Dialogue with Naxals: Doomed to Fail
18 Feb, 2005 · 1647
Prafulla Ketkar argues that the talks with Naxals ended in failure primarily because it was approached by the Government of Andhra Pradesh as a populist policy without any ground works
The euphoria over the talks between the Naxalites and the Andhra Pradesh government that began in October last year is over. This initiative, considered an unprecedented move to stop the four-decade history of violence in the State, has ended with the Naxalites deciding to pull out of the talks. But when we look into these developments, it seems inevitable that it was bound to happen, as the initiative was a halfhearted political gimmick without any groundwork or thinking. Without viable policy measures to address the roots of the problem, the dialogue was doomed to fail.
After taking over as Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, Y S Rajasekhara Reddy extended an invitation to the Maoists and the Jana Shakthi to come for talks in line with his commitment during the election campaign. The State government allowed the ban on the ultras to lapse to create a conducive atmosphere. It gave them the status of State guests during the first round of talks.
These talks went on for four days from 15 to 18 October, but ended without conclusion. Both sides could not reach a ceasefire agreement. The crux of the disagreement was clause 7, according to which Naxalites wanted permission to retain their arms, which was unacceptable to the government. So the issue was deferred to the next round of talks.
Another issue highlighted by the ultras in the first round of talks was the distribution of land to the landless. The Naxalites wanted the government to constitute a land commission for this purpose with statutory powers. The ultras insisted on distribution of at least one crore acres of land. On this issue, the Chief Minister has set up a committee to identify the land, and the government decided to distribute one-lakh acres for the time being.
Besides these core issues of arms and land, the Naxalites raised issues like creating a democratic atmosphere, right to education and health, and restoring social welfare on top of the Government's agenda. Though the government was positive on these issues, it could give any firm commitment to the ultras.
Since the peace process began, senior police officials have accused the Naxalites of moving around with arms and indulging in criminal activities like extortions, intimidation and land grabbing. On the other hand, the CPI (Maoist) and CPI-ML (Janashakti) leaders allege that the government disallowed Naxal meetings and unleashed the police forces for undertaking combing operations and fake encounters. Still peace was prevailing despite the atmosphere of distrust. Between 13 May and 31 December 2004, the Naxalites committed only four murders. Not a single policeman or Naxalite was killed during this period, though five encounters and a landmine blast took place in the last few weeks of the year. But the scene altered dramatically in January with the police launching combing operations in a big way and the Naxalites resuming their violent activities against political leaders, policemen and alleged informants. A series of encounters led to the death of 11 comrades, prompting the Naxalites to pull out of the talks.
This history is repeating itself in AP for the last thirty years ever since the movement spread to the State in 1968 and struck roots in the Telangana region. Successive chief ministers tried a "blow hot, blow cold" policy, but could not wipe out this movement.
Without learning anything from the mistakes made by his predecessors on the Naxal issue, YSR entered into a dialogue as a populist measure. It is true that Naxalism is a socio-economic and political problem. A comprehensive dialogue framework can resolve the problem, for which three pre-conditions are necessary. Firstly, the government has to take a decisive stand on the issues related to retaining arms by Naxals and land distribution. Secondly, without issuing clear-cut instructions to the police about dealing with Naxals under a ceasefire agreement, the process cannot be complete, as the police have to deal with the problem at the ground level. And lastly, the government has to differentiate between the political struggle and criminal activities by naxal groups. Crimes like extortion, money laundering, and arms supply are unpardonable, and the government should take firm steps to curb it.
Most importantly, Naxalism stems out of excessive socio-economic inequalities, which are not limited to AP. The Naxals are gaining ground in many parts of India, particularly Andhra Pradesh, eastern Maharashtra, western Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar, West Bengal and some parts of Uttar Pradesh. They are establishing a strong network with other revolutionary organizations like the MCC, CPI (ML) and Maovadis in Nepal. So unless some clear policy formulation and guidelines are provided by the Center, the problem of Naxalism cannot be addressed effectively.
