Chair: Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee (Retd.),
Speakers: Air Marshal Vinod Patney(Retd)
Professor K.P. Vijayalakshmi

Air Marshal Vinod Patney

The hype about Musharraf's visit to India is media-centric. In contrast to earlier visits made by the General, the present visit is far more significant. What is renounced as double standards could quite easily be interpreted as self-interest. It is important to recognize US arms superiority and their technical capabilities. The US technological capability transcends military disciplines. It goes into the leading aspect of all forms of technologies today. At the same time, there exists a well-embedded suspicion of the United States, which the US is also conscious of. In such circumstances India's aim must be a mutual stake in the bilateral partnership. On the sale of F-16s to Pakistan, Rumsfeld has said that the US will support Pakistan with other arms required by the former. So what? Every country has a legitimate right to defend itself. If India talks in terms of self-interests and the converging self-interest of Pakistan with US at one particular stage, it is but legitimate on the part of the US to give these arms to Pakistan to the extent that it brings about stability in India. Under the circumstances, if Pakistan feels that their security is going to be bolstered by a few more aircraft, should India oppose it? Will it ever reach a stage that India would be unable to defend itself? Will it ever reach a stage where India may not be in a position to launch a proper offensive?

Greater stability will also imply that there are less strident calls by Pakistan on the possibility of use of nuclear weapons. In that case, it would support India's international stand on nuclear weapons. This is an important factor to note.

Many bogeys of arm-race have been raised on the sale of F-16s to Pakistan. India also announced that it required 126 fighter aircraft. India needed these aircraft for maintaining a force structure to ensure its security. A bogey was created that with F-16s, Pakistan has nuclear capability. To have an aircraft by itself does not mean nuclear capability. There is a need to build a bomb, which is not easy because the bomb has to have certain element of fit and form. Why should Pakistan want nuclear weapons on F-16s? India has a no-first-use policy. Pakistan does not. In fact, Pakistan stridently remarks that any use of nuclear weapons by India will be reciprocated by Islamabad. This means that Pakistan will use their nuclear weapons if they feel that their nation is being threatened when India makes inroads into their defenses. Nuclear bogey over F-16s should be set aside.

Positive factors with US

India's stand on Iraq has hit the Americans hard, despite that the bilateral relationship has continued on a positive note. The NSSP may not have been totally to India's advantage, but it has not been inconsequential. India has made certain gains that portend further gains. There has been near tacit acceptance of our nuclear status. This is a positive aspect and India must work towards it at the diplomatic level. The forthcoming NPT Review Conference in May 2005 will make things clearer. However, between now and May 2005 there would be arm-twisting which needs to be recognized as a part of any dialogue in international relations.

What is on offer?

The US offer of strategic partnership and recognition of India as a world power will certainly have a cascading effect on Kashmir. Persistent American support will play a positive role in regional and bilateral dialogues and enhance India's reputation globally. India's defence requirements are many but they are essentially related to intelligence and intelligence gathering as well. US has made mistakes in terms of intelligence but it must be acknowledged that their equipment is still the best. With high-tech cooperation and modernization, India-US relations can progress further. There is also an offer relating to co-production and technology transfer. India should also aim for cooperative research and development and design technology.. But if these political influences are not worthwhile and our evaluation suggests that some other airplanes are better, so be it. However, this certainly does not mean that India should not give a chance to somebody else. Dialogue and arm-twisting are possibly synonymous but there must also be some leverages. Mutual stake remains the important consideration.

The US Quadrennial Defence Review as stated in the Jane's Intelligence Review highlights four primary security challenges - conventional warfare, irregular threats (insurgencies and terrorism), catastrophic threats (WMD attacks) and disruptive threats (ability of a country or non-state actor to build revolutionary military technology that could alter the balance of power). This is something new that India should interest itself.

G B Shaw said, "We learn from history that we do not learn from history." It could be said that a state has been inimical to our interests over a time but that is not the lesson of history. States change their attitude when self-interests so dictate. The lesson that should be learnt is that in the entire India-US arms deal, it is our self-interest that must always come about. But it is important to know what it is, what are the leverages that can be employed, and the limitations involved in the application of these leverages.

Professor K P Vijayalakshmi

The US internal domestic reactions make it amply clear that there is a strong base for a particular opinion to take hold and work within that system before it finally evolves as a policy. US background briefings reveal that the Americans are seriously engaged within the establishment, which includes some nuanced changes and divergences within the Pentagon and the State Department. Policy entrepreneurs like the think-tanks and policy bureau positions are equally involved in charting out what policies are advantageous for the US. Congressional Research Service briefs reveal that there is a continuum in the thinking of US policy establishments that talk of India as an emerging power and defence partnership. There has also been a change in what was perceived as routine irritants in bilateral relations.

Strategic Stability and US Arms Sales

There exists a deep sense of unease within the strategic community about Pakistan and its intentions. The Amnesty International routinely objected not only to the F-16s but also assort cars, assort rifles and teargas. After all they would be used against the human beings. The real craw that spurted such objections was: why is Pakistan being rewarded for the cooperation on war on terror with F-16s? The strategic community apprehends that this carrot can be used by Pakistan as a lever to get more hardware out of US. President Musharraf's cooperation was largely a matter of convenience. What is the US going to do if the General stops cooperating and swagger on India? The aviation industry has also expressed its apprehensions stating that the US offer to Pakistan can backfire. If India is disappointed by US arms deal to Pakistan, it might sever bilateral relations that might affect US aviation industry. The military analysts feel that US offer of F-16s and F-18s could also serve as anti-US ammunition for anti-US faction in India.

The US official formulation is that the Indian foreign policy has changed and it has created a vision that transcends South Asia. This is very significant. Is geo-strategic diplomacy being used as a cloak for American arms industry to enhance their values and keep spending for them? This is not quite so.

Nuclear Energy

The US needs a broad support on nuclear energy before it can bring it to the Congress for a change in legislation for getting a mandate. This broad support must also come from India. If India is not interested, US will not make any move on this matter. However, India is not looking at arms sale affecting stability but also nuclear energy and its costs of energy requirements in future years.

In conclusion, a few agendas from the Indian standpoint needs to be given attention. India needs energy at an affordable price. Read the fine print in all bilateral engagements. One cannot escape inter-connectedness in foreign policy decisions in hardware purchase. The process in Pakistan should not be tangled with the India-US dialogue. India must engage the world community on its record of non-proliferation to contrast it with the Pakistani proliferation without disrupting the peace process. Indian diplomacy must take a hard look and drive a bold bargain. On the other hand, US must recognize that its argument that weapons like F-16s are required in the war against terror is in reality merely expensive toys for the General. US war on terror is obviously emphasizing on arms-sale. The US must undertake measures to ensure that these weapons are not falling into the wrong hands.

Discussion and Comments

• Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee remarked that F-16 is more than just an aircraft. It is a symbol of US-Pakistan relations. It symbolized a relationship in the 1980s as a consequence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It therefore provides US strategic support to Pakistan. The withholding of F-16s to Pakistan was viewed as an abandonment of Pakistan by the US. Hence the significance of F-16s in US-Pakistan relations is much more political than strategic. The effectiveness of the F-16s as stated by the US Defence Attach? is that these aircraft are useful in counter-insurgency operations.

• Various discussions held on the issue of F-16s have had the effect of spreading alarm across the general public. It is true that every country has to defend itself for which it is important to upgrade force structure. Both India and Pakistan have to upgrade their defence requirements. There is no possibility for India and Pakistan for exchanging nuclear weapons. Hence the alarm and despondency should be kept to the background. The purchase of F-16s must be considered as a normal routine process and is based on the technical qualities of the equipment.

• Why is there so much of noise about the timing being bad about the arms sale? The arms sale is contemplated to cast a shadow on India-US bilateral relations and the India-Pakistan peace process. Why does the US want to reward Pakistan when the US domestic constituency and the non-proliferators are all against it? According to the China Defence Daily's perception, India feels that even after obtaining F-16s, it will not be able to match the new air superiority of Pakistan. The Chinese are not na?ve to make such an observation. Hence, this aspect should be taken note of. On the issue of nuclear energy, India wants atomic energy and nuclear reactors but how will India get over the NSG?

• India needs to raise the level of the debate. If the sale of F-16s is not connected with business but with geo-strategic considerations, it maybe that in the mind of the US there is a bigger game. China comes in this in a big way. It is modernizing and acquiring a certain capability. To assume that US is negotiating with India without keeping China in mind would be incorrect.

• India has been thinking of acquiring the F-16s since much earlier. However, acquisition of F-16 or Mirage is not going to make much of a difference as far as capabilities on the ground are concerned. India is projected as an emerging power but it has not reached a stage where it cannot be manipulated. In contrast, China has overcome that stage where its progress cannot be scuttled. In the past, the US has been manipulating India through Pakistan. China has also played similar games with Pakistan to keep India down. Is it not the same game being played today? If the conventional parity with Pakistan remains, our progress will remain scuttled. This will also delay our plan of emerging as a global power from a regional power.

• Will the sale of F-16s to Pakistan stabilize the country? On this, the English media is very moderate stating that the deal came too late but it is still all right. As opposed to this the Urdu press says that the defence deal is only a ploy to get access to A Q Khan and Osama bin Laden.

• India-US relations has existed since 1947 and India has sought to acquire US defence equipment for a long time. There has been arms twisting and independent foreign policy has been influenced. The national security strategy shows subtle changes. The strategic dialogue between former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and his US counterpart should be part of public debate. This will help us to decide whether US is a reliable partner.

• India needs technology transfer, not license production. Will the US allow that considering that they have denied the same to their NATO allies? There exists a large gap between the US and the NATO countries on the aspect of technology. The US will transfer technology to India whole-heartedly as long as it is civilian in nature.

• For decades now, we have been defensive on the aspect of foreign policy. The need of the hour is to take a foreign policy initiative. Unless that stand is adopted, India will not be able to emerge as a global power.

Responses

• The evaluation system that is followed by our Air Force is absolutely sound. What is needed is the political and diplomatic input. F-16s can be utilized to hit any target. If that target happens to have an impact on counter-terrorism, so be it. We should treat the arms-sale with the limited significance that it obtains, and not go berserk.

• China and US supporting Pakistan have been in our system for such a long time. They are doing this because it is part of their bilateral relations. What is important is that are we in a position to utilize and use our leverages to talk to China and the US so that we are able to get a system which is advantageous to us?

• Dual use technology transfer would do the cementing of the culmination of a serious strategic relation. We are in the business of buying nuclear energy but what we might have to consider is about safeguards. Unless we agree on some kind of safeguards and inspections on our civilian reactors, there will not be much progress in the US administration with its Congress.

• As stated by Condoleezza Rice, the change towards India is not just second administration acceleration, but a culmination of a foreign policy change. So, there is a distinct change in US policy towards Pakistan.

• On the issue of conventional parity with Pakistan and scuttling of our emergence, this is getting hyphenated. India's emergence and its goals will decide our political stature as a global power or a regional power. Being hyphenated with Pakistan was part of the western understanding of South Asia, which is now changing after 9/11.

• There is the need for effective safeguards and inspection, as they will play a positive role in clinching the deal with the US.

• National policy cannot be brought into public debate as they contain classified information which if revealed will affect diplomatic relation.