When the purged leader Zhao Ziyang died on 17 January, the international media brought China again under the democracy scanner. Memories of the Tiananmen resistance of 1989 arose afresh with expectations that another democratic movement would emerge since Zhao had stood for open democracy and the rule of law.

One month later, there are no signs of any Tiananmen. While the government was on guard, the Chinese media, too, in the last fifteen years had deliberately consigned Zhao to the archives of Chinese politics. The remnants of the 1989 movement have been systematically suppressed. But ask any Chinese, and 'he would let you know that he is more interested in economic empowerment; political empowerment be a logical supplement. This is indeed the truth behind the Chinese citizens' silence.

If China is not enthusiastic about democracy, it is because its grand strategy is preoccupied with the 'four modernizations' conceived in 1979: agriculture, industry, science-technology and military. Democracy could emerge only as a distant 'fifth' modernization. Any emphasis on democracy would distract attention from the four modernizations. Also, the CCP wants to have complete control over the reforms. Further, China does not believe in 'shock therapy'. Incrementalism has been the hallmark of Chinese reforms. After successfully experimenting village elections since 1987, the government made it mandatory in 1998 through legislation. Now the experiment is being extended to urban areas. Even if they are not truly democratic, a new democratic consciousness and political involvement is evident at the grass roots level. The problem lies at the upper echelons. The CCP is not willing to dilute its control over power. A Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), does exist, an umbrella arrangement of eight other 'recognized' political parties. This is, however, a deceptive arrangement and these parties play no role in Chinese politics.

China's unwillingness to introduce multi-party democracy has brought it into conflict with the West. Cultural diversity is being increasingly recognized in international relations, a section of Western thinkers is appalled with China's compound of liberalizing economics and repressive politics (called 'Market Leninism' by Nicholas Kristof). China's own defence is unconvincing. It considers Western liberal democracy to be a source of 'spiritual pollution'. Further, it claims that democracy cannot be 'dictated' and 'superimposed' upon a country. Democracy, China insists, should take into consideration local characteristics and traditions. China's own model of democracy, 'the socialist democracy' emphasizes on economic, cultural, and communitarian rights. Also, instead of the Western preference for the individual, China emphasizes on Asian values such as discipline, hierarchy, duties and sacrifice in any debate on democracy.

So what is China's democratic future? Bruce Gilley, in his book, China's Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead (Columbia University Press, 2004), says that China is likely to democratize by 2020. One may differ with the deadline but not with the optimism. First, the East Asian model of development with which China shares broad characteristics, suggests that democracy may be a consequence of development and not a pre-requisite for development. This means that, sooner or later, democracy will follow development in China. Second, there has been an upsurge of democratic regimes in China's neighbourhood. The former Soviet republics, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and many Southeast Asian countries have adopted some form of democracy. Hong Kong has democracy, even if it is a facade. Third, as one of the few surviving communist regimes, there is increasing pressure on China to democratize. In many ways, the future great power role of China will be linked to a democratic regime in Beijing. Also, a possible unity with Taiwan may be achieved only on some democratic foundation. Fourth, thanks to economic prosperity, growing consumerism, and Internet, there is a fledgling civil society. But for the Tiananmen incident of 1989, progress could have been more rapid. Fifth, China is moving beyond the personalized rule of a single leader. Gone are the days when their leaders would only retire 'to the graveyard. Now there is a retirement age for everybody. The Hu Jintao - Wen Jiabao regime may not be aiming at multi-party democracy, but, they are certainly interested in bringing some 'intra-party democracy' as an institutional compromise between single-party authoritarianism and multi-party democracy.

China's past behaviour indicates an adherence to global trends. It has slowly opened up to liberalization, privatization, and globalization. It is participating in WTO and UN peacekeeping operations. Finally, China is also adopting regionalism and multilateralism as being practiced in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, it is doubtful if China will be immune from the 'great democratic wave' for long.

* The views expressed are his own.