Pakistani's political situation has been a matter of serious concern for some years particularly since the latest military take over of the country by General Musharraf on 12 October 1999. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's clumsy attempt to prevent the General's return from a ceremonial visit to Colombo failed and the Army took over governance of Pakistan for a third time. The Army in Pakistan has intervened in the governance of the country and has been in power for over 29 years out of a total of about 58 since independence. A Constituent Assembly was established in August 1948 but could not adopt a constitution due to lack of consensus. A constitution was ultimately adopted in 1956. Political governance was such that in 1955 the Governor General, Iskander Mirza, dismissed the Central and provincial governments, abolished all political parties. Subsequently, on 7 October 1958, Gen Ayub Khan was appointed the Chief Martial Law Administrator and Pakistan came under its first military rule.

In his recent book, The Idea of Pakistan, Stephen Cohen, describes Pakistan as, "a potential rogue state armed with nuclear weapons on whom the world, and especially India, keeps a close watch." After this observation, he continues in the 'Introduction,' "the largely military dominated entity that now possesses nuclear weapons…and is characterized by weak and uneven economic growth, political chaos and sectarian violence" and asks, "would Pakistan dissolve slowly or collapse in a sudden cataclysm?" Cohen holds out hope, when he raises the question, "Can Pakistan become a normal state at peace with its neighbours and itself", goes onto say, "A stable, prosperous, progressive Pakistan could trigger a new spurt of South Asian development, in partnership with India and Afghanistan. Many in India and Pakistan would hope for such a development as it would be good for the sub-continent and a positive development for the world."

Jinnah's demise in September 1948 followed by Liaqat Ali Khan's assassination in October 1951 gave Pakistan poor start. The Muslim League responsible for the establishment of Pakistan, was led by Mohajirs and lacked roots in Pakistan. Other parties took time to evolve and were without credible leaders. Thus, the military take over by General Ayub Khan became inevitable. Ayub's was a benign administration but his concept of 'Basic Democracy' did not catch on and he handed over the reigns of power to the Army Chief Gen Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan held general elections in 1970 but showed lack of realism in not letting Mujib-ur-Rehman and his Awami League form the government. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto reasoned that it would lead to Bengali domination, eclipse the West Pakistan political parties and cut the Army down to size.

Yahya's handling of the uprising that followed in East Pakistan was naive. India would not have had an opportunity to intervene if the general had not let loose a reign of terror to deal with what was termed as civil disobedience. A let down, which was even worse than Gen Yahya Khan's inability to deal with the situation of the 1970 elections, was the catastrophy of Bhutto's role. Here was a charismatic personality who had the benefit of good education and who could have established sound foundations of a democratic state committed to socio-economic development. Unfortunately the feudal lord in him prevailed. He was opinionated, foul tempered and had little time for others; he was intolerant to the limit. His biographies record how he got one of his own ministers beaten up. He selected Zia-ul-Haq as the Chief of Pakistan Army superseding a number of Generals but soon started to ill treat him; nick named him, 'my little monkey'. Bhutto created circumstances of chaos by opposition led protests which facilitated the second military take over on 5 July 1977 when Gen Zia-ul-Haq had Bhutto arrested and took over power.

Pakistan Army has been "interventionist" due to political instability. The Army has thus acquired a role in the governance of the country and wants to continue to perform this role a la Turkey. One specific feature, which it would require made permanent, is that the three chiefs of the armed forces as also the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee should form part of the National Security Council.

It is necessary for the Army and 'Political' Pakistan to work out a power sharing solution that ensures stability. Gen Musharraf's prime concern should be to have a suitable constitutional arrangement accepted. His recent statement in Islamabad on 9 April 2005 that checks and balances have been introduced by his government to ensure that martial law is never imposed again, is welcome. He would do his country a singular service if before 2007, when his present term expires, he can evolve a power sharing consensus with the political parties in Pakistan. Checks and balances to prevent military take over can go by the board. What is required is a political consensus. This would carry weight if Musharraf declared his resolve not to retain power after 2007. Such a declaration would absolve him of any vested interest. It is a formidable task and a genuine resolve of the Army and the political parties can achieve this for the sake of Pakistan. Political stability alone can permit pursuit of socio-economic development that should be the country's objective.