In the first part earlier we described the circumstances in which the UN High Level Panel was constituted, its terms of reference and considered the Panel's recommendations covering the first two parts of the report.

Part 3 deals with collective security and the use of force. The Panel considered that there were three conditions in which collective force may be necessary. One is in self-defence, which is covered under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Second, when a state aggresses across borders, when under Chapter VII, the Security Council has been empowered to take collective action against the aggressor.

The third is in cases where a state is unable to carry out the primary function of protecting its citizens, where the Panel feels the international community has a responsibility to extend this protection, but with major qualifications. Five criteria are laid down as guidelines; seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences. The Report calls for declaratory resolutions in both the Security Council and the General Assembly embodying these principles. This issue will be much debated around the world, but the necessity for intervention as well as the rare occasion when this might be necessary, are clearly established.

Intervention should be only through the UN. It is equally important that the UN's legitimacy and capacity to undertake such actions are both enhanced. There are two areas where there is need for urgent attention. One, is to ensure wider participation in peace operations. Far too often in recent years has this been largely entrusted to the developing world while the developed countries have hesitated to commit their armed forces. In recent years South Asia has often contributed up to some 40 per cent of these forces while the major powers and members of the Security Council have been reluctant to do so. The second issue is one of response, both in time and with sufficient and comprehensive capability.

The question of response calls for a debate once again on stand-by forces for peace operations. It is accepted that early response by well trained forces can transform a conflict situation for the better. Allowed to simmer and develop, it may well become intractable and require much larger forces to control subsequently. Yet, who contributes force, where they are located, how they are paid for, who controls them when not deployed and how and where stocks are deployed, are all issues that are contested and will be hotly debated.

Finally, there is the question of post-conflict peace-building. Once hostilities stop and peace is established, it must be allowed to take roots. The UN should not turn away till this process is clearly established.

The Final part of the Report deals with restructuring the UN system. There are substantive recommendations on improving the functioning of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Human Rights, the UN Charter and the Secretariat. However, two major issues need only to be highlighted here. One, is the recommendation to establish a Peacebuilding Commission. There have been far too many examples in recent decades of states collapsing while the world has stood by. The Report recommends a Commission that will identify countries at risk of failing and then through partnership with these countries and the international community, prevent their coming apart. A new and challenging task.

The second substantive issue is the expansion of the Security Council. The composition of the Security Council represents the world order of 1945 and not of the 21st Century. To provide legitimacy as well as the necessary authority to this important organisation, it is imperative that its legitimacy and authority are enhanced, democratised and widened. The Panel gave deliberate thought to this. It agreed that the idea of increasing veto wielding permanent members will not be acceptable in the world of today. On expanding the membership, the Panel could arrive at no consensus and put forward two models. The total membership was recommended to be increased to 24. There would be no change in the five permanent veto wielding members. Of the rest, Model A recommended six new permanent seats and thirteen two-year non-renewable seats. Model B recommended 8 new four-year renewable seats and eleven two-year non-renewable seats.

Several comments may be made on both models and many will be right to criticise it, from their respective perspectives. The reality is that altering the delicate power balance through diplomatic adjustment is an enormously complex task, for which a consensus is difficult to achieve. It is not sure whether this will be possible in the near term. Whatever one may say the existing five veto-wielding powers will be loath to give up any of their powers or share it with others. Prospective candidates for the other permanent membership seats, all have their regional rivals who can be expected to oppose them with varying intensity. On balance Model A is what may be possible, but Indian diplomacy has its work cut out.

*To view Part I of the report go to:
http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle1.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1620&status=article&mod=b