In a clear departure from its initial position, the United States is now willing to join its European allies - Britain, France and Germany - in offering Tehran incentives to halt its nuclear program. To recall, the November 2004 'deal' between the three European Union (EU) states and Tehran, the EU members had offered to support Iran's entry to the 'Expert Group of Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle' , negotiate a 'Trade and Cooperation Agreement' , and support Iran's accession to the 'World Trade Organization' negotiations if Iran froze its 'weapons' programme.

In similar vein and more recently, after Bush returned from his four-day Europe tour, it is believed that the US Administration is also considering 'inducements' rather than military action to deal with Iran's nuclear stalemate. During his visit to Europe, the US president clearly stated that "we want diplomacy to work, and I believe that diplomacy can work so long as the Iranian's don't divide Europe and the US." He also expressed that: "military action is certainly not... the President's first choice. Diplomacy is always the President's, or at least always my first choice and we've got a common goal, and that is Iran should not have nuclear weapon."

These developments have led the US Administration to think in terms of even having commercial sales of aircraft to Tehran, and further thinking in terms of even dropping its objection to Iran's membership to the WTO. At this point, it should be remembered that the present US position is a clear departure from Bush administration's past policies on Iran, which had argued that Iran should not be rewarded with economic and political incentives until it adhered to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to which it has been a signatory for long. Moreover, the US officials were also in disagreement with their European allies on the issue, which endorsed 'carrots' in exchange for Tehran's freezing its uranium-enrichment program.

         Notwithstanding this, the US should now also persuade its allies in West Asia, particularly Israel, to desist from making statements, which perhaps could be detrimental to Iran-EU negotiations. A senior US military commander had hinted that Iran may invite attack by another regional power if it succeeds in developing nuclear weapons. Clearly, the hints were towards Israel, which seems to be concerned about Iran's nuclear acquisitions. Israel considers that a nuclear armed Iran will destabilize the regional balance. Likewise, the US Vice President, Dick Cheney, had also stated that Israel might strike to shut down Iran's nuclear program.

         For Iran, it should also cooperate with the US, the EU, and the IAEA. Iran had denied the IAEA inspectors a follow-up visit to Parchin military site, which the West thought was being misused to test as to how a 'bomb' with a fissile material would work. Moreover, it also refused IAEA's queries about another military site: the Lavizan Shiyan.

Iran plans to go ahead with its proposed heavy water reactor plant despite the IAEA's request to refrain as a confidence building measure. As the IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, mentioned recently: "Iran must do more to assist IAEA inspections and that the inquest into whether Tehran is secretly developing nuclear weapons will still take some time to complete."

It appears, Tehran is keen to have an indigenous fuel production capability. To this extent, Iran has no plans to relinquish its nuclear-infrastructure, which it has built over the years. With some positive signals coming from the US, it also seems possible to do so within the frame-work of the NPT. According to Article IV of the NPT, states do have "inalienable rights to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," and to that extent, have the "right to participate in the fullest exchange of equipments, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of energy." However, Tehran's pattern of denials, concealment, evasions, and deceptions could only raise doubts about its nuclear intent.

The shift in US attitude towards Iran should, therefore, be seen as a positive step towards bridging decades of Washington-Tehran estrangement. Notably, there is a domestic constituency within US, which is also of the view that Tehran's nuclear imbroglio be dealt diplomatically. As the 'Report of the Independent Task Force' published last year by the Council of Foreign Relations, and authored by two former senior US officials, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Gates, point out: "The International Atomic Energy Agency process offers a viable path for managing Iran's nuclear efforts, provided that there is close multilateral coordination and firm US leadership. A strong European role is essential in marshalling an effective combination of pressure and incentives. But there must be a direct US engagement in the process to maintain vigilance and persuade Tehran of the potential costs of non-compliance." For Tehran, the current US position is an opportunity which needs to be seized.