The prevailing negotiations on non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are fraught with contending views and priorities. This was evident during the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) held in May 2005. Biological weapons have rarely got the world attention accorded to nuclear weapons, but non-proliferation negotiations relating to them have suffered the same fate as nuclear weapons.

A report was released by Senator Richard G. Lugar in June, 2005 titled, "The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses". It is based on a survey involving 132 security experts regarding ways to "strengthen non-proliferation efforts, improve safeguards around existing weapons and materials, bolster intelligence gathering and interdiction capabilities, and expand international cooperation in dealing with a threat that should deeply concern all governments and peoples." Of the 132 polled, 85 experts responded to the survey. The survey found that 43 of 83 experts saw the risk of a biological attack in the next five years as between 10 and 30 per cent. Over a 10 year period, 32 of the 79 experts estimated the risk to be 40 per cent or greater. More interestingly, the respondents agreed that greater attention needs being focused on biological and chemical weapons proliferation, terming them as "underrated proliferation risks."

The decoding of the human genome, advances in the biotechnology sector, globalisation, changing nature of warfare (complicated by the entry of non-state actors) and realignments in the geopolitical scenario have reinvented the threat of use of biological weapons in contemporary times. Checks and balances to stop or control the misuse of such technologies have not kept pace with rapid technological developments. "Checks and balances" consist of not only filters in the form of rules & regulations (where constant technological and legal updates are made to keep them viable and effective), but also in the form of deliberations in the public domain. It is the latter failure that has made the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) a dead letter.

At an elementary level, public level deliberations consist of 'sharing of knowledge' about the questions in focus and 'open debates about its benefits and detriments'. The same debate at its highest level encompasses a larger political arena where states and non-state actors discuss and formulate new policies to address these issues. Not only do we see an asymmetry when it comes to access and sharing of information about negotiations relating to Biological & Toxin Weapons (technology transfer and use of dual use technology to be specific), but a clear lack of international political will to address the issue. This is reflected was reflected by the deadlocked Fifth Review Conference and subsequent lack of interest to address the issues bedevilling the BTW negotiations. These divergent strands are due to numerous factors comprising ideology, national interest, profit-motive, etc.

In India, bioterrorism is a new, unrecognized threat. Its devastation potential has been acknowledged, but a coordinated civil-military action plan to tackle this threat has yet to see the light of the day. The Indian Parliament has recently passed the WMD Bill, and this legislation brings WMD technology transfer under stringent regulations. Arundathi Ghose, former permanent representative to the UN in Geneva and the Conference on Disarmament, is of the view that, "India is a potential victim of biological attacks or blackmail by sub-national groups, acting either alone, at the behest of a hostile country or a mafia. The threat to India is real and action needs to be taken urgently, if we are to prevent any incident that might have disastrous consequences for the country as a whole." Ms Ghose is also of the view that, "India will not be party to any treaty that demands foreign inspection with regard to chemical and biological weapons." This cautionary note regarding a verification regime is the dominant thought among many nations party to the BTWC. Herein lies the biggest obstacle to making the BTWC effective.

Can the BTWC emerge from its current existential crisis or should the BTWC be relegated to history's trash bin? Can the BTWC be revamped on the lines of more effective treaties like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? Should the now defunct Ad Hoc Group of the BTWC be recast as a more effective multilateral negotiating forum? Future negotiations on bioweapons non-proliferation must also address the problem of non-state players (MNCs, NGOs, terrorist groups) as significant players in bioweapons negotiations; no other WMD category has so high a concentration of non-state players with a direct or indirect interest in its deliberations.