Discussants: Dr Rajesh Rajgopalan, Amb Arundhati Ghose, Mr Munish Puri
Chair: PR Chari

PR Chari

Any post mortem of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) would keep in mind the following two statements. First, by Kofi Anan in the International Herald Tribune; he wrote, "Regrettably, there are times when multilateral forums tend merely to reflect, rather than mend deep rifts over how to confront the threats we face." Second, by David Sanger in the New York Times; he wrote, "?the bickering between the United States, which wanted to focus on North Korea and Iran, and the countries demanding that Washington shrink its own arsenals, ran so deep that no negotiations over how to stem proliferation ever took place."

The NPT can be viewed through three perspectives: Non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Non-proliferation is essentially related to Articles I and II dealing with material transfers. Two problems must be emphasised while discussing this. Firstly, Pakistan's supply of materials to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) effectively attests to the failure of Article II. Secondly, the fact that Western countries and MNCs equipped Iran by supplying it with nuclear technology in the 1980s.

The disarmament perspective is enshrined in Article VI. The chief anomaly that negates disarmament efforts currently is the American perusal of technology such as bunker busters and other provisions related to nuclear warfare.

From the peaceful use of nuclear technology perspective, under Article IV, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has become a policing institution. Along with the Suppliers Group, it has been emasculated by the activities of rogue states. China's role as a blatant proliferant equipping state and that of rogue scientists like A.Q Khan must be recognised. At the same time, it would be na?ve to believe that either Pakistan or the US did not know about their activities.

The N3 issue pertaining to the three holdouts to the NPT - India, Pakistan and Israel - is of immediate concern to India. What could be a policy for India? The Bush administration was expected to be more sympathetic and incorporate India into the non-proliferation regime. However, it would seem that the Bush administration has only changed the style but not the substance of traditional US non-proliferation policy and India has been led on by the prospect of obtaining high technology transfers. There would appear to be policy continuity between the Clinton and Bush administrations.

There has been some gloating in India at the failure of the NPT RevCon, which would seem to validate India's decision not to join the treaty in the 1960s. The failure of the RevCon should, however, be a cause of concern for India. The question is how can India shore up the NPT and the non-proliferation regime of which it is not a part of?

Prof Chari suggested some options available to India that would entail India acting as though it was a member the NPT. It could begin by committing not to deploy nuclear weapons, not transfer sensitive nuclear technology, join international efforts like the PSI to counter proliferation, join the CTBT and the FMCT whenever there is a consensus on them, pledge to stop fissile material production and be willing to place its atomic power plants under IAEA supervision.

Should India seek access to advanced conventional weapons technology in return? Ask for a cessation of American objections to the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline? There is also the belief that aspirants to Great Power status do not bargain but join other Great Powers in governing the world. Should India bargain at all?

Munish Puri, Research Intern, IPCS

The events leading up to the Conference were both frustrating and revealing. The battle lines were drawn before the RevCon, where most nations agreed on issues but a handful held veto power. None of the Main Committees issued substantive reports. Lack of agreement was thus a certainty.

There were four groups of actors - US, Iran, the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and the New Agenda Coalition, and two major issues that deadlocked the agenda. The first was American insistence on focusing on Iran and the DPRK, while others wanted to focus on disarmament and the lack of P-5 commitment to this ideal. The second issue was the problem of how to refer to earlier agreements and the thirteen points agreed upon in the 2000 Conference, which the US did not want to adhere by.

With only ten days left to settle the agenda, current issues were not focused on. Commercial proliferation, withdrawal from the NPT, issues related to noncompliance, the role of non-state actors and other initiative like the PSI and UNSC Resolution 1540 did not come up for discussion. The inability of the NPT to address other initiatives could well signal its failure.

The lack of consensus at the 2005 RevCon implies writing off the next five years. It would take at least that much time to undo the damage. This vacuum can be filled through proactive initiatives by India. It is thus an opportunity for India to assume greater leadership on the issue perhaps through multilateral fora or other initiatives like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and UNSC Resolution1540.

Dr Rajesh Rajgopalan, JNU

A Review Conference aims at examining the state of the regime and does not necessarily aim at a final agreement; its absence does not imply complete failure. On the other hand, it identifies some important issues to be dealt with. While the Clinton administration finessed these differences, the Bush administration did not exert itself. It believes that Article VI does not mention nuclear states but only parties to the NPT and thus the US has no special obligation to meet. The US was clear about its agenda with reference to Iran and DPRK and did not try to work with the Conference once its objectives were not met. The American attitude in the RevCon was a reflection of their mistrust of multilateral agreements. It could also be the result of a realisation that the NPT cannot go any further and more needs to be done outside its parameters.

This conference brought out the exact situation of the treaty with imbalances being apparent, limitations becoming evident and the need to work outside the NPT being realised. It was an honest conference and did not delay important issues for another five years. It was an accurate reflection of reality and not merely a reflection of diplomatic language.

What happens next? The first prospect could be a change in treaty obligations. This seems improbable as it involves much work and needs Great Power consensus, which is obviously lacking. The second option could be replacing the current treaty, which is also unlikely as too much has been invested in the NPT already. The primary problem to be addressed is that of cheating within the treaty and not tackling those outside it. With the US fairly satisfied with the current state of the NPT, attempting to replace the treaty would be futile. In all likelihood, nothing about the treaty will change. If the Democrats come to power in the US there may be greater interest in reworking it.

It is important to realise that this alleged 'failure' of the NPT RevCon may actually be a good thing. There is a difference between the Treaty and the Regime. The regime is healthy even if the state of the treaty remains debatable. As more ways of plugging loopholes are devised outside the treaty (like the CSI), the regime will only be strengthened. India has always supported the regime. For India, it is the treaty as the basis of the regime that is problematic. What India wants are changes in the treaty and these being unlikely, what it will get are changes in the regime.

Amb Arundhati Ghose

India was not gloating at the failure of the RevCon and the Prime Minister had called for full cooperation with the non-proliferation regime. The government's reaction could best be described as neutral. The failure of the RevCon will not affect India, for it will continue to engage bilaterally with the US, France and others irrespective of multilateral efforts.

India's position on the NPT is not what it was ten years ago. It has not been problematic adjusting to the NPT and India has managed to deal with sanctions because it already has cutting edge technology. It is also important to note that the N3 are referred to as outliers and not as outlaws in the literature on the subject (much of which originates in the US). This is recognition of the fact that the N3 are not breaking any laws in pursuing their agendas.

It is true that the US did not exert itself. In its position papers prior to the conference it made detailed statements on disarmament and stated clearly what its objectives were, beyond which it would not exert itself. The US behaved like any other state and in doing can hardly be blamed for doing so. The NAM, led by Malaysia pushed for disarmament while Egypt pursued its agenda against Israel. The New Agenda Coalition, led by South Africa became increasingly ambivalent. Indifference was evident in the majority. There was no leadership forthcoming from the NAM or the New Agenda Coalition which could have pushed the conference forward. The Europeans too focused only on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In such a situation where domestic agendas determined the efforts of all parties, to blame the US would be unfair.

The US wants the NPT to continue, but its focus is now on building mechanisms like the PSI outside the NPT. Since these structures are being actively encouraged and are emerging across the globe, perhaps the US did not think it important to expend its energies at the RevCon. Without disarmament, proliferation cannot be controlled. As disarmament becomes increasingly unlikely, proliferation can only continue. The US copes with proliferation in its own way outside the NPT. The question is whether India is capable of coping with proliferation in the region? Should India join the CSI? Though the CSI in its current form is bilateral in nature, could its scope be expanded? It could perhaps be extended to become operational regionally or even multilaterally.

India could open its civilian facilities for inspection by international agencies. This poses some practical problems. While other states developed military facilities first and then developed civilian facilities, the process was reversed in India. Our military capabilities are an offshoot of the civilian programme. Thus, it is more difficult to differentiate between them. The process of differentiation would be fearfully complicated and require large resources in duplicating staff, etc.

The NPT is not at a crossroads or at a vital turning point. What is interesting are the times in which we live where structures are emerging globally, led by the US, by coalitions of the willing, and by domestic legislations. The key issue is how to deal with proliferation in our part of the world, increasingly carried out by non-state actors? Does India deal with this locally, regionally or by allying itself with the US?

Discussion

• Is anybody sabotaging the NPT or is it self destructing? Would it make a difference if the NPT is buried? The NPT is dying a natural death, why should we do anything to stop that?

• Why was there no discussion of non-state actors and nuclear terrorism at the NPT RevCon?

• How does India move forward with non-proliferation when it is not part of the NPT? How does it make its position known? What does nuclear non-deployment entail for India? In the tussle between China and the US, how are India's interests going to be addressed?

• Is PSI the solution? How will it address the problem? Who is going to implement it?

• How is it that NAM was led by Malaysia? Do India's interests diverge from NAM on these issue?

• India is engaged in nuclear technology for its interests; so are Iran and DPRK. What are the prospects for the future with conflicting interests and concerns?

• How are conflicting interests to be harmonised? Through the United Nations?

• Why should India sign the CTBT or the FMCT and restrict its future options?

• As far as nuclear energy is concerned, where does India stand? Do we lack fissile materials or technology?

Responses

• No one is actually trying to sabotage the NPT. The entire process has slowed down due to the wrangling over issues that goes on behind the scenes. The NPT has a future and great harm will occur if it is done away with. Much is invested in it diplomatically. The need is to envelop it in a larger regime. India could make its views known in a regional forum. It should step up to the challenge because there is room to act and it can possibly secure a UNSC seat by its efforts.

• To say that NPT is on life support would be incorrect; it still functions and it is unlikely that it will fade away.

• India's chances of technology transfers from the US are purportedly linked to NAM. The US gave no concessions because it was believed that others would also demand the same.

• PSI deals with questions of intelligence sharing and as such can become a legal dilemma. However, its functionality cannot be challenged. It has been given legal basis by UNSC Resolution 1540. All 60 member states can act to interdict defaulters. A problem may occur when decisions have to be taken about which vessel should be interdicted and which should not.

• Nuclear technology is over 60 years old; proliferation of the technology cannot thus be stopped. It does not imply the death of the NPT. Burying the NPT would indeed have dramatic repercussions. Many more states possessing nuclear weapons would be disastrous for global security. No single treaty has been absolutely successful and the NPT's success can be gauged by the fact that no major signatory has withdrawn from it.

• Non-state actors may not have been discussed within the framework of the NPT, but other mechanisms are in place to deal with them, for example Article VII of the UN charter.

• The present regime is a manageable nuisance for India. India is a responsible nuclear power. India is performing well as far as its nuclear programme is concerned; it is into phase-III. India can and will have to work with the NPT with all its problems because the prospect of amending it does not exist. The problem is not the N3, but managing those who have walked out of the NPT.

• India's energy requirements have been mapped till 2025 and till then it will be dependent on petroleum and natural gas. We lack neither the materials nor the technology for production of nuclear energy, but lack the capital required.

Comments

• The NPT is seen as being highly flawed because the security interests of various countries are not harmonised.

• Non-proliferation is possible only through disarmament; India should lead a movement for this. It should be made clear to the US that if it wants to prevent proliferation, it will have to disarm.

• India is in no position to do something about the regime as a whole. In any case why should India lead a movement for non-proliferation based on disarmament? It requires extremely intrusive inspection. India should not be part of any arrangement hat restricts its economic growth through external obligations. The prospect of non-proliferation with disarmament as its basis is not just dim but not even on the horizon. Countries that have nuclear weapons assert their importance in future security strategies. It is not logical to tell Iran and DPRK to disarm when the prevalent attitude appreciates the future uses of nuclear weapons. Disarmament is not possible as proliferation continues. The primary danger comes from non-state actors because states are unlikely to use nuclear weapons in war, but they can be used by non-state actors for terror or blackmail. Successfully dealing with the unclear future demands adhering to the PSI to provide for legal action without chaos.

• In 1995 everyone was for the NPT; problems emerged as soon as it was extended in perpetuity. The NPT is required because it provides rules and laws for the entire regime. Non-proliferation is not aimed at a complete stoppage of information, that is not feasible. Those who have information and technology continue to possess it; the aim is better management of information.

• A subject that was not discussed was that of non-state actors and the states supporting them. No non-state actor functions in isolation from state actors.

Concluding Remarks

Prof PR Chari

There is no doubt that the world is a better place with the NPT. There is no substantial argument to do away with it. However, the problems with the NPT are manifesting themselves more clearly over the years. The discussion must thus be extended to include not only non-state actors but the secret or even brazen violations of the NPT by its signatories. India's strategic interests are encapsulated in the NPT for it ensures the restriction of nuclear weapons technology to a few countries, rather than the many that could have possessed them if the NPT was not in place.