Since the India-Pakistan rapprochement began in April 2003, there have been many positives on the conventional indicators of the Jammu and Kashmir conflict. Terrorist violence has witnessed a secular decline, cross-border infiltration is down, the cease-fire on the Line of Control (LoC) is holding, and the Composite Dialogue has progressed smoothly, if not spectacularly. Further, shrill rhetoric, that has characterised bilateral relations, has been replaced by people-centric bonhomie.

However, beneath this feel-good ambiance, troublesome questions remain: Is the present entente a tactical move by President Musharraf propelled by domestic compulsions or does it indicate a considered shift? Can we trust Pakistan?

While the thaw is largely driven by people-to-people exchanges, something which will be hard to rescind, it is the direction of the Kashmir Jihad that will determine the progress of the peace process. More than personalities it is circumstances that underlie the trust framework. At present, Pakistan does not possess the capacity to sustain this Jihad since multiple crises have erupted within its own territories. There is also a realization that 16 years of Pakistani support for the 'Kashmir cause' has not effected any change in Indian strategy. Apart from some lone-rangers, policy makers in Islamabad are conscious that India can handle the military situation in J&K well into the foreseeable future. Trust, therefore, is dependent on Pakistan's commitment to disallow its territory from being used for terrorism directed against India. With the delegitimisation of terrorist violence to achieve political goals gaining currency across the globe, there is a growing conviction within the sub-continent also that this is a necessary political condition for succeeding against terrorism. The peace process would collapse if the Jihadis and their state handlers escalate violence within J&K, apart from the fact that the international community is unwilling now to support terrorist violence as an instrument of state policy.

Even though a trust-deficit still characterizes India-Pakistan relations, it is in the larger societal structure or what D P Dhar, a former Home Minister of J&K, called the "emotional enlistment" of the people in 1966, that a change can be discerned. It should be recognized that amidst the bonhomie, the realities of peace-making are not an easy task. Delhi and Islamabad have made it clear that confidence building measures (CBMs) do not change the stated positions of either country on the status of J&K. Gen. Musharraf found it necessary to reiterate, on 23 March 2005, that CBMs between the two countries would not succeed and would, indeed, lose their credibility if the 'core issue' of Kashmir was not settled. During his address at the Pakistan Day parade in Islamabad, he welcomed the trans-LoC bus service, but reiterated that it was not a solution to the Kashmir problem. And, while replying to an e-mail sent by an Indian to his (Musharraf's) website requesting his views on the reunification of India and Pakistan and his 'silence' on the Kargil war, the President was enigmatic and said: "What is the future? Resolve disputes so that Siachens, Kargil, Marpola and Chorbatla don't happen again. Let us resolve Kashmir first and then I am sure it won't happen again."

In the more immediate future, the trust framework will be dependent on two key factors: How much of momentum can India impart to the Composite Dialogue to keep the General engaged and, secondly, will he manage the internal situation and then revert to the Kashmir Jihad?

Advocating an 'out of the box solution' is easier said than done, at least in the case of Pakistan. While India has, time and again, reiterated that there can be no redrawing of borders or a further division of the State on the basis of religion, Gen. Musharraf will encounter roadblocks within Pakistan, in crafting a solution that might undercut the Jihadis' appeal inside J&K. The Lashkar-e-Toiba chief, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, has already charged that Islamabad was deviating from its stand on Kashmir under international pressure. He alleged, in the Urdu daily Nawa-i-Waqt, that Musharraf has crossed all limits to satisfy India by repeatedly changing his position.

Therefore, CBMs may do little to change the fundamentals of the conflict in and over Kashmir, which can escalate again if any of the extremist players - or their state handlers - recover their opportunity for disruption or regain the impunity under which they operated before 9/11. Considering the past uncertainties regarding the peace process, it would be pertinent to recollect what Ronald Reagan once said, in a separate context: "Trust, but Verify".

[The views expressed here are solely those of the author]