There is reason to be optimistic about the future of the India-US strategic and security relationship. As Ashley Tellis recently testified before the US House Committee on International Relations, "a close bilateral relationship that is based on the strong congruence of interests, values, and inter-societal ties, is in fact possible for the first time in the history of the two countries." Rhetoric by the two governments has similarly been encouraging.

In his article on Indo-US relations, Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee is right when he counsels caution towards the relationship. Gen Banerjee addressed four factors that will influence collaboration between the two countries: the global war on terrorism, WMD non-proliferation, global energy issues, and India's relations with China. These issues are discussed below from the US perspective.

The September 11 attacks on New York and Washington refocused US attention on South Asia, prompting the United States and India to adopt joint counter-terrorism strategies and strengthen military cooperation. Despite its wariness that Pakistan - a lesser regional power, a military autocracy, a state sponsor of terrorism - was financially and politically benefiting more from the United States than its democratic and moderate neighbour, India is now getting the US recognition it has long deserved.

However, the effectiveness and durability of this counter-terrorism cooperation depends in part on India's relations with Pakistan. It is no coincidence that improving relations between India and the United States are occurring in tandem with Indo-Pak rapprochement. Should terrorism - reminiscent of the attacks in Kashmir in 1999 and the Indian Parliament in 2001 - resurface, it is doubtful that the United States will involve itself in a regional conflict, much less offer military aid to India for use against Pakistan. Despite the growing importance of the Indo-US partnership, the United States will remain focused on its own national (and global) interests. Specifically, the United States would gain more by playing a neutral role and/or supporting a joint Indian-Pakistani agreement than automatically aligning with India.

Non-proliferation and energy concerns are linked in the US perspective. Failure to address these issues in the short- to medium-term - through the proposed Energy Dialogue is a step in the right direction - could lead to tensions between India and the United States. India is understandably interested in expanding its civilian nuclear and space programmes. Despite lifting sanctions in 2001, the United States has valid concerns that increasing Indian civilian nuclear capabilities will lead to a more muscular Indian military nuclear posture, which would be undesirable in a region afflicted by nuclear tension - not to mention nuclear developments in North Korea, China, and Japan.

Another prospective stumbling block is the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project. In 1996, the United States Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which was intended to deny Iran the ability to support terrorist organizations and acquire weapons of mass destruction by limiting "its ability to explore for, extract, refine or transport by pipeline its petroleum resources." How this legislation will be used - if at all - to curb India's intention to proceed with this project is yet to be determined. However, given continuing tension with Iran and its nascent nuclear weapons programme, it is unlikely that the United States will allow Iran to pursue any commercial activities that may be used to divert funds for its nuclear weapons programme.

A joint Indo-US stance towards China is possibly the most delicate aspect of the developing bilateral relationship from the US perspective. One does not hear the US government using the term "containment" to describe its policy towards China, but Washington views India as a useful counterweight to China's emerging geopolitical power. Recent military-to-military cooperation between the United States and India has been as much a response to China's recent force restructuring as an exercise of good will between the two countries.

While India may establish a viable military balance against China, there is no indication that the United States will support India in politically balancing China, at least in the short-term. The United States has openly supported a permanent seat for Japan on the UN Security Council; but it is unclear if Prime Minister Singh's visit to Washington later this month will persuade US President Bush to make a similar offer to India. The United States will also be wary of any policy that encourages India to start a nuclear arms race, which links US energy and non-proliferation concerns in South Asia.

In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that relations between the United States and India are at a historical high. In the past 10 years, and especially after 9/11, great strides have been taken. However, several significant issues remain. Without addressing them sooner rather than later, the United States and India may be imposing a short shelf-life on this emerging - and potentially beneficial - partnership.