Taking a leaf out of pop-fiction to show how life imitates art, in the movie 'Mission Impossible II', wherein a deadly virus is up for sale in the international market and the perpetrators of the crime are not looking for cash but payment in the form of stock options and bonds of the company they are holding for ransom. Reality, it seems, has caught up with fiction or is waiting around the corner.

Security is a relative phenomenon and the threats to security are rapidly changing and throwing up challenges with new technologies, socio-economic factors and "Glocal" politics. Weapons of mass destruction have occupied central place in the global security discourse, with images of a nuclear apocalypse firmly framed in the minds. As a result, nuclear weapons continue to hold centre stage in the public as well as the establishment's mind.

That biological weapons are also clubbed together with nuclear weapons in the WMD category is reason enough for it to be ignored. The lack of active public debate about bio-weapons and bio-terrorism afflicts both governments and the academia. This would account for the absence of Indian research in this area.

At the recent launch of the book, Bioterrorism and Biodefence, published by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies on 5 May at Sapru House, the topic under discussion was India's preparedness to a bio-weapons attack. The panel included Amb Arundhati Ghose, Rear Admiral Raja Menon, Dr Santanam and Prof. P R Chari. The panel deliberated about the wider context of biological weapons and India's response-structure to an attack of such nature and the feasible steps to strengthen India's response mechanisms.

The need to instill bio-defence measures in Indian defense policy without creating a fear psychosis is a task of primary importance. India's vulnerability to such attacks is enormous, especially from terrorists and the underworld. In such a scenario, there needs to be a coordinated effort on the part of premier nodal agencies like ICMR, CCMB, NICD, the defence forces as well as the state administration. These individual organisations have a good track record in addressing problems on their own but when it comes to building cross-linkages and implementing it with the help of the district administration, there is an obvious weakness. A "top-down" command structure is imperative to facilitate speedier response to such contingencies. While executive measures like passage of the WMD bill by the cabinet (May, 2005) are already under way, linkages with international organisations like WHO, ICRC would also add and make easier the state's task at providing security from bio-weapons.

The fight against biological weapons in the global arena does not offer us reasons to be very optimistic. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention has been in a deadlock since the 2004 Review Conference was sabotaged by the United States. The main stumbling blocks were the contentious issues of "dual use" technologies and verification regime. The driving force behind the US's current posture is the interests of private players like biotechnology firms and giant pharmaceutical companies, which is to keep the strict verification regime at bay.

Even though the BTWC lacks teeth, it has been argued that there is atleast a normative framework in place to address the issue and this may be seen as the proverbial silver lining. A more forceful infusion of the issues of biological weapons and threats of bio-terrorism is needed in the public domain in the form of active interventions by the media, lead public organisations and civil society groups.

With the shift in international relations in the 21st century, wherein the state has to increasingly contend with its retreating powers and the emergence of non-state actors and private players (MNCs), the question arises as to the kind of mechanisms can be adopted to make the private players more accountable.

Will the popular private-public partnerships being used in other areas of governance work in such a sensitive and possibly financially lucrative arena is an open ended question. To an agricultural community like India, the threat of a "bio-blackmail" at the hands of a MNC over a particular brand of seed, fertilisers or technology being used is a "clear and current" threat. The case of Monsanto is an example. Can we not consider such instances as a form agri-financial variant of bio-warfare. As stated before, the very concept of warfare, let alone biowarfare, will have to be looked into with a different perspective.