Six months after Pokhran-II: Where do we go from here?
07 Jan, 1999 · 165
Report of the ninth IPCS Seminar on the Implications of Nuclear Testing in South Asia
The following is a report of the seminar organized by the IPCS on 18 December 1988 . The speakers were P.R. Chari and Dr. Kanti Bajpai.
Chari
brought out the difference and comparison of options before
India
after Pokhran I and Pokhran II. He noted that Pokhran I was called a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, but Pokhran II was clearly designed for military purposes. He dwelt on the structure of the international system and noted that economics have become more important. He also observed that the cost, in economics terms, of not cooperating with the international regime is greater now than what it was in 1974. He particularly highlighted international trade, foreign direct investment, and access to dual use technologies.
India
viz. rollback, cap or weaponise & deploy the nuclear option. He ruled out rollback as an option for domestic political reasons. The capping option questioned the logic of the tests. Weaponisation and deployment would be a difficult choice as there would be heavy direct and indirect costs and
India
would remain a victim of current technology control regimes.
India
's nuclear restraint policy could be used to leverage technology. There were voices in the
US
that
India
could be offered 'incentives' alongside 'disincentives' to ensure that it does not proceed further on the nuclear path. The feeling in the
US
was that
India
was willing to accept the status-quo in lieu of access to dual use technology. Such a posture might be unacceptable to
India
because of domestic reasons, with the feeling developing that it was being bought off. What would be more saleable would be to use
India
's current nuclear situation to effect nuclear disarmament. It could also engage the nuclear weapon states, especially the
US
, in a dialogue to discuss the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this framework, the proposal for nuclear 'de-alerting' tabled by
India
in the UN General Assembly was an adroit step. If the nuclear weapon states were unwilling to even discuss the elimination of nuclear weapons then it could be argued that any rollback by India would be as difficult as it is was for the nuclear weapon states to proceed towards nuclear disarmament.
India
needed to be more forthright about what was required for deterrence. If
India
was determined to go nuclear, then he was in favour of a long range Agni since mid air refuelling facilities were unavailable and
India
did not have a nuclear submarine. He also examined
India
's capability vis-à-vis
China
and suggested
India
had a long way to go before it had a survivable second strike. .
India
shares borders with two nuclear capable states, and in a crisis situation, wondered how much would be enough and what kind of doctrine would be enunciated for a two front situation. He welcomed the recent Indian initiative in the United Nations on de-alerting nuclear weapons. He also asked what minimum deterrence meant and whether it included thermo-nuclear weapons and tactical weapons? And, also if a de-mated posture would be credible.
China
, Dr. Bajpai was in favour of “untying the knot” without giving the impression that
India
was apologising. He was in favour of regular discussions with
Pakistan
by “dedicated” teams. He also discussed co-operation with the middle powers and the need to engage
NAM
. He added that
India
should back a global campaign for eliminating tactical nuclear weapons. He highlighted the need for building a consensus within the country and the Parliament on key nuclear policy issues.
China
. Another participant raised the question whether
India
had the capability to carry out sub critical tests. A retired Air Force official noted that 1998 was militarily different from 1974. He said that nuclear capability and deterrence needs to be clarified. He argued that a retaliatory capability is different from a second strike capability.
Pakistan
and
China
. Another participant questioned why did
India
stop testing after 5 tests? Some scientists have argued that this was enough, but these claims have been challenged by others. He also said that, in a India-China conflict scenario,
Pakistan
would be drawn in. He also asked if
India
was willing to use nuclear weapons in a first or second strike mode, since there is a moral dilemma here. Another participant said that there was no study on minimum deterrence, how much was essential, and at what cost.
He outlined three choices before
He wondered if
Dr. Bajpai highlighted various positions in the nuclear debate. He talked of a maximalist, pragmatist and rejectionist positions in the nuclear debate, and suggested that the maximalists would put pressure on the pragmatists to move towards a more extensive and classical deterrence posture. The maximalists would like to go beyond 100-120 Hiroshima-type devices, a de-mated nuclear force, and “deterrence by uncertainty”.
On military issues he argued that
On doctrinal issues, he was in favour of a global no-first-use initiative. He also highlighted the fact that
On foreign policy issues, he was in favour of signing the CTBT and engaging in FMCT negotiations. With
In the discussions that followed a retired military official raised the important question of national consensus on nuclear issues. He also said that the government should spell out its posture clearly; for instance, no-first-use posture was not acceptable to any nuclear weapons or threshold ,state except for
Another participant argued that there is no possibility of the CTBT going through in 1999. He also observed that the definition of minimum deterrence needs to be discussed with