The recent tussle between China and Japan was one of the strongest outbursts of Chinese objection to Japanese interpretation of history. It started simmering over the question of the Japanese bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. While the crux of the issue was the Chinese reluctance to support the Japanese quest, the consequent developments unfolded a series of unpleasant allegations, demands for apologies and violent demonstrations and rallies.

Trouble started brewing when some Chinese started signing an online petition protesting against Japanese candidacy to the Security Council permanent membership. This snowballed into violent incidents of stone throwing and anti-Japan rallies held in places like Beijing, Shenzen and Guangzhou. The Japanese Embassy and Consulate in China were damaged. Charges were traded and Tokyo demanded an apology from Beijing for these attacks, which was denied by China. The Chinese administration did little at the early stages to curb these protests.

Though these issues of discord have their roots in the legacy of the War, they have manifested themselves in a variety of offshoots like the textbook controversy and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine which apotheosizes Japanese soldiers who died in the Second World War, including 14 Class-A war criminals. The shrine has long been perceived as a symbol of Japanese nationalism and latent militarism. According to both China and South Korea, history textbooks in Japan water down Japanese atrocities before the War.

These developments have to be perceived in the context of the recent past that has seen some irritants in bilateral ties between the two countries. These include the dispute over oil exploration in the East China Sea, Chinese submarine incursion in the Japanese waters late last year, the Chinese objections over a solution of the Taiwan issue being earmarked as a "common strategic objective" by both countries in the Japan-US Joint Declaration and the new Japanese National Defense Program Outline 2005, which calls for being "attentive" towards China's modernization of the armed forces, nuclear and missile power.

What makes the situation more perplexing is the fact that current economic indicators paint a picture which seems diametrically opposite to what takes place in the political domain. China has replaced the US as Japan's largest trading partner in fiscal 2004 by accounting for as much as 20.3 percent of Japan's trade. The stock market plummeted and Japanese companies in China felt the heat causing considerable unease in the business community. This anomaly can perhaps best be described as being just another exemplification of the policy of 'seikei bunri' - separation of politics from economics - in Sino-Japanese ties. However, there remains little doubt that given the vital economic interests at stake, the two countries have already begun to moderate their responses.

Koizumi's expression of "feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology" at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, seemed to have smoothened ruffled feathers for the present. The significance of Koizumi's remarks lies in the fact that this is perhaps the first occasion when a Japanese head of state has offered an apology at a regional level summit of leaders. Interestingly, Koizumi's statement to express regret for the Japanese wartime aggression were quite similar to those used by former Prime Minister Tomichii Murayama in 1995, expressing "deep remorse and … heartfelt apology" for Japanese actions. These issues were reiterated by Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing at the recently held ASEM meeting held in Kyoto.

Whether this apology will mark the 'end of history' remains a moot question though there is a likelihood that it might surface again in some other context such as yet another visit by Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine in the days ahead. It would certainly not be easy to find a common meeting point between Chinese expectations and Japanese offers of apology. The timing of the upsurge in China leaves little room for doubt that Beijing is playing the history card at a crucial time when Japan is making all round efforts to garner support for its case as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The genesis of the present discord, however, raises a larger question - that of the restructuring of the UN Security Council. One thing remains clear - that the UN Security Council restructuring would be a difficult mix of coordinating conflicting interests.

Northeast Asia indubitably remains potentially volatile. The 'rise of China' as well as the emergence of Japan from its staunchly pacifist state has only fuelled mistrust. Economic interests of the two countries, which are complementary in nature, however, seem to have prevailed prominently enough to temper and dilute political and strategic differences and disputes in the long run. It remains to be seen whether Japan's planned joint historical research project with China will provide a breakthrough of some kind in this regard.