different social groups behave quite similarly.

Others argue the conflict is due to "weak" governments, particularly governments' inabilities to provide economic development, law enforcement, etc. While this is true in Naxalite areas, it is also true where the number and frequency of Naxalite events are much lower, like north Bihar.

Organizations - whatever their motivations - typically require regular inputs of money, personnel/supporters, and other organizational resources that enable them to act upon their motivations and endure. In conflict, the balance of organizational resources between opponents often influences conflict duration and outcome. In Naxalite areas, economies are poorly diversified, and most of the population derives mot of their income and subsistence from cropland and forests. Thus, their livelihoods heavily depend on the quantity and productivity of the natural resources they can access, and differences in resource access often correspond to caste and other social boundaries. Since Naxalites are active in economies relying on natural resources, the economic, social, and other consequences of natural resource distribution may influence the balance of money, weaponry, and other organizational resources that Naxalites and their opponents can mobilize for conflict.

In the two areas where Naxalites have been most active, traditionally powerful landlords (Bhumihars, Reddys, etc) were weakened in the late 1960s as minimal land reforms and agricultural technologies enabled other groups (Yadavs, Kammas, etc) to become economically and politically influential. As these caste groups were in contention with each other, Naxalites in Bhojpur and Telengana were one more actor in an existing conflict. Thus, shifts in natural resource productive benefits between social groups may have created opportunities for Naxalites to emerge in these areas. In areas where this process did not occur, the Naxalites were crushed by opponents whose traditional political and economic strengths had not been weakened. Similarly, income, strategic terrain, and other benefits of forests may have also reduced the balance of power between Naxalites and their opponents in forested areas. Perhaps Naxalites have developed sufficient capacities over time to remain active in Bhojpur and Telengana and mobilize elsewhere. Thus, changes in distributions of natural resource benefits may have provided the opportunity for enduring conflict. Furthermore, to understand the causes of Naxalite conflict the most appropriate question may not be whether Naxalites are Robin Hood or Al Capone, but why the conflict occurs where it does.