An exhausted-meaning syndrome seems to have afflicted the Government of India (GOI) in its peace talks with the insurgencies of Northeast India. The delay in translating the unilateral ceasefire by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) to a peace negotiation is a case in point. As early as 30 September 2004, the Government of Assam offered peace talks to the NDFB and the ULFA. The former responded by declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 15 October 2004. It was followed by green signals from the GOI to Assam for tripartite talks with the organisation. However, after five months, there exist no ground rules of a formal ceasefire between the GOI and the outfit. Accusing the Government of dishonesty and killing its cadres during the unilateral ceasefire, the NDFB has repeatedly warned that its unilateral offer should not be construed as a weakness and threatened to opt out of it in the absence of positive responses.

What is taking the GOI so long to finalise a set of ceasefire rules to start peace talks? Does it consider the group's firepower too insignificant to cause enough harm to the lives of the people and to the integrity of the nation? Or, is there a puzzle of not knowing what territory the talks would enter? Affirming the latter seems more convincing if one takes into account the history of GOI's peace talks with the insurgencies in the region. The proclivity for talks with stronger groups regardless of the represented interests and the scant appreciation of the socio-economic and historical interdependence of various communities has resulted in redrawing of boundaries between communities with the aim of erecting closures around themselves. The exclusivities hence produced have, apart from consolidating existing boundaries, given birth to new identities and 'ethnies' which are mutually exclusive, even offensive at times. It has been either forgotten or repressed that the claims and interests are overlapping and a solution to these cannot work on the basis of these exclusivities. The resultant anarchy of meanings is a product of an ill diagnosis of the problems confronting the region: the problem had been read as insurgency, not their causes. These exclusivities had so far served well the security-centric approach to the region.

Now, when the dominant mood in the region is for peace, the GOI finds itself in a fix. Talks have either been initiated or ready to be, but without a clear knowledge of how far it is willing to go. This uncertainty is a natural result of realizing an uncomfortable truth of inextricability of the various claims and counterclaims. Following the tradition of security, the GOI may still utilize the differences and counterclaims as a tool in its bargaining with individual insurgent outfits. But a solution for enduring peace in the Northeast will have to abandon this shortsighted solution of military strategists. A political solution, which has been more of rhetoric so far, has to strive to bring together on a common platform the various communities, insurgencies and civil society. The aim should be in terms of creating a minimum consensus to be broadened and maximized on every future occasion.

The roadblock faced in starting talks with the NDFB is an occasion for the GOI to reconceptualise its policy towards the Northeast as a whole. The former diagnosis that preferred one group over the other to solve the same problem is proving inadequate. Currently, the influential All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) seems to be leaning towards the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) and has demanded that it along with the BTC be included in the peace talks with the NDFB. Was it not possible to conceptualize the previous talks on such inclusive ways? The BTC today has a demarcated area of jurisdiction with an amount of self rule. What must be bothering the Government of India is what it can offer to the NDFB under the circumstances. An autonomous state will cause an upheaval in Assam and has problems of setting a further precedent. Inducting all its cadres in the paramilitary will amount to paving an alternate way of recruiting personnel for the forces, despite the agreement with the Bodo Liberation Tigers in 2003 having such an understanding.

The reading, again, in some circles is that following the Bhutan offensive in 2003, the outfit has been dilapidated. This argument falls in the same military approach and asks the people to wait for peace until the outfits come to such a stage, and defers indefinitely a dialogue to solve genuine problems, while failing to guarantee that no new insurgency will emerge after their 'natural' death. It is high time the Government of India let go off its inhibitions about un/conditional talks with the insurgencies of the region. That could well be the first step in bringing them together on a common platform for talks. Without that, remnants will keep emerging; and there is no guarantee remnants will prove less dangerous.