The Dawn of 5 October 1999 published an article authored jointly by Agha Shahi, Zulfigar Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar which discussed the exigency under which Islamabad may consider the use of nuclear weapons. They state, "if the enemy launches a war and undertakes a piercing attack to occupy large territories or communication junction, the weapon of last resort would have to be invoked."

A number of Pakistan's senior retired military officers have subsequently written about their first use doctrine citing India's superiority in conventional military forces as the raison detre. Writing in Pakistan Defence Journal (1999), Lt Gen F S Lodhi states, "In a deteriorating Military situation when an Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defences, which cannot be restored by conventional means at our disposal, the Government would be left with no option except to use nuclear weapons." In the Defence Journal issue of 2000, Brigadier Saeed Ismat writes about an Indian Offensive "to dismember Pakistan". Analysts in India take these assertions of India's military prowess as a compliment and let it pass. Execution of a nuclear strike by Pakistan, in response, is assumed as a fact of life. Is it? Will Pakistan go to the extant of actually launching a nuclear weapon? General Lodhi talks of "stage by stage" approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step to deter India. He talks about "a demonstration explosion of a small nuclear weapon on its own soil" and goes on to say that this would be followed by "a few nuclear weapons on its own soil against Indian attacking forces." His next stage is "against critical but purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan - probably in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing least collateral damage". Gen Lodhi does not seem to have grasped the nature of nuclear weapon nor the implications of their use even if these are tactical nukes. Two nuclear weapon states (NWS) may engage in a limited conventional weapons war but if one invokes the nuclear weapon, it must be with the full realization that the other will retaliate with an immediate full nuclear weapon response and the result will be mutual assured destruction (MAD). One NWS will not be allowed to play a one-sided game of chess as it were. Besides such developments would attract world attention and big powers like the United States would act speedily to prevent a nuclear flash point developing in South Asia. The 19 January 2005 statement of Condoleeza Rice confirms that the US has contingency plan to exfiltrate Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in certain circumstances.

One must also question the whole basis of the line of argument put forth by Pakistan to justify its first use doctrine; the threat of dismemberment of Pakistan by India's superiority in conventional military forces. In the 1965 war, as also on India's western front in 1971 war, the Indian incursions were marginal. The dismembering in 1971, the declaration of independence in East Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh was caused by Pakistan's political inability to deal with the situation. If it had accepted the result of the national elections and appointed Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman the Prime Minister of Pakistan, East Pakistan may not have separated.

The objective of the Indian Army in the 1965 war was to lean on the Ichogil Canal, just across the international border, and fight a battle of attrition, to inflict the maximum damage to Pakistan's military machine.

The mobilisation of Indian military strength in 2002, Operation Parakaram, lasted 10 months or more but no offensive was launched either across the LoC in J&K or on the Rajasthan-Sind Border, where India's three strike corps would have faced two of Pakistan's resulting in a stalemate. Pakistani assertions of India's military strength and capabilities and the consequent requirement for it to adopt the first use doctrine in respect of its nuclear weapon capability has no basis.

The possibility of two nuclear weapon states (NWS) fighting a conventional war has been debated for over 50 years. While at Staff College, Camberley, in 1950, we discussed this issue and came to the conclusion that it is possible that two NWS may fight a limited war with conventional weapons without invoking the nuclear arsenal. Subsequently, there is also the realization of the limitations of military power in as far as middle order states with near parity in conventional military power are concerned. This ordains that war should be avoided as it provides no solution; neither country is in a position to enforce its will on the other militarily. In these circumstances, Pakistan needs to review its Nuclear Weapon Doctrine.