Arzan Tarapore, Intern, IPCS

Speakers: Prof Stephen Cohen and Prof PR Chari
Chair: Amb Eric Gonsalves

Prof PR Chari

Introduction:

Prof Chari began by expressing his thanks to USIP and noting there is no final decision yet on whether this report would be published in its current form or expanded and continued.

This report is the third in a series, following studies on 'Operation Brasstacks' of 1987 and the "compound crisis" of 1990. It focuses on the post-1998 environment, especially the crises of the Kargil war in 1999, and 'Operation Parakram', the mass mobilisation of 2001-02. The common feature of these crises is that they challenged the conventional wisdom that democracies do not wage war on each other, and that nuclear powers do not engage in direct conflict.

Limited war under the nuclear shadow:

This third report concludes, contrary to conventional wisdom, that nuclear deterrence does not prevent sub-conventional or conventional conflict between nuclear powers, and may even exacerbate those tensions. This is the stability-instability paradox.

The Kargil war, for example, was launched by Pakistan as small-scale infiltrations, possibly with a calculation that it could have escalated to full conventional war. Nuclear deterrence allowed Pakistan to consider that it had cover for a potential conventional war, and successfully deterred both sides from escalating the conflict.

This reflects a belief in South Asia (unlike that held in the west during the Cold War) that conventional and nuclear conflicts are disconnected – conventional wars can be waged without direct bearing on the stability of nuclear deterrence.

A war can be limited by four parameters: time, geography, weaponry used, and objectives sought. The Cold Start strategy, which seeks to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff with limited offensives, provides all corps with offensive capability and upgrades the role of Special Forces. The tactical objectives may include a rapid shallow invasion, destroying terrorist infrastructure or Pakistani military assets, or hot pursuit of militants - all limited objectives. The strategic objective would be to get India out of its post-1998 "strategic box" of being deterred by Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from acting against Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir.

Limited war advocates assert that the rationality of Pakistan's leadership will preclude their use of nuclear weapons. This is not a purely theoretical assumption. It underlies strategic thinking that will inform India's operational planning and force structuring, and is therefore central to strategic stability in South Asia.

Conclusions of the report:

Prof Chari then briefly outlined the 10 conclusions of the report.

First, the Kargil and 'Operation Parakram' crises demonstrated that Mutually Assured Destruction deterrence is operating in South Asia, and that both sides have fairly recessed redlines for resorting to nuclear strikes. But it remains unclear how much of their restraint is due not to direct deterrence, but to a lack of political will or external intervention.

Second, in contrast, both sides are prepared to engage in dangerous brinkmanship. The leadership of both countries are more aware of the utility of nuclear weapons as a political tool rather than their military implications. So provocative statements are easily made, often for domestic or third-party (chiefly US) audiences, which may send mixed signals to the adversary. Stability is also undermined by a lack of substantive progress on confidence-building measures, and by the role of China, which has been benignly uninvolved in recent crises, but retains the potential to complicate future crises.

Third, each side's leadership has apparently learned little from past crises. Their provocative declarations and strategic postures indicate a belief that deterrence works, but only in restraining the other side, not their own actions.

Fourth, the role of the US continues to enlarge, since its intervention in the Kargil war or even earlier. But certain paradoxes complicate its role. It urges restraint in Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, while continuing to develop its own capabilities, especially with smaller weapons (such as "bunker busters") designed for use in war rather than as a strategic deterrent. Both sides have sought US intervention in crises, even though both sides remain staunch advocates of bilateralism, and Pakistan still sees the US as a potential threat to its nuclear program. And while the US insists that its relations with India and Pakistan are not a zero-sum game, it remains difficult to exercise a fine balance, especially when it maintains a physical presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Overall, the US has a growing interest in the region and can play a stabilising role in crises.

Fifth, the issue of Kashmir remains central to India-Pakistan relations, as evidenced by its prominence in the Composite Dialogue process, and cannot be ignored.

Sixth, maintaining the status quo is easier than revising it. Put another way, as the Kargil and 'Operation Parakram' crises showed, deterrence is more effective than coercion, regardless of which side assumes which posture.

Seventh, successive India-Pakistan crises have resulted in renewed attempts to develop confidence-building measures. But the centralised nature of national security leadership on each side makes it difficult to consolidate these initiatives into a more enduring peace process.

Eighth, despite some growing interdependence, there are few signs of long-term accommodative policies in either country. The search for new doctrines, and strategies like Cold Start, are potentially very destabilising.

Ninth, on the other hand, the recent crises have shown three potentially stabilising trends: a growing restraint in each state's crisis management behaviour, growing transparency in their strategies, and growing US involvement in crisis resolution.

Finally, in assessing the effects of the 1998 nuclearisation of the region, the jury is still out. It is unclear whether the nuclear tests had a positive or negative effect on regional strategic stability.

Prof Stephen Cohen

The methodology of this study allows different perspectives (from India, Pakistan, and the US) to be aired, while also maintaining some deniability in the attribution of views to individual authors. This entire three-part USIP project seeks to add to existing literature on crisis management, especially the analysis of the 1990 "compound crisis," which analysed how a confluence of separate crises, between the two sides as well as within each state, combined into a major complex crisis.

This study's conclusions on nuclear deterrence reflect a fundamental lack of certainty, despite extensive literature on crisis management and scenario-building. Such scenario-based studies are not reliable, since crises are inherently complex and unpredictable.

The authors were also interested in analysing the politics of crisis management - the perceptions and decision-making of each side's leadership. The efficacy of learning from each incident and the stability of the policy process depend on the characteristics and the continuity of the leadership.

There are at least two strategic triangles in the region. In the India-Pakistan-US triangle, both India and Pakistan have sought to use the US for their own ends. With greater reliance on the US, for example as a source of information, the actions of the US have greater consequence for each crisis. In the India-Pakistan-China triangle, China's role in South Asia is less predictable (but perhaps more constructive) than before.

In the next phase of this project, some of the analysis may be rewritten, but the conclusions will remain the same.

Discussion

A range of topics of discussion were raised by the participants.

Regional balance of power:

• In the strategic competition between India and Pakistan, it could be said, as Ashley Tellis has argued, that Pakistan's window of opportunity is closing as India's power continues to rise. India's growing economic clout, international prestige, and conventional military superiority, all contribute to limit Pakistan's options. This will inevitably influence future crisis management.

• Nuclear crises in South Asia cannot disregard the role of China. Prof Chari claimed, however, that with the passage of time, China would seek to work itself out of the South Asian strategic triangle, to become less entangled and more balanced between India and Pakistan.

• Prof Chari noted some points to suggest a long-term improvement in India-Pakistan ties, based on systemic factors. First, economic interdependence and international pressures are making revisionism more difficult to pursue. Second, the US is increasingly playing a regional role in South Asia with its actions in Afghanistan and its growing involvement in Nepal and Bangladesh. Third, people-to-people links and Track-II processes are growing. These are all hopeful signs.

Economic dimension of crises:

• It is also important to analyse the economic dimension of crises. However, Prof Chari disagreed with the contention that 'Operation Parakram' was initiated to economically coerce Pakistan - the cost was very high on both sides. Moreover, Prof Cohen argued, India cannot afford to have a failing Pakistan - in a doomsday scenario, that could leave 3-4 Pakistani corps commanders with control over nuclear weapons, which could potentially be used against India or transferred to terrorists.

• On the issue of economic development, we should study Southeast Asia, where interdependence is overcoming political fears, or China-Japan relations, where mutual threat perceptions do not preclude large and growing investments.

US intervention:

• According to the Bruce Riedel report on the Kargil war, the US played a central role in resolving the crisis by "bullying" Sharif. Prof Chari asserted (and Prof Cohen agreed) that the Riedel report is believable because it was corroborated by Strobe Talbot.

• He also agreed that it was possible, as Riedel argues, that Sharif did not know about Pakistani preparations for nuclear launch. Some participants insisted, however, that no nuclear preparations were made at any point during the Kargil war, on either side. US intelligence (on Pakistani nuclear preparations) may not be blemish-free, many participants agreed, but Prof Cohen argued that it was believed by the Clinton Administration, and so its political consequences were real.

Pakistani control of nuclear arsenal:

• The safe custody of the Pakistani arsenal will be critical in future crises. Pakistani officials have assured India and the world that their arsenal is safe. But the possibility remains for a "Seven Days in May" scenario (of a plot against the government by hawkish elements of the military). Prof Chari noted that India and Pakistan are both undergoing a learning process on how to be nuclear powers.

Defining limited war:

• There is apparently a need to redefine limited war in the South Asian context. One participant suggested that it be defined as the conduct of hostilities with the intent of restoring grand-strategic (not simply nuclear or even military) deterrence as quickly as possible, through political, economic, and diplomatic means. These limited objectives would then ensure that hostilities are also limited.

• The Cold War was a broad conflict, but rarely territorial, as the rivalry is in South Asia. Pakistan has consistently seen territorial gain as its objective, and seen military means as viable. In this context, keeping a conflict limited will be very difficult, especially given the narrow military structure of Pakistan's leadership, and a body of strategic thinking that has always considered nuclear weapons as a war-fighting weapon.

Cold Start:

• The fundamental objective of Cold Start is not to wage offensive operations more effectively, but to prepare for operations more efficiently, by avoiding a long, drawn-out mobilisation process. By integrating offensive and defensive formations, India may be able to avoid repeating the failings of 'Operation Parakram', which in effect negated India's conventional superiority.

Irrational behaviour in crises:

• Prof Chari pointed out that, by all rational calculations, the Kargil war was a strategic blunder by Pakistan. Even if it was tactically successful, it failed to account for the international environment and completely misread India's reaction. As Prof Cohen noted, this highlights the importance of personalities in crisis management, especially in Pakistan.

Limited war as a policy option:

• Limited war may or may not be militarily feasible, but the question remains whether it is advisable, given the uncertainties of escalation control and Pakistan's traditionally risk-taking behaviour. Even if it is true that the outcome cannot be predicted, policy-makers are still forced to make decisions and make plans based on some assumptions.

Objectives in limited war:

• Keeping war limited requires an acceptance by both sides of limited success as well as limited failure. The Kargil war, for example, may have been a failure in garnering international support for Pakistan's stance on Kashmir, but it was a success in bolstering the position of the army in Pakistan. It may not have been a strategic success, but it may nevertheless have provided some political success to some Pakistani elements. Prof Chari, however, cautioned against using ex post facto rationalisations, which may be manipulated by interested parties for narrow political advantage.

Stability of strategic deterrence:

• Recent crises (Kargil and 'Operation Parakram') have shown that both sides continue to take risks. However, Prof Cohen argued, tension and crisis may be creative - brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy may achieve positive results, if conducted carefully.

• According to Prof Cohen, one of the greatest dangers of the India-Pakistan-China strategic triangle is the threat of further proliferation, especially to non-state actors. This triangle links the Middle East (through Pakistan) and Northeast Asia (through China), so the dynamics of India-Pakistan relations have very far-reaching effects on proliferation.

Confidence-building measures:

• Attempts to build effective CBMs always suffer from difficulties in understanding each side's intent and language. Prof Chari agreed that the language of the CBMs must be common. Continued dialogue on security doctrines and concepts, and their increasing standardisation, is the most important aspect of bilateral talks. Amb Gonsalves agreed that CBMs must not be restricted to a single dimension - they must be broad-based, to build an attitude of cooperation.

Concluding remarks:

• Amb Gonsalves offered some concluding remarks. Fears over keeping a future crisis or war limited are exacerbated by Pakistan's less stable, non-civilian leadership - the army's role in Pakistani society is an asymmetry that India cannot address, only accept and understand. A long-term peace process would benefit from a Helsinki-type process that is region-wide (not only bilateral) and multi-dimensional (not only military). Such fundamental processes – decreasing competition with Pakistan and building ties with China – would contribute to an Asian system that could counter-balance the US superpower and restore some checks and balances to the international system.