Discussant: Dr. Rafiq Dossani (Senior Research Scholar and Executive Director of the South Asia Program at the Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University)

Chair: Major General Dipankar Banerjee (Retd.)

Dipankar Banerjee

General Banerjee opened the discussion by introducing Dr. Dossani and mentioning his book Prospects for Peace in South Asia. He said, that given the recent visit of President Pervez Musharraf and the opening of bi-lateral dialogue between India and Pakistan, it was an interesting time to look at what the future held for the two nations and if the on-going conflict could be resolved following the recent thaw in hostilities.

Rafiq Dossani

Dr. Dossani begun his presentation by outlining his intent to provide a mini-synopsis of the topics his book covered. He said that if one were to look at the history of India and Pakistan dating back to independence, there was a great knowledge of the cultures and people of the two nations. The division of the sub-continent meant that 30 percent of the population was lost because of partition and Nehru's vision of a 'great' Indian nation was shattered. Dossani went on to say that the need of the hour at independence was unity, and that without fulfilling this pre-requisite, it was a challenge to overcome the economic and social problems faced by the nation. The partition of the sub-continent by the British shattered all hopes of a culturally unified nation and left Nehru disappointed with the countries' former rulers.

With India left to fend for itself, the rulers of India chose to adopt a centralized model of governance based on the Soviet, whereby the civil, political and economic arenas were controlled by the State taking away any flexibility that the country enjoyed at independence. Pakistan, on the other hand, while unified by religion, was divided in every other respect. Demographically, India was spread across a vast expanse, with the elite of the freedom struggle intellectually situated in the West demanding a large slice of the political cake. With the ruling elite in turmoil, Pakistan witnessed four governments over a span of 6 years; since Ayub Khan's takeover in 1958 the army has been the main ruler in Pakistan.

However, as Dr. Dossani pointed out, military rule in Pakistan has proved to be anomalous when compared to other such examples across the world. The military establishment took control with the intention of creating a new government consisting of civilians, and did not wish to remain in power forever, as was the case in Thailand. The Pakistani experience has been different with a genuine effort to develop an electoral system. All instances of a return to civilian rule in Pakistan have followed a crisis, like the Bangladesh war or Zia ul Haq's death, and have never followed a gradual transfer of power process.

As is the case with several developing countries, Pakistan has had her share of corrupt federal systems under civilian rule, prompting the masses to often display unequivocal support for military rule. Religious parties, which have performed poorly in elections held by civilian governments, have been content with obeying the army and supporting it as it has given them a legitimate place in the country with power to boot.

The constant political turmoil in Pakistan and India's failure to establish a political system suitable for its developmental requirement has meant that both countries have remained poor but skeptical about each other. In Dr. Rafiq's view, the ruling Indian establishment has viewed all its border states as potential threats, capable of weakening the country. The mutual distrust harboured against one another is reflected in their political agendas. In 1971, Indian representatives felt that Bangladesh had the right to be an independent and sovereign nation and provided it with military and moral support. On the other hand, Pakistan has been a constant supporter of insurgency, which has been aided by the Afghan conflict, Iran and, to a large extent, the intermeshing of politics with religion.

Dr. Dossani went on to say that he and his colleagues believed that economics had a major part to play in the prospects for peace in South Asia. Prior to 1991 the Indian government firmly subscribed to the belief that centralization was necessary to maintain economic, political and cultural unity. However, 1996 was the turning point in Indian politics with the acceptance of a coalition government and the notion that a federal system would not weaken the state, but actually strengthen it. With signs that federalism is working, the government was encouraged to show flexibility in dealing with the Kashmir problem; and with the nation feeling the positive effects of economic reforms, the government believed that 'great power' status could be achieved if they were willing to provide concessions to Kashmir by making it a Delhi-Srinagar process and not solely Delhi-Islamabad.

While India was undergoing changes in policy and ideology, the Pakistan army was transforming its image to that of a secular and modern establishment, and with a secular and forward thinking leader in Musharraf, India was no longer perceived as the big threat to their country. Coupled to this was Pakistan's faith in its nuclear capabilities, and the support they were assured from the United States. Despite Pakistan's new sense of security, there was some reluctance to return to civilian rule. The numerous coups the country has witnessed had led to a gradual erosion of the civil bureaucracy with the army being regarded as the only institution with any form of depth and coherence.

In conclusion, Dr. Dossani suggested that negotiations between Srinagar and Delhi were of paramount importance, and although it was vital for Islamabad to partake in any eventual settlement, it was of equal importance for them to withdraw all support for the insurgents. The US interest in the sub-continent peaked following September 11and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan. While the US did play a role in diffusing tensions between India and Pakistan in 2002, Dossani made it clear that this was done in view of America's own interests in its 'war on terrorism' in Afghanistan.

Dossani believes that as India grows economically, the US will have a keener interest in maintaining and pursuing good relations with New Delhi. However, he felt that Islamabad need not fear this growing alliance as India's democratic status and booming economy would benefit Pakistan and help its development as well. In short, the speaker felt that there were several favourable factors coming together to promote peace in South Asia.

Discussion

• The book Prospects for Peace in South Asia adopts a strong historical approach. After Zia ul Haq took over there was a determined Islamisation of the Pakistan army. What proof is there that the Pakistan army is now secular? The Pakistan army has been described as an organization with depth. The Indian army is an establishment with much greater depth. Comment on the fact that while the Pakistan army is ruling the country, it cannot provide the skills and specialization which a civil body can. Pakistan in many ways is a failed state with the failure of political parties. What future is there for political parties to return to power and rule efficiently? Why is there a constant referral to Pakistan as a 'failed state'? The book seems to focus on India and Pakistan, what about countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh and China, surely they play a part in the prospects for peace in South Asia?

• There is evidence of depth and capability in the Pakistan army. In many ways, it is capable of ensuring better results than the bureaucratic system and has been able to withstand and survive all changes, which the civil administration has not been able to. Although there is still plenty of scope for the army to gain more depth and specialization, it has achieved much more than the civil governments in Pakistan.

• If the army was not secular, there would be a lack of support for President Musharraf within their ranks. Musharraf has separated religion from politics while allowing religious parties to co-exist in the formation of a new government. Proof that there is a move away from Islamisation to secularism within the army is the 'Beard Count' and the fact that there are several forward thinking officers within the ranks.

• Pakistan is not a failed state, although it does have the potential to fail. Prior to 1979 it was a very successful state with several economic indicators pointing towards greater success than India. Pakistan's biggest opportunity to develop is to latch on to the Indian success and look towards India, instead of the other way. There is a definite future for Pakistan in political parties returning to power and ruling efficiently, although this can only be a gradual process with the army paving the way.

• The book does tend to focus on India and Pakistan, although there is a discussion of other countries and their role in promoting or preventing peace in South Asia. However, countries like China are increasingly becoming less important in the peace process as they are more focused on their own economic growth and their prospects for development and great power status.

General Banerjee closed the discussion by saying that while Pakistan was better off than India in several respects, it still faced formidable challenges which it needed to overcome. He said that to an observer in the West, India might seem like a country in the midst of political turmoil and disintegration. The problems of insurgency and communal violence that the nation faced needed to be dealt with immediately and effectively. However, he was optimistic and hopeful that the recent meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and the Pakistani President would pave the way for peace in South Asia.