In a significant turn of events, the US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld is believed to have recently remarked that Iran is "years away from having a nuclear weapon" and that the United States would perhaps prefer diplomacy over military action to deal with it on the nuclear issue. The statement came a week after the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit to Europe wherein she stressed on diplomacy as the road to dealing with Iran's nuclear ambitions. Clearly, with two senior US officials stating so, it appears that the US is now backing its European allies to try and resolve the Iran nuclear question through diplomacy.

However, there are also media reports suggesting Washington is covertly persuading its European allies and, in fact, Russia as well to stall its 'nuclear' deals. Washington fears that Russian nuclear-fuel supply to Bushehr reactor along with other facilities which Iran is building would move Tehran closer to acquiring a bomb under the cover of a civilian program. While Iran's nuclear stalemate may now have reduced to a bilateral issue between Iran-US and Iran-European Union, the debate indeed has once again triggered a more fundamental discourse on the issue of 'rights' and 'obligations' of the nuclear 'haves' vs. the 'have nots' under the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT) of 1970 .

Proliferation of nuclear capability is a fact. It is also clear that nuclear technology is primarily 'dual-use'. Today, at least eight nations have demonstrated nuclear-weapons capability. Many more have the technology or have renounced their 'weapons' option. However, it should be clear, that under the obligations of NPT, there is no restriction on any country possessing or building an enrichment plant like Iran is doing at the moment.

Article III, Para 2, of the NPT clearly states : "Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article." The next paragraph of Article III or Para 3 qualifies what it lays out in the preceding paragraph when it says: "The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear materials and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this treaty and the principle of safeguarding set for in the Preamble of the Treaty."

However, under the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Trigger List, a list of items that fell in the ambit of Article III, Para 2, of the NPT was developed, which has put restrictions to nuclear commerce. It is in this context that the entire question of nuclear energy for civilian purposes is gaining credence. The issue has become more relevant in the context of the NPT Review Conference, which is scheduled this May.

Post 9/11, the validity of NPT and NSG also has been compromised on at least two counts. First, states that are not party to it have the capacity to provide the required equipment. Secondly, the spread of 'private' nuclear network also includes individuals from at least three of the NSG signatory members: Britain, Germany and Switzerland; thereby, highlighting the weaknesses of such nuclear 'cartels'. The NPT and the NSG model to contain proliferation, therefore, appear to have weakened; and indeed have proved to be detrimental to the overall civilian nuclear industry and fuel supply. For sure, the need for civilian nuclear power will expand worldwide. Nuclear power generation would cater to significantly large chunk of the future energy demand. As a result, the proposed measures to combat nuclear proliferation by largely focusing on greater controls over the nuclear fuel cycle, tightening of existing export control regimes, and even further, criminalizing proliferation may not work as desired. Indeed to extend the argument further, the situation today is so grim that the possibility of numerous states resorting to clandestine networks for nuclear procurements to meet their burgeoning energy demands can not be completely ruled out. Iran's case should be instructive in this respect.

It is against this backdrop that the effort today should be primarily geared towards looking into fresh approaches towards evolving an effective non proliferation strategy wherein states should have a greater appreciation of the risks of weapons proliferation even as there is a greater international cooperation amongst them in the civilian nuclear sector.